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Unfair Business Competition
I. INTRODUCTION
Two sectors in American society, private enterprise and the federal
government, are widely recognized as playing indispensable institutional
roles, and both are in obvious need of revenue to accomplish their respective
goals. The importance of a third sector-those institutions broadly subsumed
under the classification of private, nonprofit charitable organizations-should
not be undervalued relative to the other two, nor should its equally pressing
need for revenue be underestimated. Beginning early in American history,
private institutions have played a major role in attending to social needs. In
contrast to other countries where major institutions attending to social needs
are financed and operated by the government, many of the universities,
schools, scientific research organizations, hospitals, libraries, museums,
symphony orchestras, and social welfare agencies in the United States are
voluntarily supported and operated by private citizens.'
From the very beginning, tax law in the United States has recognized
the unique role played by private, nonprofit charitable organizations by
affording them exemption from tax.2 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code exempts from income tax organizations organized and
operated exclusively3 for religious, charitable,4 scientific, literary, or
1. See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in America:
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector 9 (1975); Note, Criticized Uses of Federal Tax Exemption
Privileges by Charitable Foundations and Educational Institutions, 98 U. Pa. L Rev. 696, 696-
97 (1950).
2. The Tariff Act of 1894, sec. 32, exempted from tax "corporations, companies,
or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes .... " Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, sec. 32, 28 Stat. 509. 556. The language was
carried over to the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, sec. II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114. 172. For a history
of the charitable exemption, see generally John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt?
(And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption For Private Educational Institutions), 35 Ariz. L Rev.
841, 844-45 (1993); Kenneth Liles & Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax
Treatment of Charities, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1975, at 6.
3. Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(I) (as amended in 1990) relaxes the "operated
exclusively" test by providing that an organization must engage primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more exempt purposes specified in IRC § 501(c)(3). For a critical analysis
of the Treasury Regulations, see Colombo, supra note 2. at 845-47.
4. Regs. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) provides in part:
The term "charitable" is used in section 501 (c)(3) in its generally accepted
legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate
enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may
fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial
decisions. Such terms include: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or
science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or
works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social
1996]
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educational purposes, testing for public safety, or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals.5 No part of the net earnings of such organizations
may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.6
Exemption from tax, nevertheless, has historically proved inadequate
as the sole means to generate sufficient revenue to enable the charitable sector
to make ends meet. In their never-ending quest for revenue, 501(3)(c)
organizations7 in the early decades of the twentieth century began to turn to
the commercial world in search of profitable ventures to support their exempt
activities, operating the ventures either directly or through wholly-owned
"feeder" corporations. Relying on a series of cases which held that the test
of tax exemption is the charitable destination of the income generated by
those ventures and not their commercial source, exempt organizations, most
especially universities, marched into the private enterprise sector with
increasing acceleration in the years following World War U. One of their
favorite ventures was the acquisition of real estate with borrowed funds, lease
of the property back to the vendor under a long-term lease, and amortization
of the loan with tax-free rental income received from the property.
Following hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means
in 1942 and 1947 and hearings before both the House and Senate Committees
in 1950 investigating the perceived growing abuse of the tax exemption,8 and
on President Truman's urging to curb the abuse,9 Congress reacted by
welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above
purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice
and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law;
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
5. IRC § 501(c)(3).
6. Additionally, no substantial part of the organization's activities can be carrying
on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the organization cannot
participate in, or interfere in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. IRC § 501(c)(3).
7. For purposes of this article, the term "501(c)(3) organization" means an
organization described in § 501(c)(3) that has as its primary function the conduct of an activity
in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The term does not include churches and other religious
organizations. The claim to exemption for these organizations rests on somewhat different
grounds.
8. Revenue Revisions of 1950: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on
H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter Senate Hearings of 1950]; Revenue
Revision of 1950: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1 (1950) [hereinafter House Hearings of 1950]; Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means on A Bill to Reduce Individual Income Tax Payments, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1895 (1947) [hereinafter Hearings of 1947]; Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
89 (1942) (statement of Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury).
9. 96 Cong. Rec. 769 (1950) (Message from the President of the United States).
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including in the Revenue Act of 1950'0 several solutions. These measures
abolished the tax exemption of feeder corporations, imposed an income tax
on the taxable income of unrelated businesses conducted directly by certain
exempt organizations primarily to raise revenue for their exempt purposes,
and taxed specified rents received in connection with the leveraged sale and
leaseback of real estate."
Forty-six years after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, a
number of issues remain to be resolved. This article explores the following
central questions: Should an income tax exemption be retained for "related"
businesses directly furthering the charitable purposes of 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions in the face of charges from the small business community of unfair
competition? Can 501(c)(3) organizations receive tax-free income from their
feeders and "unrelated" businesses without affording such businesses the
opportunity to compete unfairly with their taxable counterparts? Have the
Treasury Department and the courts applied appropriate criteria to differenti-
ate "related" from "unrelated" businesses conducted by 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions? Is the "substantially related" standard administerable? Are there
additional measures that can be taken to promote the integrity and financial
viability of the private, nonprofit charitable sector?
Central to the thesis of the article is the view, explored in Part II, that
the private, nonprofit charitable organization represents generically a better
model than the for-profit enterprise to provide the socially essential or
important activities enumerated in section 501(c)(3). The tax exemption
afforded to the charitable activities of nonprofit organizations is justified as
a means of subsidizing and encouraging an institutional system that has
historically fostered pluralism, diversity, and democratic decentralization in
American society.
Part III of the article describes the concurrent entry of 501(c)(3)
organizations into the private enterprise sector and explores the judicial
evolution of the "destination of income" theory which protects from tax the
income generated by commercial ventures used to support the organization's
exempt activities. There follows a broad description of the provisions
included in the Revenue Act of 1950 to curb the perceived abuses of the
exemption and subsequent amendments added by the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Although several commentators challenge the claim that untaxed
feeders and unrelated businesses enjoyed an advantage over their for-profit
taxpaying competition, this article assumes arguendo the validity of the unfair
competition rationale as justification for imposition of the new taxes.
10. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947-52
(1950).
11. IRC §§ 502, 511-14 (formerly IRC §§ 101, 421-423).
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Two questions underlie the discussion in Part lI. First, as an
alternative to paying the taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1950, and
assuming that appropriate limitations and safeguards are built into the
statutory system, could not the problem of unfair competition also be resolved
1) by requiring the feeder or unrelated business to charge competitive rates,
and 2) by granting the feeder or unrelated business the option to distribute a
combined amount equal to its tax liability plus an assumed adequate return
on investment to the 501(c)(3) organization to be used exclusively in
financing its charitable activities? Second, if such a statutory system were put
into effect, would the loss of federal tax revenue be justified by the social
benefits anticipated from the additional distribution to the 501(c)(3)
organization? Both questions are answered in the affimative.
Congress unwittingly created the framework for its own affirmative
response to the first question when it inserted into the Tax Reform Act of
1969 a piece of special interest legislation designed for the exclusive benefit
of radio station WWL, operated by Loyola University. The proposed
amendment to the statute, outlined in Appendix A of this article, is an attempt
to expand on the innovative motif of this special interest legislation. The
amendment does so by granting a feeder or unrelated business maintaining
competitive pricing a limited elective credit against tax for certain distribu-
tions to its 501(c)(3) owner to cover its current operating losses from the
conduct of activities related to the furtherance of its exempt purposes.
Assuming that the elective credit is as effective in eliminating the
potential for unfair competition as is payment of the tax to the government,
adoption of the credit can be viewed as a measure to replace diminished
revenue from public contributions and federal grants with a revenue source
that is within the control of the 501(c)(3) organization's wholly-owned
business benefactors. Adoption of the credit as a provision of universal
application, however, can be justified on the condition that the charitable
sector concomitantly addresses certain operational weaknesses in its various
subsectors by establishing the type of self-regulatory bodies responsible for
planning and oversight more fully described in Part V of the article. Alter-
natively, the elective credit can be more narrowly employed to enable and to
encourage the charitable sector to meet specific social goals such as the
delivery of essential goods and services to the needier segments of the public.
The focus in Part IV of the article shifts from an analysis of the
solutions offered by the 1950 and 1969 tax legislation regarding the problem
of unfair competition to an exploration of the legislative, regulatory, and
judicial evolution of two defining elements of the statute itself. First, for
purposes of the tax imposed by section 511 on the taxable income of an
unrelated trade or business conducted by a 501 (c)(3) organization, what is a
trade or business? Second, what is an unrelated trade or business?
[Vol. 3:7
Unfair Business Competition
Inasmuch as a trade or business substantially related to the perfor-
mance of the organization's exempt purposes should not have as its primary
purpose the making of profit, Subpart A of Part IV concludes that the
definition of the phrase "trade or business" as it evolved for the purpose of
allowing the deduction of business expenses under section 162, viz., an
activity conducted with an intent, or primary intent, to earn profit, is an
inappropriate standard for purposes of the tax imposed by section 511.
Defining trade or business more accurately as the sale of goods or the
performance of services at market value from which gross income is derived
encompasses activities whether designed principally to further the exempt
purposes of the organization or to earn profit. Accordingly, the reference to
section 162 in both the legislative history of the tax on unrelated business and
in Treasury regulations interpreting the statutory meaning of essential terms
have misled the courts into applying the "for profit" test in their attempt to
distinguish trade or business activity from other types of endeavors such as
fund raising conducted by section 501(c)(3) organizations.
Subpart B of Part IV explores both the primary motive test of the
1958 Treasury regulations and the "substantial causal relationship" tests of the
1967 regulations in their attempt to sort out whether or not a trade or
business is related or unrelated to the charitable purposes of the exempt
organization. Subpart B concludes that many courts slip back into applying
the 1958 subjective standard even after having recited the 1967 objective
standard as the one to apply. Subpart B further concludes that the error in
applying the "for profit" test to identify trade or business has misled a
number of courts into resolving the "related versus unrelated" issue by
focusing more on the existence of profit itself than on the causal connection
between the activity in question and the accomplishment of the organization's
exempt purposes. Additionally, courts have relied on other inaccurate
assumptions to conclude that an activity is an unrelated rather than related
trade or business. Subpart C of Part IV explores the issue of whether a
specific finding of unfair competition with a taxable entity engaged in a
similar activity should be a prerequisite to imposing the section 511 tax on
an unrelated trade or business.
In June of 1987 the Subcommittee On Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means held hearings to review the income-
producing activities of organizations exempt from income tax, to determine
whether the "substantially related" test was the appropriate one to determine
which income-producing activities should be taxed, and to ascertain the
degree of compliance with the law. The small business community used the
occasion to mount a vigorous attack, challenging the tax exemption afforded
to business activities related to the charitable purposes of 501 (c)(3) organiza-
tions and to question the effectiveness of the "substantially related" test in
differentiating related from unrelated business. Part V of the article addresses
19961
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the two primary issues presented by the 1987 House Hearings: is the
"substantially related" test an appropriate expression of tax policy and is it
a workable standard in differentiating exempt from taxable activities? Again,
both questions are answered in the affirmative.
The lesson to be learned from the 1987 House Hearings is that tax
exemption for "related" activities is no longer sacrosanct. The article con-
cludes with the proposal that the various subgroups of 501(c)(3) organizations
establish their own self-regulatory associations for the purpose of formulating
planning strategies, operational guidelines, and periodic review procedures to
monitor compliance with the law and the degree to which member organiza-
tions are efficiently providing social benefits to the public. It is virtually
imperative that the charitable sector seize the initiative to demonstrate
accountability to the public, to promote understanding of its unique role in
American society, and to restore public confidence in the tax exemption it
enjoys.
I. JUSTIFYING TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES OF
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Apparently acting on the assumption that the legitimacy of the tax
exemption afforded to private, nonprofit charitable organizations is self-
evident, Congress has through the years reenacted the provision with little
explanation for its justification.' 2 Although commentators have offered
several rationales to support the exemption, none is fully satisfactory. One
view, most fully developed by Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, is that the
exemption requires no affirmative justification as a special privilege in the tax
system.' 3 Rather, nonprofit organizations engaged in charitable, educational,
scientific, and social welfare activities are exempt from income tax because
the principles used in our tax system to compute gross income less business
expenses "rest on the premise that the organization seeks to maximize its
profit, and hence are not a satisfactory way of measuring the success of
organizations that reject this basic premise."' 4 In this view, such organiza-
tions do not derive taxable income as presently defined in the tax system.
Moreover, according to Bittker and Rahdert, even if charitable organizations
realized taxable income, there is no easy method to determine the appropriate
tax rate on such income because "the economic burden of the tax will fall on
12. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 845.
13. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 304 (1976).
14. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 307.
[VoL. 3:7
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the organization's ultimate beneficiaries"' 5 who are generally unknown at
the time the income is received by the organization. 6
Alternative rationales for the tax exemption afforded to 501(c)(3)
organizations view the exemption as an indirect governmental subsidy and a
concomitant loss of federal revenue that requires affirmative justification. 7
15. Id. at 315; see William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA
L. Rev. 13, 56 (1972) ("In my view, on the other hand, if one focuses (as one should) on the
effects achieved by imposing taxes on the income of charitable foundations, it is taxation rather
than nontaxation that appears to be unnatural and in need of special justification.").
16. Colombo, citing Henry Hansmann, criticizes this theory on the ground that it
is no more difficult to measure the income derived by a nonprofit organization from the sale
of goods and services than it is for any other business. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 859.
Maintaining that tuition and sales revenue received by educational institutions "fall squarely
within the definition of § 61," Colombo states: "In addition, aside from the profit motive issue,
the expenses of most educational institutions (teacher salaries, maintenance and the like) are
classic examples of deductible business expenses under I.R.C. § 162." Id. at 860. The profit
motive issue was precisely Bittker and Rahdert's point. It may be possible to come up with
a number that looks like "taxable income" derived by a nonprofit organization from the sale
of goods or services. The problem is that "taxable income" normally measures the results of
an enterprise seeking to maximize profits. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 307.
Hansmann argues that the most satisfactory explanation is to view the exemption as
a subsidy in recognition of the fact that nonprofit organizations (a) have difficulty raising
capital and (b) supply goods and services that would be undersupplied, or less efficiently
supplied, by the private market. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale LJ. 54, 55 (1981). Colombo is also
critical of Hansmann's capital subsidy theory. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 868-71. Colombo
states: "If nonprofit firms face capital formation problems sufficient to warrant government
intervention, a far more precise mechanism would be direct government construction grants,
government-assisted loans or tax incentives targeted at capital formation." Id. at 870. Those
who fear overdomination by the federal government and the entrapment of the nonprofit,
charitable sector into dependence on the prevailing political view in Washington may prefer
to stay with a stable income tax exemption than to rely on government subsidies. See also Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 501 (1990); Colombo.
supra note 2, at 871-73 (criticizing Atkinson's altruism theory).
17. The governmental subsidy resulting from tax exemption is not obvious unless
the 501(c)(3) organization realizes the equivalent of "taxable income." For example, assume
that a 501(c)(3) organization receives $50x from donations, SS0x interest and dividends from
investments, and S300x gross receipts from the operation of related activities for the taxable
year, and incurs $400x of "deductible" expenses in the operation of such activities. In this
case, the entire financial support is ostensibly received from the public and previously received
gifts and none from tax exemption. Alternatively, assume the same facts, except that the
"deductible" operating expense are $300x and the applicable tax rate is 35%. The equivalent
of taxable income is $100x and the tax savings resulting from exemption is S35x. Thus, S365x
financial support is received from the public and previously received gifts and S35x from the
federal subsidy. Compared to a taxable entity with S100x taxable income, the subsidy resulting
from the tax exemption allows the 501(c)(3) organization to lower prices by S35x or to
accumulate that amount. In either case, it is clear that exemption from tax as a governmental
subsidy works very imprecisely. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 863-64.
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In a rare Congressional pronouncement on the matter the House Committee
on Ways and Means, in 1938, observed that "the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."' 8 In other
words, the private, nonprofit charitable sector merits the tax savings afforded
by the exemption because the money foregone by the government would have
to have been appropriated by Congress to meet the very same public needs
being met by the charitable sector. 9 One of the difficulties with this quid-
pro-quo rationale for the exemption is its failure to address the alternative
possibility that the government could revoke the exemption, collect the
otherwise foregone tax, and use the revenue to meet the public needs now
being met by the 501(c)(3) sector.20 Obviously, the government would have
18. H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
19. "[U]nder this law, in view of the fact that bequests for public purposes operate
in aid of good government and perform by private means what ultimately would fall upon the
public, exemption from taxation is not so much a matter of grace or favor as rather an act of
public justice." Maurice Finkelstein, Freedom From Uncertainty In Income Tax Exemptions,
48 Mich. L. Rev. 449, 451 (1950) (quoting Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286, 288
(7th Cir. 1937)).
20. Some commentators view the revenue loss resulting from a tax incentive
designed to further a social goal (e.g., exemption from tax) as economically equivalent to the
government collecting the tax and allocating the revenue as a direct expenditure through
grants, loans, and guarantee of loans. These commentators look upon tax incentives with
disfavor because the foregone revenue is not explicitly accounted for in the federal budget and
there is consequently no public and legislative review of what is essentially a concealed federal
subsidy. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970);
Comment, Tax Incentives As State Action, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 414 (1973). Professors Bittker,
Surrey, and Hellmuth have vigorously debated the issue. See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting For
Federal "Tax Subsidies" In the National Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey
& William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 Nat'l
Tax J. 528 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply To Professors
Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 538 (1969).
This article views the § 501(c)(3) exemption from tax as a federal subsidy, imprecise
as it is, granted to broad classifications of socially essential or important activities conducted
by charitable, nonprofit organizations in part as an affirmation of the principle of decentraliza-
tion of institutionalized power in America. A shift in power from the charity to the federal
government implicit in the repeal of the exemption (i.e., the right to decide how to spend the
tax collected or whether even to spend it on 501(c)(3) type activities) contravenes this
principle. See Liles & Blum, supra note 2, at 56 ("Having come this far and having achieved
so much under a tax system which encourages private philanthropy, it would be a disaster if
we were at this late date to decide to junk the present system in favor of some untried scheme
of direct government subsidy or operation of all charity."); see also James T.Y. Yang,
Collaboration Between Nonprofit Universities and Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for
Exempting Nonprofit Universities from Federal Income Taxation, 95 Yale L.J. 1857, 1874
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to expend amounts far in excess of the foregone tax to meet the same public
need now being met by a tax exempt nonprofit charity."'
The most appealing rationale for the exemption, but one admittedly
resting on value judgments and assumptions that are difficult to test, justifies
the tax savings afforded by the exemption as the result of two fundamental
hypotheses: (1) profit motivated enterprise cannot be relied upon to meet the
essential or important public needs enumerated in section 501(c)(3) that have
been historically addressed by the private, nonprofit charitable sector, and (2)
any shift in revenue and decision-making power from the charitable sector to
the federal government implicit in the repeal of exemption could not be
accomplished without endangering the decentralized form of democracy as
it has developed in the United States. With respect to the first hypothesis, this
view assumes that if a for-profit business undertook to meet a social need
traditionally addressed by a 501(c)(3) organization, the primary goal of the
endeavor would be profit and the fulfillment of the social need would be but
the means to this end. If meeting the public need did not appear to be
profitable prospectively, or if it turned out to be unprofitable, the for-profit
business would not embark upon the endeavor or would later abandon it.
Moreover, in an effort to maximize the bottom line, the for-profit
business may be tempted to sacrifice the quality of the goods and services
offered to meet the public need. This point appears to cut against the classic
principle that only the best quality of goods and services serving a particular
market survive in a competitively free marketplace. The "free marketplace"
(1986) (arguing that universities are a better alternative to conduct basic scientific research
than the government because of the relative independence, freedom from sluggish and
expensive bureaucracy, encouragement of private philanthropy, and link to training).
The 501(c)(3) exemption from tax does not imply that Congress endorse the policies
of any given nonprofit, charitable organization. Comment, supra. at 463. "Indeed, to
characterize every grant of tax-exempt status as an approval of each underlying activity would
be to render the government's § 501(c)(3) approval policies nonsensical since the government
would often be endorsing various activities that work at complete cross purposes from one
another." Comment, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions And Tax Deductions For Donations
To 501(c)(3) Organizations On Statutory And Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L Rev. 156,
184 (1982). For example, both Planned Parenthood and "Pro-Life" organizations qualify under
§ 501(c)(3). Id. at 184 n.174.
21. See Bittker & Rahdert. supra note 13, at 332; Colombo, supra note 2, at 862-64.
Colombo states that "[t]he establishment and maintenance of institutions of higher education
is certainly not the responsibility of the federal government." Colombo. supra note 2 at 863,
quoting Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations:
Its History and Underlying Policy, in Research Papers Sponsored By The Commission On
Private Philanthropy And Public Needs 2025, 2033 (U. S. Dep't of the Treasury ed., 1977).
Colombo correctly points out that the scope of activities historically exempt from tax as
"educational" extends beyond what could be argued as being within the perimeters of
governmental responsibility. Id. at 864.
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principle nevertheless may not work to encourage private enterprise to offer
the best quality of goods and services of the type now offered by 501(c)(3)
organizations when consumers have difficulty forming an educated judgment
as to what they or society is receiving. 22 How, for example, would a for-
profit university's consumers judge the quality of the university's contribution
to literary scholarship or to pure scientific research?
By contrast, the raison d'8tre of private, nonprofit charitable
organizations described in section 501(c)(3) is to address a category of public
needs designated by Congress as essential or important, and not to earn profit
for the benefit of its owners or other individuals. A 501(c)(3) organization is
less likely to abandon its activities for lack of profit, and there is far less
temptation to sacrifice quality for the bottom line.' Further, the amount of
public financial support received by a 501(c)(3) organization, an indication
of its relevant success in addressing a public need, extends beyond the
revenue received from the consumers of its goods and services to include
gifts from private citizens, corporations, and foundations and the income
derived from the investment of previously received donations.
In this view of the exemption there is an essential democratic
decentralization implicit in the opportunity afforded to private citizens of
diverse religious, ethnic, and racial backgrounds and with different economic,
political, and social agendas to contribute their time and money to the
22. Hansmann calls this "contract failure." See Hansmann, supra note 16, at 69;
Dennis Zimmerman, Nonprofit Organizations, Social Benefits, and Tax Policy, 44 Nat'l Tax
J. 341, 342 (1991):
Here the problem is one of an essentially private good about which the
seller possesses much more information than the buyer, leading to a
possibility that the buyer will be taken advantage of by the profit-
motivated seller .... Nursing homes and mental treatment facilities are
thought to be good examples of services that fit this profile. In such
instances, the nondistribution constraint on nonprofit organizations (the
prohibition against surplus or profit being distributed to board members or
managers) supposedly reduces the incentive for the service provider to take
advantage of the consumer's informational disadvantage.
Additionally, some commentators argue that private enterprise cannot supply a sufficient
quantity of its goods or services in cases where they are consumed collectively by the public.
See id. at 341-42.
23. For a contrary view, see Colombo, supra note 2, at 866 n.149 ("One can argue,
in fact, that for-prcfit institutions are likely to be more responsive to community needs, since
for-profits rely on customer patronage for financial success, and customer patronage requires
selling a product the customer wants."). Colombo argues that "the existence of for-profit
private schools also would increase parental choice, educational opportunity and promote
diversity." Colombo, Id. at 866. The primary problem presented by the private enterprise
sector, however, is not lack of diversity, but lack of reliability if the enterprise turned out to
be unprofitable.
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privately controlled nonprofit charitable organization of their choice in an
effort to meet public needs and to promote controversial causes. It is precisely
this pluralism, diversity, and opportunity for private philanthropy and public
service extending beyond the power structure of the federal government that
not only allows for creativity and innovation in the resolution of social issues,
but also serves as a counterweight to the power and wealth of both the
government and for-profit enterprise. 24 In this view, one that is accepted by
this article, as a general principle the subsidization, encouragement, and
preservation of the private, nonprofit charitable sector as an essential
institutional provider of public goods and services justifies the loss of revenue
by the federal government resulting from the exemption from tax afforded
501(c)(3) organizations.' This view of the exemption does not mean to
24. For an eloquent expression of this view, see Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax
Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a National Policy, 1968
U.S. Cal. Tax Inst. 27, 39-40; see also Yang, supra note 20.
25. Building on Hansmann's theory that nonprofit organizations spring up when the
private market fails to function properly, Colombo proposes his donative theory to explain the
exemption. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 873-87. Under this theory, tax exemption is
deserved only when there is both private market failure and governmental failure to provide
the desired goods and services at an optimal level. Id. at 874. Government failure occurs
because the majority of the legislators will not vote for certain goods and services desired by
a minority bloc; however, the majority will permit a partial subsidy of such goods and services
in the form of a tax exemption in the expectation that they will receive like treatment for their
own special interests. Id. at 874-75. The best evidence of this twin failure, according to
Colombo, is "donations by more than a de minimis number of individuals to a given entity.
Where neither the private markets nor the government supplies a good or service at an
optimum level of production, high-demanders have no choice but to donate to the supplying
entity to encourage more production." Id. at 876. Exemption is deserved only when donations
constitute a prescribed minimum percentage of the nonprofit organization's total support, e.g.,
10 to 33% in the case of educational institutions. The donative theory, according to Colombo,
is "the key to an objective, administrable standard for granting exemption." Id. at 873-74.
Colombo's theory raises several questions. Why is not the public's purchase of
nonprofit organizations' "related" goods and services also an indication of this twin failure?
What would happen to the required minimum charitable donation percentage if a flat tax
eliminating a deduction for charitable contributions were adopted? Will the minimum required
charitable deduction percentage cause charitable organizations to allocate an undue percentage
of their budget to fundraising? Colombo asks: "Would Harvard really go out of business if it
were not tax exempt?" Id. at 867. Why not ask the same question in cases where donations
constitute 33% of a university's total support, indicating, in Colombo's view, that the
university deserves exemption?
More fundamentally, Colombo is compelled to quantify the standard for exemption
because he erroneously tests what he calls the "community benefit theory" against specific
nonprofit charitable organizations rather than against the nonprofit, charitable sector as a
whole. See id. at 864-68. The "community benefit theory" justifies the exemption as the result
of two assumptions: (1) private enterprise cannot be relied upon to meet the public needs
enumerated in § 501(c)(3); and (2) the shift in revenue and power from the charitable sector
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suggest that the federal government should not concomitantly devote its
financial resources to the meeting of public needs and the resolution of
essential social issues.
III. THE PROBLEM OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND ITS RESOLUTION:
TAX THE INCOME DESTINED FOR CHARITY OR
DISTRIBUTE THE TAX WITH THE INCOME?
A. Bath Houses, Noodles and Piston Rings in the Service of Charity
In the year 1913, the income of the legal representative of an ancient
religious order located in the Philippines consisted primarily of rents from its
real estate holdings, dividends from stocks, interest on loans, and negligibly
of proceeds from the sale of wine, chocolate, and other articles.26 Stipulating
that the legal representative was an exempt charitable organization organized
and operated under the predecessor of section 501(c)(3) and that its income
was used exclusively to carry out its religious, charitable, and educational
work, the tax collector argued nonetheless that the organization was operated
to the federal government implicit in the repeal of the exemption would be an undesirable
encroachment upon the form of decentralized power as it developed in the United States. Thus,
the "special qualities" or "special ethic" that Colombo seeks can be found in the private,
nonprofit, charitable sector as a whole rather than in any particular organization. As an initial
matter, a particular nonprofit organization "deserve[s]" the exemption if it is organized and
operated primarily to further one or more of the activities enumerated in § 501(c)(3) and
complies with the section's additional requirements. Id. at 865.
Whether a particular organization is in fact being operated primarily to further its
stated purposes, or is in violation of a prohibited rule, is quite another matter that needs to be
addressed by compliance procedures. It is also another matter whether Treasury Regulations
are sufficiently precise (or an appropriate expression of social policy) in their attempt to
delimit the scope of activities that fall within the broad classifications enumerated in
§ 501(c)(3). It can also be questioned whether the Treasury Department should be the agency
issuing the regulations, or whether the Internal Revenue Service should be the agency
interpreting the regulations and enforcing compliance.
Rather than audit a particular exempt organization to determine whether it is being
operated primarily to further its stated purposes, or is in violation of a prohibited rule,
Colombo prefers, and attempts to formulate, a quantitative test for granting and maintaining
the exemption to be applied on an entity-by-entity basis. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 873-
87. But see Richard Steinberg, "Unfair" Competition By Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 Nat'l
Tax J. 351, 361-62 (1991):
The burden of proof should not fall upon each individual [nonprofit] to
justify its exemption. [Nonprofit]s innovate and experiment, and not every
experiment is a success. Successful innovations (such as day care,
hospitals, drug-addiction therapy, and universities) have often been picked
up by government or for-profits after [nonprofits] have demonstrated their
viability; "inefficient" subsidies may be the price we have to pay for the
next breakthrough.
26. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 579-80 (1924).
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also for business purposes and that it should pay tax on the income from its
commercial activities.27 The tax collector lost in both the trial and appellate
courts.' The Supreme Court affirmed in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden.29 The
case is notable for its governing principle, one that would prevail for the next
twenty-four years: the destination, not the source, of the income of a corpo-
ration organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
or educational purposes is the ultimate test of exemption." Charitable activi-
ties, the Court observed, cannot be carried on without money:3 "Evidently,"
said the Court, "the exemption is made in recognition of the benefit which
the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is
intended to aid them when not conducted for private gain."32
If Trinidad left any doubt as to whether the destination of income
principle applied to a full-blown business operated for the benefit of a
charitable organization, the confusion was dispelled by the Second Circuit in
Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Cormnissioner.3 Roche's Beach, Inc. was a feeder
corporation organized to operate a bathing beach business and to turn over
its profits to a tax-exempt charitable foundation for the relief of destitute
women and children. 4 The business, operated by 34 employees during the
summer, consisted of 3000 bath houses to be rented to transient bathers, plus
suit and towel rentals, restaurant and refreshment concessions, and other
property rentals.35 Citing Trinidad, the Court held that a feeder corporation
was exempt from income tax even though it conducted business activities for
profit and did not itself engage in charitable endeavors.'
In 1947, a New York University School of Law alumni group
orchestrated the purchase of C.F. Mueller Company, one of the country's
leading noodle manufacturers, for the benefit of the School of Law." The
group organized a Delaware corporation for the "charitable" purpose of oper-
ating the noodle business and distributing its dividends to the University for
the benefit of the School of Law, a tax-exempt educational institution.3" The
Delaware corporation borrowed $3,550,000 under a 15-year loan from the
Prudential Insurance Company, purchased all of the outstanding stock of the
27. Id. at 580-8 1.
28. Id. at 579.
29. Id. at 578.
30. Id. at 581.
31. Id.
32. Id. For an analysis of the case, see Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 453-57.
33. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
34. Id. at 776-77.
35. Id. at 777.
36. Id. at 779. For an analysis of the case. see Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 457-59.
37. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1951).
38. Id.
19961
Florida Tax Review
existing taxable New Jersey company for $3,495,057.60 and then merged the
Delaware corporation into itself.39 The Internal Revenue Bureau challenged
the tax exemption of the feeder corporation; but the Third Circuit reversed the
Tax Court, which had found for the Commissioner, because the Court of
Appeals could not distinguish the case from Roche's Beach.40 Although it
was by no means the largest of the acquisitions of taxable businesses for the
benefit of a tax-exempt charitable organization, the purchase of a well-known
noodle company engineered by benefactors of the N.Y.U. School of Law was
perhaps the most notorious. Furthermore, it served as an alarming example
for those who were becoming concerned with the rapidity with which tax-
exempt organizations, especially colleges and universities, were entering the
world of commercial enterprise.
In point of fact, the purchase of C.F. Mueller Company was but one
of four acquisitions on behalf of New York University over a relatively few
years. The other three were Howes Leather Company, valued at $35,000,000;
American Limoges China, Inc., valued at $3,300,000; and the Ramsey Corpo-
ration, manufacturer of piston rings, valued at $3,000,000.4 1 On December
13, 1948, The New York Times ran a story entitled "University Dollars
Yielding Tax-Free Business Profits," in which it was reported that other types
of businesses had been acquired for the benefit of various educational institu-
tions across the country, including a cattle ranch, an English walnut grove,
filling stations, a street car company, a citrus grove, and an airport.
41
By far the most widespread practice that had developed during the
post-World War II era, however, was the acquisition of commercial real
estate by colleges and universities, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
39. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 922, 923-24 (1950), rev'd, 190 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1951).
40. C.F. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 121-23, rev'g 14 T.C. 922 (1950); cf. Willingham v.
Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950) (corporation originally
organized as for-profit entity and later reorganized as not-for-profit held to be tax-exempt); but
cf. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 465 (7th Cir.) (for-profit corporation
reorganized into "research fund" trust held to be not tax-exempt), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850
(1950).
41. See House Hearings of 1950, supra note 8, at 780, 799 (statement of Solomon
Barkin).
42. Benjamin Fine, University Dollars Yielding Tax-Free Business Profits, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1948, at Al, A29. The Times article was one of a number of articles
publicizing the perceived abuse of the tax exemption. Two years later, both the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance held hearings. House
Hearings of 1950, supra note 8; Senate Hearings of 1950, supra note 8; see also Comment,
Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 Yale L.J. 851, 851 (1951) ("[Congress,
however,] lacked precise information ... regarding the extent to which exempt organizations
are operating commercial enterprises."); Note, supra note 1, at 698-700 (providing examples
of "criticized activities of educational institutions").
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properties that included the real estate of the country's largest department
store chain, warehouses, shopping centers, office buildings, and apartment
houses.43 Most often, the purchased property was leased back to the seller
under a long-term lease. In many cases the educational organization borrowed
the entire purchase price for the property and amortized the loan with the tax-
free rental income received from the vendor-lessee.' In its report accompa-
nying the bill to enact the Revenue Act of 1950, the House Committee on
Ways and Means commented: "The purchase and lease-back arrangement
apparently is of recent origin. Nevertheless, it has already become big
business and a recent writer has characterized it as 'the most noteworthy,
financial device of the present century."' 4
B. The Revenue Act of 1950
In his message to Congress in 1950, President Truman noted that
"[s]ome tax loopholes" had emerged "through the abuse of the tax exemption
accorded educational and charitable organizations." '46 It was not his purpose,
said President Truman, to change the policy supporting the exemption.
Rather, his concern was that "an exemption intended to protect educational
activities [had] been misused in a few instances to gain competitive advantage
over private enterprise through the conduct of business and industrial
operations entirely unrelated to educational activities.4 7 President Truman
urged Congress to close the tax loopholes as part of his plan "to improve the
fairness of the tax system, to bring in some additional revenue, and to
strengthen [the] economy."' '
Congress responded by including three measures in the Revenue Act
of 1950, designed to curb the perceived abuse of the tax exemption. Effective
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950, the predecessors to
Code sections 511-513 imposed the regular corporate income tax on the
taxable income (gross income less directly connected deductions) of any trade
or business regularly carried on"0 by certain tax-exempt organizations, "the
conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such
organization[s] for income or funds or the use [they make] of the profits
derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization[s] of [their]
43. Fine, supra note 42, at A29.
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950).
45. Id.
46. 96 Cong. Rec. 769, 771 (1950) (message from the President to the United
States).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 769.
49. See IRC § 511(a)(1). The individual income tax rate was imposed on the
unrelated business income of certain tax-exempt trusts. See IRC § 511 (b)(1).
50. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for
[their] exemption."'" Included among the organizations subject to the new
tax were religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational organiza-
tions, and organizations established for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals; but excluded were churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches.52
Also excluded from the reach of the tax on unrelated trade or
business was "passive" investment income received by section 501(c)(3)
organizations, i.e., all dividends, interest, annuities, royalties (including
overriding royalties) whether measured by production or by gross or taxable
income, rents from real property (including personal property leased with real
property), except certain rents on property acquired with borrowed funds, and
gains or losses from the disposition of property other than inventory or
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the
trade or business.53 A 5% (of unrelated business net income) charitable
contribution deduction was allowed in computing the taxable income of the
unrelated trade or business, provided the contribution was not made to the
organization operating the unrelated business. 4 A $1,000 specific deduction
was allowed in order to eliminate de minimis cases involving excessive costs
of collection and payment.55
Under the second measure included in the Revenue Act of 1950, the
predecessor to Code section 502, a feeder organization operated for the
primary purpose of conducting a trade or business for profit was no longer
51. IRC § 513(a) (formerly IRC §§ 421, 422).
52. See IRC §§ 511(a)(2) (formerly § 421(b)), 501(a), (c)(3), 508(c)(1)(A). Also
subject to the tax were certain other categories of exempt organizations, including labor,
agricultural, and horticultural organizations and business and trade associations. See id.
§ 501(c)(5)-(6). For a more detailed discussion of the judicial and regulatory developments
prior to 1950, and the legislative history of the 1950 Act, see Comment, supra note 42. See
also John H. Myers, Taxing the Colleges, 38 Cornell L. Rev. 368 (1953); Kenneth C.
Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)-How Much Unrelated Business
Activity?, 21 Tax L. Rev. 53 (1965); Liles & Blum, supra note 2, at 41-48.
53. See IRC § 512(b)(l)-(5) (formerly § 422(a)). IRC § 512(b)(7)-(9) excludes all
income derived from research: for the United States or any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
or any state or political subdivision; performed by a college, university, or hospital; or
performed by an organization operated primarily for the purpose of carrying on "fundamental"
research benefitting the general public. See id. § 512(b)(7)-(9) (formerly § 422(a)(7)-(8)(B)).
For a discussion of the exclusion for research, see Myers, supra note 52, at 381-84.
54. See IRC § 512(b)(10) (formerly § 422(a)(9)(A)). The charitable contribution
deduction currently allowed is 10%. Id. The requirement that the contribution be made to
another charity can be traced to the House and Senate Reports of the Revenue Act of 1950.
See H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 44, at 111; S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 109
(1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 3053.
55. See IRC § 512(b)(12) (formerly § 421(c)).
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exempt from income tax on the ground that all of its profits were payable to
one or more tax-exempt organizations.5 6
Under the third measure, the predecessor to Code section 514,
designed to combat the "lease-back problem," rental income received by a
501(c)(3) organization from the lease of real property for more than five
years (including options to extend) was subject to the new tax if, at the close
of the lessor's taxable year, there existed unpaid debt incurred by the lessor
in acquiring or improving the leased property.' The amount of such rent
included in the gross income of the tax-exempt organization was the same
proportion of the total rent received during the taxable year as the amount of
the borrowed funds at the end of the year bore to the adjusted basis of the
property at the end of the year.5" A proportionate amount of real property
taxes paid during the taxable year with respect to the leased property, interest
paid on the debt, and depreciation were allowed in computing the net income
from the lease.59 The tax applied whether or not the vendor of the property
to the exempt organization and the lessee were the same person.
C. Unfair Competition: The Rationale For the Tax on Unrelated Business
Income
1. Unfair Competition for Market Share.-As explained by the
House Committee on Ways and Means, the problem that had developed
which necessitated the imposition of the tax on unrelated business income of
certain otherwise exempt organizations, as well as the elimination of the
exemption of feeder organizations, was primarily one of unfair competition;
i.e., such businesses were in direct competition with their taxable counter-
parts: "The tax-free status of these [501(c)(3)] organizations enables them to
use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can
56. See IRC § 502 (formerly § 101). Educators testifying before Congress did not
resist this measure, but vigorously opposed taxing unrelated businesses operated directly by
educational institutions. See Comment, supra note 42, at 876-77 n.1 12; Myers. supra note 52,
at 375. At the same time, the consensus of educators was that their institutions should refrain
from engaging in commercial enterprises. See Comment, supra note 42, at 877 n. 112.
57. See IRC § 514 (formerly § 423).
58. See IRC § 514(a)(1). Assume, for example, that an educational institution
purchased property for $500,000 and leased it for a period of 20 years, and the adjusted basis
of such property at the close of the first taxable year was also S500.000. If the institution
borrowed $200,000 to acquire the property, because this is two-fifths of the adjusted basis,
two-fifths of the rental income received from the leased property would enter into the
computation of unrelated business net income. If, in a subsequent year, the indebtedness were
reduced to $100,000, assuming the adjusted basis were still $500,000, one-fifth of the rental
income would be included as an item of gross income in computing the unrelated business net
income. Id.
59. See id. § 514(a)(2), (3) (formerly § 423(d)(3)).
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expand only with the profits remaining after taxes."' In confining the scope
of the new tax to unrelated business income, Congress chose to leave the
basic exemption of the 501(c)(3) organization intact and did not restrict such
organizations' rights to acquire and operate businesses unrelated to their
charitable purposes. Only if operating a business for profit became an
organization's primary activity would there be a danger of losing the
underlying exemption.61
The problem thus stated by the House Committee on Ways and
Means underplayed the extent of the concern making its way through the
Congress of 1950. To illustrate the extent of the perceived problem, assume
that a well-recognized university invests one million dollars of its endowment
fund by purchasing all of the stock of an ice cream manufacturing corpora-
tion. The corporation merges into a new corporation designed to turn over all
of its profits to the university, and the new corporation is exempt from
corporate income tax under the Trinidad "destination of income" test. Assume
for purposes of this discussion that taxable income equals cash profit and that
both the corporate and individual income tax rates are 35%. If both the feeder
organization and a taxable corporate competitor owned by taxable share-
holders earn $100x profit for the taxable year from the sale of ice cream of
comparable quality, the feeder obviously has the ability to retain $35x more
than its taxable competitor after the latter's payment of the corporate income
tax. If both the feeder and the competitor are passthrough entities or
unincorporated businesses, the feeder still has the ability to retain $35x
additional profit because its university owner is tax-exempt, whereas the
competitor presumably will be required to distribute $35x to the taxable
investors to cover their tax on the passed-through income.
60. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 44, at 36. The rationale for exempting
§ 501(c)(3) organizations from tax also served to justify the continued exemption of related
businesses, even though they might compete with taxable entities. See Note, The Macaroni
Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1284 (1968) [hereinafter The Macaroni Monopoly].
61. Regs. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(e)(1) states:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501 (c)(3) although
it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the
operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's
exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or
operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or
business, as defined in section 513.
For discussion of the potential threat business activity poses to the § 501(c)(3) exemption
itself, see Eliasberg, supra note 52; Norman A. Sugarman & Harlan Pomeroy, Business Income
of Exempt Organizations, 46 Va. L. Rev. 424 (1960); Comment, Preventing the Operation of
Untaxed Business By Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581 (1965); Note,
Profitable Related Business Activities and Charitable Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), 44
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 270 (1976).
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The feeder has several options with respect to its $35x additional
profit. It can temporarily reduce or eliminate the additional profit by selling
at a lower price the same quality ice cream as sold by the taxable competi-
tor. 2 It can maintain its price and allocate the $35x to research and
development, invent a better ice cream, and sell the improved product at the
same price as the taxable competitor's product. It can retain the $35x to tide
it over in difficult times. Or it can spend the additional $35x to modernize
production facilities, expand marketing efforts, or improve distribution
systems. Accordingly, there is the potential that the exempt feeder will be
able to eat into the profits of its taxable competitor, or drive the competitor
out of business altogether. The feeder, in fact, may be able to increase market
share enough to eat into the profits of several taxable competitors, and
perhaps even comer the ice cream manufacturing market by driving all of its
tax-paying competitors out of business. If one tax-exempt unrelated business
of one university has the potential to accomplish this economic feat, think of
what hundreds of tax exempt unrelated businesses of hundreds of universities
could do to their taxable competitors. The free enterprise system would move
to the top of the list of endangered species.63
62. Commentators disagree as to whether income tax has an impact on the price of
a product. See Comment, supra note 42, at 876 (noting that the exempt organization's
advantage declines proportionately as prices are cut lower and lower), Comment. supra note
61, at 591 ("Yet under competitive conditions all firms in an industry produce until the cost
of another unit of output equals the additional revenue it will bring. Because an income tax
is levied only on profits, it will not be relevant in determining when that equalzation point is
reached."); The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1281 (describing how an exempt
organization might win a price war by driving taxable competitors' return on investment so
low that investors would restrict their investments to fields in which there were no tax-exempt
players; however, a number of factors make such a price war unlikely). Klein. supra note 15,
at 64-65 (arguing that it is unlikely that feeders will lower prices to drive out competition);
Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax. 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1430, 1465-66 (1980) (§ 501(c)(3) organizations, typically pressed for current
income, are unlikely to cut prices to drive out competition). But see Finkelstein, supra note
19, at 460:
Profit itself, we are told, enters into the determination to undertake
enterprises and is an element in the determination of prices; and if such be
the case, it is obvious that a tax levy on profits would be an important
element in the consideration of the price structure, and the exemption from
the income tax would be a substantial benefit to a competitor.
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation. 34 Stan. L
Rev. 1017, 1023 (1982) (in either a competitive market or an oligopolistic industry the
presence of nonprofits could lower prices).
63. Some commentators find this scenario overly simplistic. See Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 62, at 1022-38 (maintaining that tax-exempts may or may not have an unfair
advantage over their taxpaying competition, depending on such factors as the efficiency of
capital markets, excessive entry of nonprofits into an industry, the degree to which the business
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The basic premise of this scenario is that the exempt feeder will
retain all or a part of the additional $35x profit and reinvest it in business
operations or lower prices to the detriment of its taxable competitor. The
Commissioner stipulated in Roche's Beach, however, that any excess of
income over expenses earned by the feeder in that case was in fact turned
over to the foundation for its charitable purposes.' Assume that the feeder
in the above example distributes its $100x profit to the university rather than
reinvesting any part of it in business operations and the university uses the
distributed amount to conduct its educational activities, i.e., does not directly
or indirectly reinvest an equivalent amount of cash or property back into the
feeder. Having distributed its additional $35x profit to its university owner,
the feeder is no longer in a position to compete unfairly with its taxable
competitor for market share. If the feeder were required to distribute its entire
profit to the university for its educational purposes, the taxable competitor
would now in fact be in a position to compete unfairly with the feeder, i.e.,
the taxable competitor would have available $65x more than the feeder to
reinvest in business operations.
Alternatively, assume that the feeder is required to distribute to the
university for its educational purposes only an amount equal to the tax
liability of its taxable competitor ("tax equivalent amount"), i.e., $35x.
Although neither business appears at first glance to have retained a competi-
tive advantage over the other, subsequent dynamics could swing the
advantage back to the feeder. The feeder, for instance, would regain an
advantage if the taxable competitor was impelled to distribute a dividend to
its shareholders, e.g., $15x. In that case the feeder would have available $65x
retained income for business operations compared to the taxable competitor's
activities of nonprofits are diffused, the exit costs faced by taxable businesses from an
industry, the foreseeability of nonprofit competition at the time the taxable entity entered the
industry, and the degree to which taxable oligopolists are already earning super competitive
profits in an industry). The author concludes that the tax on unrelated businesses of nonprofits
caused their profitable activities to be concentrated into areas deemed related, which
concentration allowed them to inflict losses on their taxpaying competition. Id. at 1038. But,
why is this undesirable? Presumably, Congress sanctioned the competitive advantage related
businesses enjoyed with respect to their taxpaying competition in recognition of the unique
role played by the private, nonprofit charitable sector in American society. See The Macaroni
Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1282 ("Even in an industry with inelastic demand the untaxed
business will be able to invest in improvements at a faster rate than its competitors."); Klein,
supra note 15, at 61-64 (Congress "responded to a paranoid delusion" when it bought the
unfair competition argument because (a) allowing a feeder to go untaxed will not affect the
economic behavior of either the feeder or its taxable competition, (b) investors in a taxable
competitor will not shift investments to the feeder because they would have to give their assets
to charity to do so, and (c) the feeder will not be induced to expand because the taxable
competitor's supply to the market will not decline.).
64. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 777 (1938).
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$50x (after payment of a $35x tax to the government and a S15x distribution
to shareholders). In order to eliminate its potential competitive advantage, the
feeder would have to distribute to the university not only a tax equivalent
amount, but also an additional amount approximating an adequate return on
investment to the shareholders of the taxable competitor.
Assume that the feeder is required to distribute to the university both
a tax equivalent amount plus an amount representing an adequate return on
investment. The university would be in a position to regain its competitive
advantage by directly or indirectly reinvesting the tax equivalent amount back
into the feeder as a capital contribution or loan. A statutory provision would
have to be devised to prevent such a reinvestment. Further, with the
university receiving a greater return on investment than the shareholders of
the taxable competitor (equal to the tax equivalent amount), the feeder would
be in the position to lower its prices and still have the ability to distribute to
the university a greater return on investment than could its taxable competi-
tion. A further statutory provision, therefore, would have to be devised to
insure that the feeder maintained competitive prices.
2. Capital Market Competition at the Investor Level.-Apart from
the fear of the 1950 Congress that unrelated businesses operated by 501 (c)(3)
organizations had the potential to compete unfairly with their taxable
competitors for market share, was there concern as well with the potential
that such tax-exempt organizations were in a position to compete unfairly as
investors in the capital markets even if competition for market share at the
operational level were made fair?
As explained by the House Committee on Ways and Means,
dividends, interest, royalties, rents (other than on property acquired with
borrowed funds), and gains on sales were not subject to the tax on unrelated
business income because investments producing such "passive" income used
for exempt purposes had "long been recognized as proper for educational and
charitable organizations.""5 Furthermore, explained the Senate Committee on
Finance, because such types of income are passive in character they "are not
likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar
income."6
65. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 44, at 38.
66. S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54, at 30-3 1. reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. at 3083.
For cases dealing with the "active" versus "passive" income issue, see Disabled Am. Veterans
v. Comnmissioner, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'g 94 T.C. 60 (1990); Fraternal Order of
Police, Illinois State Troopers v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987). aff g 87 T.C.
747 (1986); Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981); National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 456 (1989). rev'd on other grounds. 914
F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990); National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75 (1989);
See also Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.
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Two conclusions can be drawn from the Committee explanations.
First, by creating an artificial distinction between active and passive
investments and by categorizing rent received from the lease of real property
as passive, the 1950 Congress presumably was unconcerned that an exempt
organization's tax free rental income could put it in a position to compete
unfairly in the rental market by lowering the rent, improving the property, or
paying a higher purchase price for additional real property than could be
offered by a taxable investor. Nor was there apparent concern that the
combination of tax-free current income and freedom from capital gains tax
on an eventual sale of the real property could put the exempt organization in
a position to accept a lower sales price.67
The second conclusion is that the 1950 Congress was unconcerned
that a 501(c)(3) organization's exempt dividends, interest, and capital gains
could put it in a position to compete unfairly as an investor in the capital
markets by either driving the rate of return down or by outbidding taxable
investors for the investment. 8
67. See Thomas J. Gallagher, III, The Taxation of Investments By Pension Funds
and Other Tax-Exempt Entities, 67 Taxes 981, 990 (1989) ("In Rev. Rul. 69-574 and later in
Rev. Rul. 78-88, the IRS supported an 'active' versus 'passive' analysis for determining
whether a given level of activity constituted a trade or business for purposes of calculating an
entity's UBTI."); see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 319 ("Moreover, the labels 'active'
and 'passive' were accepted as though they denoted self-defining and clear-cut compartments,
although in fact the spectrum of profit-oriented activity is not readily bisected.").
68. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 319.
Equally mysterious was the unarticulated but widely accepted assumption
that charities would compete unfairly with their taxable rivals in "active"
manufacturing and mercantile pursuits, but not in "passive" investment
areas. No one suggested, for example, that charities would lend their
endowment funds or rent their real estate for less than the going rate, and
thus drive private investors in these areas out of business .... Nor was
there any discussion of the possibility that, if charities increased their
ownership of active business enterprises, they would correspondingly
reduce their ownership of marketable securities and other passive invest-
ments and, hence, compete less vigorously with taxable investors for these
assets.
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 319.
For the view that there was no clear rationale for exempting "passive" income, see
Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1466 ("Thus, the unrelated business income tax lacks a consistent
economic underpinning. Rather, it is a political compromise that keeps certain customary
sources of income-interests, dividends, rents, and the like-tax-free and eliminates the
perceived tax advantages of actively conducting 'unrelated' commercial operations."). See also
Note, supra note 1, at 705-706; Gallagher, supra note 67, at 989-92 (mentioning several
alternative theories to support the full or partial exemption of investment income received by
§ 501(c)(3) organizations: (1) inasmuch as contributions to such organizations are deductible
and thus excluded from the tax base, the investment earnings from the contributions should
be excluded as well; (2) if a portion of a contribution is not deductible, the same proportion
[Vol 3:7
Unfair Business Competition
Thus, although both an incorporated feeder and its incorporated
competitor are required to pay corporate income tax subsequent to the
Revenue Act of 1950, the 501(c)(3) organization, unlike the taxable
shareholders of the competitor, is in a position to receive dividends from the
feeder tax-free and to sell its shares of stock in the feeder free of capital gains
tax. Similarly, although the section 511 tax imposed by Congress on the
income of an unincorporated, unrelated business conducted by a 501(c)(3)
organization, or by a wholly-owned pass-through entity, prevented the
501(c)(3) organization from receiving larger distributions of tax-free current
income from the business for nonbusiness use than could be received by a
taxable investor, the charity was still in a position to realize a higher total
return on the investment by eventually selling the noninventory assets of the
unrelated business free of capital gains tax.
Assume that the 1950 Congress had elected to level the playing field
for market share competition by requiring the feeder to maintain competitive
prices and by affording the feeder an option to distribute a tax equivalent
amount plus an amount representing an adequate return on investment to the
501(c)(3) organization for its exempt purposes as an alternative to the
imposition of the corporate tax. If the feeder in the previous example receives
$100x taxable income from the sale of ice cream and distributes to the
university for its educational purposes a tax equivalent amount of $35x plus
an additional $15x representing an adequate return on investment, the
university would receive the entire $50x undiminished by tax. On the other
hand, the taxable shareholders of the competitor who receive an equivalent
$15x return on investment in the form of a dividend would, in the assumed
35% tax bracket, retain only $9.75x. Had the feeder been required to pay
federal income tax and had both the feeder and its taxable competitor
declared a $15x dividend, the exempt university would have retained $15x
of the dividend and the taxable shareholders of the competitor would have
retained $9.75x.
Alternatively, assume that in lieu of the section 511 tax, an unrelated
business wholly-owned by a 501(c)(3) organization or conducted through a
of investment earnings therefrom should not be excluded; (3) citing George Break & Joseph
A. Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 Nat'l Tax
J. 341,344 (1975), a moderate tax on investment income would "reduce their ability to finance
activities not directly supported by the public"; (4) citing Hansmann, supra note 16, the
exemption promotes efficiency in areas underserved by the private sector and compensates for
nonprofits' lack of access to equity capital). "The contrary argument, that the earnings should
be exempt because they are used in furtherance of the entity's exempt purpose recalls the
destination of income test rejected in the 1950s legislation." Gallagher, supra note 67, at 991.
It is the position of this article that Congress should have been able to live with the destination
of income test had the problem of unfair competition been resolved through distribution of the
tax on feeders and unrelated businesses to the § 501(c)(3) organization for its exempt purposes.
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wholly-owned pass-through entity is afforded the same option to maintain
competitive prices, and to distribute a tax equivalent amount plus an amount
representing an adequate return on investment to the exempt organization for
its charitable purposes. If both the unrelated business and the competitor
owned by taxable investors earn $100x taxable income for the taxable year
from a sale of ice cream of comparable quality and both distribute $50x to
their respective owners, the university will retain the entire $50x undimin-
ished by tax and the taxable investors of the competitor will retain $15x after
payment of a $35x tax. Had the section 511 tax been imposed on the univer-
sity with respect to its unrelated business taxable income, both investors
would have retained $15x. Thus, whether the ice cream business is operated
through an incorporated feeder or as a directly owned unrelated business,
allowing the university to retain a tax equivalent amount as an alternative to
a tax payment to the government increases its return on investment in the
above example by $35x over what it could receive under the current statute.
While the 1950 Congress may have been unconcerned that a
501(c)(3) organization's traditional portfolio income consisting of dividends,
interest, and capital gains could put the organization in a position to compete
unfairly as an investor in the capital markets, clearly an increased disparity
in current return on investment equal to the tax equivalent amount was not
factored into the equation. Little, in fact, would be accomplished by removing
the potential for unfair competition for market share at the operational level
only to discover an enhanced potential for unfair competition has turned up
at the investment level. An additional statutory provision would have to be
devised, therefore, to insure that the tax equivalent amount, optionally
distributed by the unrelated business to the university as part of a plan to
eliminate the business's potential for unfair competition for market share, was
used to fund the university's exempt activities rather than used to augment
its portfolio of investments. If such additional yield were in fact used to
operate the organization's exempt activities, rather than to reinvest back into
the unrelated business or add to the endowment fund, the exempt organiza-
tion's substantially higher return on its investment should be viewed as no
more unfair than the organization's underlying tax exemption itself.
3. Loss of Federal Tax Revenue.-The House Committee on Ways
and Means intended the Revenue Bill of 1950 to reduce substantially war
excise taxes that had been in effect since World War II. It was anticipated
that the new tax on feeder organizations and on the unincorporated unrelated
businesses conducted by certain 501(c)(3) organizations would partially
compensate for the loss of revenue. By the time the Bill reached the Senate,
the breakout of war in Korea converted this tax legislation into one to raise
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revenue to meet an increased defense budget.69 Thirty years later courts
were still debating the importance of the revenue raising aspect of the new
tax, relative to the goal of preventing unfair competition.
The framers of the Revenue Act of 1950 predicted that the tax on
unrelated business would generate annual revenues of $100 million.7' In its
first year of operation the tax raised thirty seven dollars. 2 By 1985 tax
collections had risen to $39 million;73 by 1990, to $128 million;' and for
the government's fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, to $294,336,706.71
This last figure consists only of tax collections with respect to unrelated
businesses reporting on IRS Form 990-T. The figure does not include tax
collections with respect to separately incorporated feeders reporting on the
regular corporate income tax return, Form 1120, or with respect to "unrelat-
ed" joint ventures reporting on the partnership return, Form 1065. The figure,
therefore, is an understated amount. The figure may not reflect taxable
income derived from unrelated businesses on a composite basis for the
additional reason of poor compliance.
Whatever immediate additional revenue was anticipated through
imposition of the new tax, of graver concern to the 1950 Congress was the
potential future erosion of the tax base if the feared expansion of operations
by feeders and unrelated businesses through unfair competition was not put
in check.76 No Congressional study was published, however, to determine
69. S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54, at 1, reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. at 3053.
70. See infra p. 444.
71. See George Cooper, Trends in the Taxation of Unrelated Business Activity, 29
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1999, 2019 (1971).
72. Id.
73. Steinberg, supra note 25, at 352.
74. Id.
75. Telephone Interview with Peggy Reilly, Office of Taxpayer Services, Internal
Revenue Service (May 21, 1996).
76. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 44, at 39: see also House Hearings of 1950,
supra note 8, at 580 (testimony of Rep. Dingell) ("Eventually all the noodles produced in this
country will be produced by corporations held or created by universities ... and there will be
no revenue to the Federal Treasury from this industry.").
When the 1950 legislation was proposed, there was some fear that the
acquisition of taxable business enterprises by tax-free feeder corporations
would narrow the federal tax base, but this danger seems, in retrospect.
overstated if not wholly erroneous. This is because the sellers of the
business would presumably reinvest the proceeds of the sale in new
enterprises, marketable securities, rental real estate, etc., which would
produce a taxable yield to restore the status quo ante. The charitable
organization purchasing the enterprise, for its part, would shift its
investment from assets producing tax-free dividends, interest, and rent to
equally tax-free business profits.
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 320.
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whether and to what extent feeders and unrelated businesses were in fact
reinvesting their profits back into the business as opposed to distributing them
to the owner 501(c)(3) organizations for their charitable purposes." Nor was
there any study published to compare the loss of tax revenue resulting from
the exemption afforded to feeders and unrelated businesses under the
destination of income test (reduced by the potential cost of collecting such
revenue) with the cost of the social benefits that were being financed by such
exempt business profits.78
Suppose feeders and unrelated businesses were offered the option to
maintain competitive prices and to distribute a tax equivalent amount plus an
amount representing an adequate return on investment to their owner
501(c)(3) organizations to be used exclusively to operate their charitable
activities as an alternative to payment of the tax to the government. Would
the loss of tax revenue be justified by the social benefits anticipated from the
additional distribution to the 501(c)(3) organization? Assuming that statutory
safeguards are built into the system to prevent the 501(c)(3) organization
from directly or indirectly reinvesting the tax equivalent amount back into the
business, the distributing business would no longer be in a position to erode
the tax base by expanding with tax dollars that are not available to its
competition.
Although unfair competition for market share would be beyond reach,
there is always the possibility that a feeder or unincorporated unrelated
business would still be able to expand with dollars earned through fair
competition and/or the effects of inflation, even after having distributed each
77. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 319.
78. Several reasons additional to unfair competition and loss of tax revenue were
offered to justify taxing feeder corporations and unrelated businesses. Commenting on the
"destination of income" test as applied to the commercial activities of colleges and other
institutions, Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, in his testimony before the Committee on
Ways and Means, stated: "The correction of present abuses, which shift additional burdens to
the rest of the population, becomes essential for reasons of equity." House Hearings of 1950,
supra note 8, at 19. The comment fails to address the degree to which the untaxed income was
being used for charitable purposes. There was also concern that preoccupation of 501(c)(3)
organizations with commercial ventures would detract from their exempt purposes. See The
Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1283; but see Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong.,
1 st Sess. 208 (1987) (statement of the Independent Sector) [hereinafter UBIT Hearings] ("The
traditional argument that running unrelated businesses diverts attention from charity is a bit
threadbare-it is not clear why it is any better to have the board worry about fundraising or
portfolio management than an unrelated business."). There should be added to the list of
reasons justifying the new taxes: (a) the undue risk § 501 (c)(3) organizations might be willing
to take with respect to their endowment funds by shifting investment funds to more speculative
ventures in the hope of obtaining a higher yield; and (b) the concentration of economic power
in colleges and universities. See Hearings of 1947, supra note 8, at 3528.
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year a tax equivalent amount to its 501(c)(3) owner. Such an expansion
would result in an increasing amount of tax dollars going to the charity rather
than to the government. The C.F. Mueller Company, for example, purchased
in August 1947 for $3,495,407 for the benefit of the School of Law of New
York University, was sold in 1976 for $115 million cash, notwithstanding the
fact that it was subject to tax on its taxable income in 26 of those 30
years. 79 Through the sale of the stock of the noodle company, the University
was able to add $47.5 million to its unrestricted endowment, an increase of
200%, and $67.5 million to its endowment for the benefit of the Law
School."0 The ability of any given 501(c)(3) organization to enjoy the
benefits of such spectacular growth due to the business acumen or luck of its
feeder benefactor operating in the free enterprise world is the result of the
very freedom the system affords to charitable organizations. The 1950
Congress did not require exempt organizations to dispose of their unrelated
businesses or to pay capital gains tax on their eventual disposition, but merely
to pay the same tax on operating income as their profit-motivated competi-
tion."1 It is only due to hit-or-miss fortune that the famous noodle company
was acquired for the benefit of a well-recognized law school of a large
private university rather than for the benefit of a 501(c)(3) organization that
did not already derive support in the marketplace from public contributions,
endowment funds resulting from such contributions, or income from the sale
of goods or services related to its charitable purpose.
C.F. Mueller Company's taxable income increased from $962,366.75
for 19462 to $6.1 million for 1975.3 Had C.F. Mueller Company been
afforded the option to pay its tax obligation to New York University for the
operating budget of its law school rather than to the government, the increas-
ing loss of tax revenue would have to be weighed against the benefit derived
from such revenue's support of educational and legal services delivered by
the School, e.g., in the form of more money for need-based scholarships,
lower tuition, better research facilities, legal services to the disadvantaged,
etc., or simply to meet increasing costs or to offset a decline in contributions
(perhaps caused by a change in the tax laws) or diminished investment
79. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 912, 923 (1950). rev'd, 190
F.2d 120 (1951); William J. Ruane, NYU to Sell Mueller's for S 115 Million. Law School,
University to Share Profit, Wash. Square News, Sept. 29, 1976, at 1.
80. Ruane, supra note 79, at 1.
81. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986)
("[IWn the 1950 Act [Congress] struck a balance between its two objectives of encouraging
benevolent enterprise and restraining unfair competition by imposing a tax on the 'unrelated
business taxable income' of tax-exempt organizations.").
82. C.F. Mueller Co., 14 T.C. at 925.
83. Foremost Agrees to Buy for Cash C.F. Mueller Co., Wall St. J., Sept. 29. 1976,
at AIO.
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income due to market conditions. For instance, New York University itself
incurred an operating deficit of $4.4 million for the taxable year ending
August 31, 1975 and a deficit of $2-$3 million in the subsequent year.'
Assuming feeders and unrelated businesses were afforded the option
to maintain competitive prices and to distribute a tax equivalent amount plus
an amount representing an adequate return on investment to their owner
501(c)(3) organizations to be used exclusively to operate charitable activities,
a number of safeguards in addition to those already mentioned would need
to be incorporated into the statutory system. First, although it might be argued
that any organization qualifying under section 170(b)(1)(A)85 as a "50%
type" charity by definition receives most of its financial support from the
public and therefore demonstrates its responsiveness to social need, in order
to justify the loss of tax revenue to the government, the tax equivalent
amount the organization may receive from feeders and unrelated businesses
should not exceed a limit based on an acceptable ratio of unrelated business
gross receipts to gross receipts generated by public financial support.
Second, both to safeguard the federal revenue and to discourage the
501(c)(3) organization from subjecting more than a certain percentage of its
investment portfolio to undue risk by investing in, or accepting as contribu-
tions, unrelated businesses or feeders, there would need to be a limit imposed
on the tax equivalent amount the 501(c)(3) organization may receive from
feeders and unrelated businesses, determined by an acceptable ratio of the
organization's basis for its assets used in feeders and unrelated businesses to
the tax basis of the total investment portfolio. Third, in order to discourage
the 501 (c)(3) organization from diverting its attention and energies away from
its charitable purposes, there would need to be a prohibition against
employees of a 501(c)(3) organization receiving compensation from the
feeder or unrelated business.
4. The Sale-Leaseback Problem.-Although a 501(c)(3) organization
anticipating tax-free rental income from the sale and leaseback of real
property appears to be in a position to outbid a taxable competitor for the
purchase of the rental building or to charge lower rent on the lease of the
property back to the vendor, the 1950 Congress did not act to prevent this
potential for unfair rental market or investment competition. Of particular
concern to Congress was the practice that had developed among certain
84. Id.
85. IRC § 170(b)(1)(A) includes: (i) churches, (ii) educational organizations, (iii)
medical, hospital care, medical education, medical research organizations, (iv) college or
university related organizations, (v) governmental units, (vi) a governmentally or publicly
supported § 170(c)(2) organization, (vii) a private foundation described in § 170(b)(l)(E), or
(viii) a § 509(a)(2) or (3) organization.
[Vol 3:7
Unfair Business Competition
exempt organizations of borrowing all or a portion of the purchase price and
amortizing the loan with its tax-free rental income from the purchased
building. Through this practice the exempt organization was in a position to
exploit its competitive advantage over and over again without the use of its
own funds. The potential for acquisition was thus unlimited by the size of the
exempt organization's existing endowment fund. The practice was attractive
to the taxable seller/lessee because of the potential for disposing of fully
depreciated property at an inflated price and leasing it back for a low,
deductible rent.
As explained by the House Committee on Ways and Means, there
were three principal objections to the leveraged lease-back transaction. "First,
the tax-exempt organization is not merely trying to find a means of investing
its own funds at an adequate rate of return but is obviously trading on its
exemption, since the only contribution it makes to the sale and lease is its tax
exemption."86 The second objection stated:
[I]t is altogether conceivable that if its use is not checked,
exempt organizations in the not-too-distant future may own
the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real estate in
the country. This, of course, would lower drastically the
rental income included in the corporate and individual
income tax bases .... Such acquisitions are not in any way
limited by the funds available for investment on the part of
the exempt institution. This explains why particular attention
should be given to lease-backs which involve the use of
borrowed funds. Where an exempt organization uses its own
funds, expansion of its property holdings through the lease-
back device must necessarily proceed at a much slower
pace.'
The third objection offered was in fact a reformulation of the first
one, i.e., "the exempt organization has in effect sold part of its exemption"
by purchasing the property at a higher price than a taxable competitor could
pay or by agreeing to lower rent on the leaseback.m A fourth objection, not
mentioned in the House Report, might have been the use of the leveraged
sale-leaseback transaction to enable an exempt organization to accumulate
real estate wealth not measured in any way by such organization's respon-
siveness to social needs.
86. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 44, at 38-40.
87. Id. at 39.
88. Id.
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Had the 1950 Act afforded the 501(c)(3) organization entering into
a leveraged leaseback transaction the option to use a tax equivalent amount
to finance activities related to its charitable purpose, with some appropriate
mechanism to prevent the use of an equivalent amount to pay principal on the
acquisition loan, and with the safeguards previously suggested incorporated
into the statutory system, the exempt organization would have lost its
advantage over a taxable competitor entering into a similar transaction. With
the 501(c)(3) organization paying its tax liability by using an equivalent
amount to fund its charitable activities, both the exempt organization and its
taxable competitor would enter a sale-leaseback transaction with the prospect
of an equal amount of after-tax dollars.
D. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
In February of 1953 the shareholders of Clay Brown & Company, a
corporation engaged in the sawmill and lumber business, sold all of their
stock to the California Institute for Cancer Research for a $1.3 million dollar
noninterest bearing note.89 The Institute agreed to make a $5,000 downpay-
ment from the assets of the company and to pay the balance of the purchase
price over a ten-year period exclusively out of the income generated by the
business.90 It was agreed that the company would be liquidated immediately
after closing and that the Institute would lease the business assets under a
five-year lease to a new corporation, Fortuna Sawmills, Inc., owned by the
attorneys for the sellers. 9' Fortuna was to pay 80% of its operating profit
before depreciation or taxes to the Institute as rent for the assets and the
Institute would pay 90% of its rent as payments on the $1.3 million dollar
note.92 Fortuna operated the sawmill and lumber business by taking over
Clay Brown & Company's situs and virtually all of its personnel.93
The selling shareholders reported the amounts received on the note
as capital gain.94 In a 1965 decision, Commissioner v. Clay Brown,95 the
Supreme Court, affirming the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit, agreed that
payments on the note were capital gain and not taxable as ordinary income
as claimed by the Commissioner. 96 The Clay Brown decision and a Tax
Court case reaching a similar result, University Hill Foundation v. Commis-
89. Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 567 (1965).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 568.
94. Id.
95. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
96. Id.
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sioner,97 spawned no less than three separate measures included in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 to curb the new abuse of the tax exemption as perceived
by Congress.
Fortuna was able to avoid payment of income tax on 80% of its
taxable income generated by the lumber business by deducting the rent it paid
to the Institute for the lease of its operating assets.98 However, the very
requirement to pay out a substantial portion of its taxable income to the
Institute and the opportunity to retain only 20% of it for working capital left
Fortuna in no position to compete unfairly with its taxpaying competition in
the lumber market-9 Rather, by converting operating income received by
Fortuna into "passive" rental income received tax-free by the Institute, the
Clay Brown lease enabled what was essentially unrelated business taxable
income to escape tax at any level. A comparable amount of income received
by a competitor pass-through entity would have been taxed once at the
investor level. Even with the almost 100% financing afforded the Institute by
the sellers of the stock, the Institute's rental income escaped the reach of
section 514, the sale-leaseback provision of the 1950 Act, because of that
section's limited purpose to tax only rent received from the lease of real
property acquired or improved with debt.
The Clay Brown transaction presented Congress in 1969 with
virtually the identical problem presented by the sale and leaseback of real
property financed with debt nineteen years earlier. By financing the purchase
of business assets with tax-free earnings generated by those assets, the exempt
organization was placed in a unique position to pay a higher price than a
taxable investor could afford with after-tax dollars." Not using its own
funds to make the purchase and not being limited by the size of its own
endowment, the exempt organization could practice this form of unfair
investor competition without limitation and without any "relation to public
approval of the activities or purposes of the organization."'' Once again,
the exempt organization's only contribution to the transaction was in effect
the sale of its exemption and once again there was concern that, if unchecked,
the Clay Brown transaction could result in substantial loss of tax revenue in
97. 51 T.C. 548 (1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
965 (1972). The Clay Brown provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 were adopted prior
to the IRS's 1971 victory in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
98. Id. at 567.
99. Id.
100. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 62-63 (1969). reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2091.
101. Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Subject of Tax
Reform, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 5359 (1969) (General Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform
Proposals).
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the future.' 2 What especially rankled the 1969 Congress was the seller's
use of the exemption to obtain an inflated purchase price for their business.
The seller's ability to convert ordinary income generated by operating assets
into capital gain upon receipt of the very same income as installments of the
purchase price for the stock only added insult to what was already considered
to be an injury to the federal tax structure. 0 3
Curiously, the Clay Brown case itself was not the best illustration of
the multiple potential evils Congress feared could flow from a Clay Brown
transaction. The Tax Court, for instance, found the purchase price of the stock
to be "within a reasonable range in light of the earnings history of the
corporation and the adjusted net worth of the corporate assets, '' "° not above
market value and presumably not significantly higher than a taxable
competitor would pay. Moreover, Fortuna closed its doors after only four
years of operations because of a lack of demand for lumber, and the Institute
was forced to sell the business for only $300,000. Allowed to retain a meager
10% of the sales proceeds, the Institute was able to add $30,000 to its net
worth, nowhere near the $1.3 million that had been contemplated.
Nonetheless, Congress did not stray from its purpose to discourage
Clay Brown transactions "by eliminating the incentive for owners desiring to
sell a business to exploit the tax exemption of nonprofit organizations."'0 5
Effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, section 514
was amended to tax income received by any exempt organization0 6 in any
form (e.g., dividends, royalties, rent) from any type of property (e.g., rental
real estate, tangible personal property, corporate stock) unrelated to its
102. H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 46 (1969), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1691.
103. S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 100, at 62-63, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2091.
104. Clay Brown v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 461, 486 (1961), aff'd, 325 F.2d 313
(9th Cir. 1963), affd, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
105. H.R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 102, at 46, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1691. For a discussion of developments to and including the Tax Reform Act of 1969, see
Cooper, supra note 71.
106. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (extending
the unrelated business income tax to all exempt organizations except United States
instrumentalities because many of such organizations had begun to engage in substantial
commercial activity).
Some churches are engaged in operating publishing houses, hotels,
factories, radio and TV stations, parking lots, newspapers, bakeries,
restaurants, etc. Furthermore, it is difficult to justify taxing a university
or hospital which runs a public restaurant or hotel or other business and
not tax a country club or lodge engaged in similar activity [sic].
S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 100, at 67, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2096.
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charitable functions acquired or improved with debt." Under a formula
essentially similar to the one enacted in 1950, the same percentage of total
income received by the exempt organization was includable in gross income
as the average debt for the taxable year with respect to the property bore to
the average adjusted basis of such property."es The same percentage of
capital gains was taxed on the sale of the property." 9
Assume that taxable investors had entered into a transaction identical
in terms to the facts in Clay Brown, liquidating the acquired lumber company
and leasing the business assets to Operating Company. Assume further that
both Fortuna Sawmills and Operating Company earn $125x profit before
depreciation and taxes for the taxable year and distribute, and deduct, 80%
as rent, i.e., $100x, under the terms of the lease. After payment of $35x tax
on the rent received, the taxable investors have available $65x, 90% of
which, i.e., $58.5x, is required to amortize the acquisition note.
Assume that the California Institute for Cancer Research incurred a
$50x operating loss for the taxable year in the conduct of its 501(c)(3)
activities after taking into account unrestricted current contributions and
107. IRC § 514. Under another amendment added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
a tax-exempt "controlling organization" is taxable on interest, annuities, royalties, and rents
derived from either a taxable or tax-exempt "controlled organization." IRC § 512(b)(13)(A)-
(B).
108. For example, "[I]f a business or investment property is acquired subject to an
80 percent mortgage, 80 percent of the income and 80 percent of the deductions are to be
taken into account for tax purposes. As the mortgage is paid off, the percentage taken into
account diminishes." S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 100, at 63-64, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2092. Two additional weaknesses of the 1950 legislation were addressed: (1)
rental income from the lease of property is taxable under amended § 514 regardless of whether
the term of the lease exceeds five years, and (2) to eliminate front-loading depreciation
deductions in the early years of the debt-financed transaction when a higher percentage of
income generated by the property is taxable, only straight-line depreciation is allowed. Section
514(b)(3)(A) exempts from the definition of "debt-financed property" real property acquired
by an exempt organization if (1) the principal purpose of the acquisition is substantially related
to the exercise or performance of the organization's purposes, (2) the real property is in the
neighborhood of other property owned by the organization, and (3) the property is used for
such purpose within 10 years of the acquisition. Section 514(c)(2)(B) excludes from acquisition
indebtedness a mortgage on real property when such real property was acquired by an exempt
organization by bequest or devise, so long as the organization did not agree to assume the
mortgage in order to acquire the property. The period during which such mortgage will not
be considered acquisition indebtedness may not exceed 10 years from the date of acquisition.
109. IRC § 514(a)(1); Regs. § 1.514(a)-I(a)(l)(v). For a critical view of§ 514, see
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 322-25. For the view that there is lacking "a systematic
tax policy analysis supporting the rules regarding the taxation of debt-financed income of
exempt organizations," see Gallagher, supra note 67, at 991. "[O]ne must seriously question
whether the approach of Section 514 is correct in a non-bootstrap acquisition scenario." Id. at
992; see also id., at 993-96.
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income from its portfolio of stocks and bonds. Had Fortuna been required to
maintain competitive prices and had the Institute been afforded the option of
either paying to the government the $35x tax imposed by section 514 or
using an equivalent amount plus an additional $6.5x as a return on investment
to reduce the operating deficit incurred in the conduct of its related activities,
but not to make payments on debt incurred to acquire or improve assets used
in activities unrelated to its charitable purposes, both the Institute and the
taxable investors would have had available the same $58.5x with which to
make payments on the notes issued to acquire the stock of the respective
lumber companies.
E. Variations on the Theme of Section 512(b)(15)
It appears from the inclusion of another measure in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 that Congress stumbled upon an alternative solution to counter
the threat of unfair competition other than to tax feeder corporations or
unrelated businesses conducted directly by 501(c)(3) organizations. In a
remarkable bit of special interest legislation designed for the benefit of the
religious order operating Loyola University's radio station WWL," ' the
1969 Congress enacted what is now section 512(b)(15). The measure provides
in substance that the income and all directly connected deductions of a
federally licensed unrelated service business carried on by a religious order
(or by an educational organization maintained by the order), in operation
before May 27, 1959, is not subject to the tax on unrelated business income
if 1) less than 10% of each year's net income from the business was used for
activities which were not related to the religious order's exemption and 2) it
was established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the rates or other
charges for such services were competitive with those charged for similar
services by persons subject to tax.
According to the Senate Committee on Finance, which introduced the
measure, "In such a case there are no competitive advantages obtained by the
business from the exemption, and where the exempt organization has for a
long time depended on this income, to make it forego approximately half of
it would constitute a serious hardship."' " Not surprisingly, no explanation
was offered by the Senate Finance Committee as to why this alternative
solution to the threat of unfair competition, i.e., the maintenance of
competitive prices and the mandatory distribution of more than 90% of the
net income of an unrelated business to the exempt organization for its
charitable purposes, would not work as well for the cancer research conducted
110. See Cooper, supra note 71, at 2009.
111. S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2099.
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by the California Institute in Clay Brown and for other worthy 501(c)(3)
organizations as it would for the religious order that was the exclusive
beneficiary of section 512(b)(15).
Admittedly a piece of special interest legislation designed to benefit
one radio station operated by a particular university owned by a religious
order, section 512(b)(15) carries a message more significant than the 1969
Congress realized. By predicating the radio station's exemption from tax on
the distribution of more than 90% of its net income to be used for activities
related to the religious order's charitable purposes, section 512(b)(15)
resurrected the "destination of income" principle formulated by the Supreme
Court forty-five years earlier and abandoned the tax reforms adopted by the
Revenue Act of 1950. The charitable destination of income, not its commer-
cial source, is the ultimate test of exemption, the Supreme Court held in
1924.'12 By requiring the radio station to charge competitive rates as well
as to distribute the bulk of its net income to the religious order, section
512(b)(15) was unique in its attempt to preserve the station's tax-free revenue
stream for the benefit of the 501(c)(3) organization without affording the
"unrelated" source of that revenue the opportunity to compete unfairly with
its taxable competition." 3
112. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
113. Section 512(b)(15) was not the first attempt to resolve the unfair competition
issue by mandating a distribution of income to the charity. John Gardes. an attorney
instrumental in New York University's acquisition of the C.F. Mueller Company, was quoted
as suggesting:
mhat if tax exemption placed a corporation so organized in an advanta-
geous competitive position, a practical remedy would be to amend the
Federal tax laws to provide that tax-exempt institutions deriving profit
from businesses be compelled to use currently for educational purposes a
sum equivalent to the amount which a business concern having the same
profits would be compelled to pay in the form of taxes.
N.Y.U. Denies It Is Misusing Tax Exemption, Herald Trib., Jan. 25, 1950, (in author's files).
In a provision included in H.R. 2976, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), which was not enacted.
feeder organizations were mandated to distribute 75% of their net income (other than capital
gains) each year to the charity, unless the Commissioner approved a plan to accumulate more.
See Comment, supra note 42, at 876 n. 111.
Other solutions to the unfair competition problem had also been suggested, "such as
rigid antitrust law enforcement, direct limits on expansion of tax-exempt business, or limits
on capital accumulation." The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1282 n. 13.
In Crosby Valve & Gage Company, a separately incorporated feeder made a
distribution to its parent, a charitable organization, and claimed a deduction under § 170 for
a charitable contribution. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed
that an unrelated business operated directly by a charity is allowed to deduct up to 5% of its
taxable income for a charitable contribution to another charity. The Court refused to allow the
feeder to deduct the "charitable contribution" made to its own parent because, quoting
legislative history, "[i]t is difficult to see why a difference in tax treatment should be allowed
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Section 512(b)(15) nevertheless lacks the statutory safeguards and
refinements to merit wholesale expansion of its scope to include feeders and
unrelated businesses of all 501 (c)(3) organizations. The proposed amendment
to the tax on feeders and unrelated businesses more fully developed in
Appendix A to the article is an attempt to construct a statutory provision
based upon the section 512(b)(15) motif, but adding sufficient safeguards to
make the provision useful as a fiscal option of broad application. The
amendment draws upon the analysis of the effect of distributions on the
potential for unfair competition discussed above. The amendment preserves
the existing tax, but grants the feeder or unrelated business an elective credit
against its income tax liability for distributions made or deemed made during
the taxable year to its 501(c)(3) owner on the basis of $1 credit for a
combined distribution of $1 plus an additional amount (e.g., $.35) assumed
to equal an adequate return on investment that a for-profit competitor would
be expected to distribute to its owners. The goal is to leave the feeder or
unrelated business in approximately the same "after-tax/distributions to
owners" position as its for-profit competition, rather than leaving the feeder
or unrelated business at a competitive disadvantage which would be the result
if it were required to distribute more than 90% of its net income for the
taxable year to its 501(c)(3) owner.
The amendment requires the feeder or unrelated business to establish
the competitiveness of its rates or charges, but supplements the facts-and-
circumstances approach of section 512(b)(15) by incorporating a set of safe
harbor guidelines. The goal is to establish an objective standard to prove
competitive pricing without imposing a case-by-case fact-finding burden on
the Internal Revenue Service. The amount of the elective credit is subject to
a number of additional limitations. In order to assure that the distributed
amounts are used by the 501(c)(3) owner to fund its related activities rather
than (1) reinvested back into the feeder or unrelated business as a capital
contribution, loan, or collateral for a loan; (2) used to augment the 501 (c)(3)
owner's investment portfolio; or (3) used to amortize debt incurred to acquire
merely because in one case the income is earned directly by an educational or charitable
organization, while in the other it is earned by a subsidiary of such an organization." Crosby
Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 148 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
976 (1967). Comparing the bottom-line results to the feeder with the results to a "competing
business corporation not owned by a charity," the Court correctly observed that the tax savings
resulting from allowing the feeder to deduct up to 5% of its taxable income for a distribution
to its own parent would leave the feeder with an increased after-tax net profit with which to
"finance competition in services, etc." or which would allow the charity to receive a greater
return on its investment. Id. at 149 at n.3. As a third option, the feeder could cut prices to a
level such that its after-tax net profit would still equal its competitor's. Id. In the Court's view,
this is precisely the unfair competition the 1950 Act attempted to prevent. See also C.F.
Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 275, 297-98 (1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973).
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or improve assets used in activities unrelated to its exempt purposes, the
elective credit for a taxable year available to a 501(c)(3) owner's feeders and
unrelated businesses is limited on a combined basis to an amount equal to the
net operating loss incurred by the 501(c)(3) owner for the same taxable year
in the conduct of all of its related activities divided by 1.35 (assuming $1.00
credit for $1.35 distribution). For this purpose, the net operating loss is
determined by adding net investment income and unrestricted gifts received
during the taxable year to related activity gross income, excluding noncash
items as deductions, but deducting capital expenditures for the acquisition of
assets substantially used to further related activities.
In order to cap the potential loss of tax revenue to the federal
government, and to discourage the 501(c)(3) owner from subjecting more
than 25% of its total investment portfolio to the risks inherent in business
ventures, the amount of the elective credit available to each of a 501(c)(3)
owner's feeders and unrelated businesses is reduced by four percentage points
for each percentage point in excess of 25% that the value of the 501(c)(3)
owner's total investment portfolio at the time of acquisition (not including
assets substantially used in related activities) consists of investments in
feeders and assets used in unrelated businesses.
Further, in order to reduce the danger that a 501(c)(3) owner could
use the distributed amounts to fund activities unresponsive to social needs,
the amount of the elective credit available to each of a 501(c)(3) owner's
feeders and unrelated businesses is reduced by four percentage points for each
percentage point in excess of 25% that the 501(c)(3) owner's gross receipts
for the taxable year from all sources is derived from feeders and unrelated
businesses.
Finally, in order to discourage a 501(c)(3) owner from diverting
energy away from its charitable purposes, as a condition to electing the credit,
employees and directors of the 501(c)(3) owner are prohibited from being
employed by, or serving as a director of, any of such owner's feeders or
unrelated businesses.
F. Is The Elective Credit Sound Tax Policy?
Essentially, the elective credit against tax described in Appendix A
grants a feeder or unrelated business maintaining competitive pricing the
option to pay regular tax to the government or to distribute a tax equivalent
amount (plus an assumed adequate return on investment) to its 501(c)(3)
owner to cover its current operating loss from related activities. Assuming
that the elective credit is as effective to eliminate the potential for unfair
competition as is payment of the tax to the government, the question remains
whether the social benefits anticipated from the additional distribution to the
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501(c)(3) organization justify the foregone tax." 4 That the amount of the
foregone tax cannot be readily determined significantly complicates the
answer. 15
Assuming that the total amount of the tax lost to the government
through exercise of the elective credit proves to be more than minimal, can
one persuasively argue pluralism as the rationale for granting feeders and
unrelated businesses the option to distribute a tax equivalent amount to their
501(c)(3) owners in lieu of paying the tax to the government? Commentators
who justify the exemption afforded related activities directly furthering the
charitable purposes of the organization on the grounds of democratic
decentralization may be reluctant to extend the same rationale for the benefit
of feeders and unrelated businesses indirectly furthering the same purposes.
Collection of the tax otherwise lost through exercise of the credit may be
justified not only for the reason that the federal government needs revenue,
but also in support of the principle that Congress has the duty to allocate the
tax dollars collected in accordance with national priorities determined through
public debate.
The public debate must, nevertheless, reckon with the fact that two
sources of revenue historically relied upon by the nonprofit, charitable sector
for financial survival--contributions from the public and grants from the
114. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 325-26 (commenting on the taxation
of unrelated business income).
By reducing the amount that the exempt organization can apply to its
charitable or other purposes, the tax necessarily burdens the beneficiaries
of these activities, and their ability to pay ought to be considered in
deciding whether and to what extent to impose the tax. Yet it was
evidently never suggested during the 1950 and 1969 debates that the tax
on the unrelated business income of charitable organizations reflected the
ability to pay of those affected by it. Almost certainly, we believe, it did
not, and thus made the income tax more regressive.
Id.
The incidence of the UBIT is also of importance for policy analysis....
Perhaps some portion of the tax would fall on donors or grantmakers or
charitable-service recipients, not just on paying consumers, owners, or
suppliers of capital and labor. This subject has, to my knowledge, received
no attention in the literature.
Steinberg, supra note 25, at 354.
115. Current data applicable to 501(c)(3) organizations is insufficient to determine
what the tax liability of feeders and unrelated businesses would be on a composite basis if the
maximum 25% of investment assets were invested in feeders and unrelated businesses.
Moreover, current data is insufficient to determine on a composite basis (i) the ratio of
distributions received from feeders and unrelated businesses to gross receipts received by
501(c)(3) organizations from all sources, and (ii) net operating losses (as defined in Appendix
A) incurred by 501(c)(3) organizations in the conduct of their related activities. Cf. Statistics
of Income Bulletin, Internal Revenue Service, Spring 1995 and Spring 1996.
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federal government-have in recent years diminished as a percentage of total
revenue and threaten to shrink even more significantly in the future.
Charitable contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations dipped from 36% of total
revenue from all sources in 1946 to 18% in 1982. '16 Although the cause is
not certain, studies indicate that federal taxes, in particular the charitable
contribution deduction available to itemizers, the interplay of this deduction
with the standard deduction, and, to some extent, marginal tax rates, affect
the size of charitable gifts and the type of recipient. Taxpayers in the highest
tax brackets are most affected by a decline in marginal rates. The top
marginal income tax bracket decreased from 91% in 1946 to 50% in 1982.
For taxable years beginning in 1988 the top marginal income tax bracket
decreased even further to 28%, with each decrease representing a tax
disincentive for a high bracket taxpayer to contribute to a 501(c)(3)
organization because of the diminished tax savings generated by the
charitable contribution deduction. Proposals to eliminate the charitable
contribution deduction altogether through the enactment of a flat tax (without
replacing the deduction with a credit) seriously threaten the revenue stream
from public and corporate gifts historically relied upon by the charitable,
nonprofit sector for financial viability."
17
As private donations as a percent of total revenue have diminished,
federal government support of activities conducted by 501(c)(3) organizations
continues to be dictated by the prevailing political philosophy in Congress
and the nation and therefore remains an unreliable source for funding as well.
As a case in point, "Between 1982 and 1984, federal spending for activities
supported by human service nonprofits declined an estimated $42 bil-
lion."' 18 Finally, although the size of the average endowment fund of
colleges and universities may have increased over the years, there is evidence
that such funds have actually decreased in purchasing power based on the
Consumer Price Index.' 19
501(c)(3) organizations have thus been confronted with the task of
meeting increasing operating expenses with diminished and unreliable revenue
streams from traditional sources. If it was true in 1953, for example, that
116. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 139 (statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Associate
Director, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
117. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving 277 (1995).
On the other hand, a decrease in the marginal tax rates increases "the after-tax income from
which taxpayers can make contributions." Id. at 274. See also, Fred Stokeld, Charities Fear
Loss of Deduction Under Flat Tax Proposals, 70 Tax Notes 935 (Feb. 19, 1996).
118. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 239 (testimony of the National Assembly of
National Voluntary Health & Social Welfare Organizations); see also id. at 158 (statement of
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Board Member, Independent Sector) (discussing the decline in
government participation).
119. See id. at 369 (statement of the American Council on Education).
19961
Florida Tax Review
"[t]he present financial plight of American colleges and universities is not an
acute non-recurring illness but the aggravation of a chronic condition of many
years standing,"' 2 then forty-three years later financial suffocation threatens
to render the patient terminal absent the discovery of life-saving procedures.
Adoption of the elective credit can be justified as a measure to replace
diminished revenue for the benefit of 501(c)(3) organizations with sources
that are at least within the control of the organization's wholly-owned
business benefactors.
This is not to suggest that the elective credit should be viewed as a
panacean replacement for other possible forms of direct and indirect federal
government subsidization of the activities of 501(c)(3) organizations. What
is more essential than the specific form of the tax subsidy and/or direct
expenditure designed to benefit charitable nonprofits and their beneficiaries
are the guiding principles employed in the selection. First, of necessity, the
financial support afforded the charitable sector in the form of the underlying
exemption from tax must remain an indirect federal tax subsidy as opposed
to an annually reviewed direct government expenditure as an expression of
its purpose to preserve the political independence and continuity of the sector.
Second, tax and social policy planners need to come to terms with the fact
that the combination of exemption from tax afforded "related" activities and
the itemized deduction for private gifts to charitable organizations has
historically proved inadequate as measures to ensure sufficient revenue to
enable the charitable sector to make ends meet. Additional federal subsidiza-
tion of the sector is therefore required. Third, the form of the additional
federal subsidy must be designed to preserve the charitable sector's political
and financial independence. Fourth, in an attempt to ensure that the additional
federal subsidy is utilized to fund activities responsive to social needs, the
subsidy should either track the nonprofit organization's revenues derived from
"related" activities and/or gifts from the public, e.g., a federal direct grant
program matching gifts received by the organization from private sources
(over and above the indirect tax subsidy afforded the charitable contribution),
or the subsidy should be targeted for a specific purpose, e.g., a need-based
scholarship or loan program, a tax credit for college tuition payments, or a
grant program to provide essential services to the poor.
From this perspective, it is not necessary to view the elective credit
solely as a life-saving provision of universal application designed to enable
the nonprofit, charitable sector as a whole to assume some measure of control
over its financial destiny. The credit can be more narrowly utilized as a
means to enable and to encourage the charitable sector to meet specific social
goals. The utilization of the credit for this purpose is suggested partly in
120. Myers, supra note 52, at 368.
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recognition of several operational weaknesses, albeit correctable ones, in
several of the nonprofit subsectors as the provider of public goods and
services. First, a number of nonprofit subsectors providing essential public
services, such as health care and higher education, lack a self-regulatory body
responsible for overall planning and oversight with authority to enforce
compliance with its regulations. Lack of self-regulation allows for inefficien-
cy, waste, violation of the constraint against private inurement, and ad hoc
expansion of capacity and subsequent downsizing in reaction to changes in
the demand for services.'
2 1
Second, if consumers of public goods and services are willing to pay
too high a price to a for-profit enterprise as a result of their inability to judge
the quality of what they or society are receiving in exchange, they are willing
to pay the same high price to a nonprofit organization as well. In the case of
the for-profit enterprise, the effort to maximize price and minimize cost is
driven by the purpose to earn profit, a purpose that constitutes an intrinsic
defect in the for-profit model as the provider of essential public goods and
services. In the case of the nonprofit organization, the effort to maximize
price may be driven by the necessity to meet an operating budget inflated by
lack of planning, inefficiency, excessive compensation, excessive marketing
for consumers of its products and services, and fund raising for a diminished
pool of contribution dollars.'2 These operational failures, while serious, do
121. See Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Charities: Increasing Account-
ability and Compliance, 36 Cath. Lawyer 203 (1995) (tracing recent incidents of self-dealing
and other abusive practices involving public charities and the scrutiny they have invited. Id.
at 204-09). See also Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 341-43. Zimmerman discusses two
additional sources of voluntary sector failure, viz., (1) "philanthropic paternalism," the
definition of community needs determined by the wealthy, who have the means to contribute
to charity and thereby to influence the voluntary sector's agenda to serve themselves rather
than serve the poor, and (2) "asymmetric information failure," nonprofits providing goods and
services with complex characteristics, such as health care, to a wealthy group of clientele, to
suggest that the nonprofit is not really delivering a social benefit. Zimmerman admits that
"[e]mpirical evidence on voluntary sector failure is somewhat anecdotal." Id. at 343.
Zimmerman summarizes several studies leading to the conclusion that there are incidences of
voluntary sector failure, e.g. Herzlinger and Krasker in 1987: "They found that the nonprofit
hospitals were spending much of their tax benefits on behalf of the professional staff of the
hospitals '... without providing better, cheaper, or more accessible health care in return."'
Id. at 344. "[S]uspicion abounds that some tax revenues are being wasted without commensu-
rate provision of social benefits." Id. at 345.
122. Public perception of this type of nonprofit failure among institutions of higher
education has been enhanced by negative coverage in the media. The Philadelphia Inquirer
ran a five-part series from March 31 to April 4, 1996, maintaining that college tuition has
almost tripled between 1981 and 1996, more than twice the rate of inflation, not because of
a rise in demand, but because of a "Chivas Regal" effect-the more expensive, the better. See
Karen Heller & Lily Eng, Higher Education: How High the Price, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 31.
1996, at Al. With the last of the "baby boomers" reaching college age in the early 1980s.
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not constitute intrinsic defects in the nonprofit model as the provider of
essential public goods and services. Nevertheless, establishment of a series of
self-regulatory bodies responsible for planning and oversight in the various
nonprofit subsectors, further described in Part V of the article, should be
viewed as the necessary companion piece of legislation to adoption of the
elective credit in the form of universal application described in Appendix A.'2'
demand, in fact, went down. See id. With no outside monitoring and no incentive to cut
spending, increasing tuition revenues have supported an explosion in inefficiency and waste
rather than an increase in the quality and accessibility of higher education-more administra-
tors, more assistant administrators, more faculty assistants, more fundraisers, more marketers,
more student amenities, more building programs. See id. As a case in point, between 1980 and
1996, the number of full-time students registered at the University of Pennsylvania increased
by 29; the number of administrators and nonteaching staff members increased by 1820. See
id. With colleges and universities competing against each other for a diminished pool of
applicants, a high percentage of their inflated operating budgets have been allocated to
marketers and recruiters for students and to other budget lines thought to increase the prestige
of the institution, such as fundraising and faculty whose primary strength is published research
rather than teaching. See id. at A25. College presidents and deans have been chosen not based
on how well they govern, but on how well they fundraise. See id. Moreover, a high percentage
of the gifts and grants received have been allocated to the endowment fund and an insufficient
amount into the current operating budget. See id. at A24. Saddled with more administrators,
faculty, programs, and buildings than are needed to accommodate present demand, colleges
and universities are finding downsizing extremely difficult. See id. at A24.
The Philadelphia Inquirer series of articles made its point, but overstated the case.
Certainly, some percentage of the tuition increase that occurred between 1981 and 1996 was
returned to students in the form of necessary increases in faculty salaries and benefits,
enhanced counseling and placement services, upgrading of laboratories, libraries, and physical
plant, and installation of computer systems and new technology. Additionally, colleges and
universities are compelled to comply with a myriad and burgeoning amount of federal
regulations. Further, although the authors of this series are correct to point out that some
percentage of the tuition increase had occurred because of an increasing budget line for student
financial aid, with more student aid being required because of the higher tuition, a spiraling
effect squeezing the middle class out of the opportunity to go to college, the phenomenon is
the result of lack of social planning that implicates the federal government as much as it does
institutions of higher education.
123. There have been legislative proposals to deny tax exemption to a nonprofit
entity unless the organization can satisfy a quantifiable test proving the delivery of adequate
social benefits. See Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 346-48. For the view that a certain degree
of nonprofit inefficiency is an expected price to pay for nonprofit innovation, see Steinberg,
supra note 25, at 361-62. If the delivery of adequate benefits to low-income beneficiaries is
implicitly the sole test to be applied to each and every nonprofit organization in order to retain
tax exemption, the test reflects a constricted view of the role of nonprofits in American
society. The performance of many essential public services by nonprofits, e.g., the conduct of
basic and applied research by a university, indirectly benefit all income groups. Further, it is
not always easy to determine which income groups benefit from the activities of nonprofits,
let alone to quantify the benefit. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit
Sector?, The Univ. Of Chi. Press (1992). Additionally, if it is determined that a nonprofit
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This is not to infer that there do not already exist vast numbers of
501(c)(3) organizations efficiently delivering reasonably priced high quality
goods and services to the public. Nor is it to infer that measures to correct
whatever operational deficiencies now exist in certain subsectors of the
nonprofit, charitable sector will additionally eliminate their pressing need to
acquire a revenue source to replace traditional sources threatening to shrink
significantly in the future. It is only to suggest that from the point of view of
tax policy efficient utilization of financial resources, planning, and oversight
are the necessary companions to a broad-based federal subsidization of the
activities of nonprofit charitable organizations.
It is also to suggest that the elective credit can be utilized for
purposes other than to address in broad terms the financial crisis confronting
the entire charitable sector. The credit can be more narrowly utilized to fund
a nonprofit organization's sub-budget specifically targeted to meet social
needs that are being inadequately addressed at the present time (in a some-
what modified form from that described in Appendix A). The credit could be
made available, for instance, on condition that the required distributions by
the feeder or unrelated business to its 501 (c)(3) owner be used exclusively to
fund need-based college scholarships, with all administrative and overhead
expenses necessary to conduct the scholarship program coming from the
organization's general budget. Or, revenues generated by the credit could be
used in similar fashion to fund sub-budgets exclusively targeted to deliver any
number of goods and services to the disadvantaged, such as healthcare,
nursing home care, day care centers, legal representation, a trip to a major art
museum, or seats at a symphony orchestra concert, with a general budget
again supplying the required administrative and overhead support.
subsector is devoting a low percentage of its resources to the needs of the poor, as Lester M.
Salamon has determined with respect to the social services, then the question to ask is, "'Why
is this the case?" See Clotfelter, id. at 171. Salamon provides the answer. In order to cope with
their dependancy on external revenue sources over which they have little control, nonprofit
human service agencies have had to broaden their sights "well beyond the needs of the
poor..... Ic "The one truly effective countervailing force in the system has been the
availability of government funding targeted to the poor. Based on our statistical analysis, it has
been the availability of such funding that has allowed or encouraged the nonprofit sector to
focus on the poor to the limited extent it has." Id. If, then, the government cuts back its
financial support granted to a nonprofit organization targeted to aid the poor, is the solution
to deny tax exemption to the nonprofit entity, or is it to seek a revenue source to enable the
entity to aid the poor, including reinstatement of government funding? Similarly, if it is found
that "the bulk of the benefits of the activities of nonprofit arts and cultural organizations are
realized by people in the upper half of the income distribution .. .", as Dick Netzer has so
found (id. at 202), is the solution to add to the financial pressures already confronting
symphony orchestras and museums by denying them tax exemption, or is it to attempt to find
a method to increase access to, and interest in, their benefits for people in the lower half of
the income distribution?
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It is doubtful that the present resources of federal agencies are up to
the task of administering and enforcing the use of the elective credit in this
fashion, let alone administering and enforcing the tax on unrelated business
income as it currently exists. The vital subject of compliance is explored in
Part V of the article.
IV. THE COURTS SEARCH FOR STATUTORY MEANING: FORTY-SIX
YEARS WANDERING IN THE DESERT
A. "Trade or Business": In Pursuit of a Definition
Unless one of the specific exceptions is applicable, gross income of
a 501(c)(3) organization is "includible in the computation of unrelated
business taxable income if (1) it is income from trade or business, (2) such
trade or business is regularly carried on by the organization,"24 and (3) the
124. Regs. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended in 1983). For a discussion of "regularly carried
on," see Regs. § 1.513-1(c); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that NCAA's share of net revenues from the sale of programs
and advertising space therein for the Men's Division I Basketball Championship was not
derived from a business "regularly carried on."). In 1991 the Internal Revenue Service
announced that it would not follow the Tenth Circuit NCAA decision. I.R.S. T.A.M. 91-47-007
(Aug. 16, 1991) ("the TAM"). See James R. Hasselback and Rodney L. Clark, Colleges,
Commerciality, and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 74 Taxes 335, at 339 (May, 1996).
On the other hand, proposed regulations issued in January, 1993 take the position that revenue
received from a corporate sponsor by a 501(c)(3) organization conducting a bowl game, where
the organization "acknowledges the sponsorship payment by adding the corporation's name
to the title of the event," does not constitute advertising "because it does not promote the
sponsor's service, facility or product." Prop. Regs. § 1.512(a)-l(e), ex. 2(i). The proposed
regulations additionally confirm that the sale to commercial broadcasters of the right to
broadcast the bowl game on television and radio, as well as admission fees, are not taxable
to the 501 (c)(3) organization. Id. See Mary E. Monahan, Unfair Competition or Fundraising?
A Proposal to Modify the Regularly Carried On Test of the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
10 Am. J. of Tax Pol'y 73 (1992) (proposing a two-part test to be substituted for the "regularly
carried on" test. '"The test will first examine whether the purchaser of the goods or services
derives more than an insignificant commercial benefit from the purchase. If the commercial
benefit is insignificant, the activity would not be commercial and would not be subject to
UBIT. If the commercial benefit to the purchaser is significant, the test would then examine
whether the activity was intended and operated as a fundraiser with full disclosure of profit
and the approval of the membership of the organization. If the activity lacks one of the factors
of the second part of the test, it would be a business subject to UBIT." Id. at 73-74.).
It is indisputable that intercollegiate athletics has become "big business. In 1988
alone, the 104 Division I-A college football teams made over $500 million through gate,
television, and licensing receipts and $52 million in bowl game revenues. In 1995, with the
so-called 'Bowl Allicance' between the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, the Federal Express Orange
Bowl, and the Nokia Sugar Bowl, the average payout per team per bowl game was over $8
million." Hasselback and Clark, at 340. Observing that a loss in a late-season game could send
a team to a far less lucrative bowl encounter than a win, Malcolm Moran, writing in The New
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conduct of such trade or business is not substantially related (other than
through the production of funds) to the organization's performance of its
exempt functions."' The Revenue Act of 1950 provided no definition of
the phrase "trade or business" for purposes of the new tax.126 The Senate
Report accompanying the 1950 Revenue Bill offered the assurance, however,
that the term had the same meaning for purposes of the tax on unrelated trade
or business as it had elsewhere in the Code, citing as a specific reference the
predecessor of section 162127 which allows as a deduction ordinary and nec-
essary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business." The difficulty
with this clarification is that neither the Code nor the Treasury regulations at
the time of the enactment of the 1950 legislation or ever after has supplied
an all-purpose definition. Nor can much be gleaned from judicial inter-
pretation of the predecessor of section 162 preceding the Senate Report.'
By the time of the enactment of the 1950 legislation the Supreme
Court had decided two major cases dealing with the meaning of the phrase
"trade or business" as used in the predecessor of section 162: Deputy v. Du
Pont" and Higgins v. Commissioner.32 Faced with the question of
whether a corporate shareholder was engaged in a trade or business when he
sold some of his stock short in order to preserve the value of his investment,
the majority of the Court in Du Pont in effect sidestepped the issue,
disallowing the short sale expenses on the grounds that they were neither
York Times, commented: "[N]o college player should have to live with the consequences of
a missed extra point that cost his school more than S7 million." Malcolm Moran, Bowl
Alliance Raises the Stakes Too High, The N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1996, at C3.
125. Section 513(a) excludes from the reach of the tax any trade or business:
(1) in which substantially all the work. . . is performed for the organiza-
tion without compensation; or (2) which is carried on ... by the
[charitable] organization primarily for the convenience of its members,
students, patients, officers, or employees . . .; or (3) which is the selling
of merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the
organization as gifts or contributions.
IRC § 513(a) (formerly IRC § 422(b) (1939)). An example of the first exception is an "exempt
orphanage running a second-hand clothing store" where "substantially all the work is
performed by volunteers without compensation." S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54, at 108.
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3166. An example of the second exception "would be a
laundry operated by a college for the purpose of laundering dormitory linens and the clothing
of students." Id. An example of the third exception is a thrift shop. See Regs. § 1.513-1(e).
126. See IRC § 513(a) (formerly IRC § 422(b) (1939)).
127. IRC § 162(a) (formerly IRC § 23(a) (1939)).
128. S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54 at 106. reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. at 3165.
129. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23. 27 (1987).
130. Id. The Supreme Court has provided a brief judicial history of the phrase "trade
or business." Id.
131. Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
132. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
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ordinary nor necessary. In Higgins, however, the Court squarely addressed the
issue, holding that an investor who incurred salaries and other expenses in
managing his portfolio of stocks and bonds was never engaged in a business
no matter how regular and continuous the investor's activity.
Inasmuch as the 1950 Congress had already determined that gross
income, less related expenses, derived from most investment activity engaged
in by a 501(c)(3) organization was to be excluded from unrelated business
taxable income,' 33 neither Supreme Court decision illuminated the trade or
business landscape painted by the 1950 legislation. More prophetic was
Justice Frankfurter's attempt at a definition in his concurring opinion in Du
Pont: "'carrying on any trade or business,' within the contemplation of
§ 23(a), involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services. This the taxpayer did not do."'"
1. The 1958 Regulations.-In the summer of 1958 the Treasury
Department adopted a set of regulations interpreting the Code provisions
imposing the tax on unrelated businesses.' 35 Echoing the Senate Report's
earlier reference to section 23(a), the 1958 regulations provided that "the term
'trade or business' has the same meaning as it has in section 162."' 136 In the
eight years that had elapsed between the issuance of the Senate Report and
the 1958 regulations, however, little had developed on the judicial horizon to
shed further light on the definition as it related to the deduction for business
expenses.
What is more significant is the inference that can be drawn from both
the Senate Report and the 1958 regulations as to the scope of the term in the
context of the tax on unrelated businesses. It is clear that both Congress and
the Treasury contemplated that a trade or business conducted by a 501(c)(3)
organization could be substantially related to the organization's performance
of its exempt purpose as well as substantially unrelated. The Senate Report
offered as examples of related businesses "a wheat farm operated by an
exempt agricultural college as part of its educational program" and athletic
activities conducted by an educational organization.'37 The 1958 regulations
added to the list of substantially related businesses "a university radio station
or press ... operated primarily as an integral pait of the educational program
of the university" and the sale of articles made by handicapped persons as
133. IRC § 512(b)(1)-(5) (formerly IRC § 422(a)(I)-(5) (1939)).
134. Du Pont, 308 U.S. at 499.
135. T.D. 6301, 1958-2 C.B. 197. The 1958 regulations adopted under the 1954
Code were for the most part a readoption of the 1952 regulations adopted under the 1939
Code. See T.D. 5928, 1952-2 C.B. 181.
136. Regs. § 1.513-1(a)(1) (as amended by T.D. 6301, 1958-2 C.B. 197).
137. S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54 at 107, reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. at 3165.
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part of their rehabilitation training. 3' It appears, therefore, that whatever
meaning the term "trade or business" held in the context of the 1950
legislation should apply equally to describe those businesses substantially
related to the exempt purposes of the organization as well as to those
substantially unrelated.
2. The 1967 Regulations.-In December of 1967 the Treasury
Department amended the 1958 regulations in an attempt to bring into sharper
focus the meaning of the term "trade or business" in the context of the tax
on unrelated businesses. 3 9 The 1967 regulations contained the following
salient provisions relating to the meaning of the term: (1) "for purposes of
section 513 the term 'trade or business' has the same meaning it has in
section 162";"4 (2)a trade or business "generally includes any activity
carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or perfor-
mance of services"; 4' (3) a trade or business for purposes of the tax on
unrelated businesses
is not limited to integrated aggregates of assets, activities and
good will which comprise businesses for the purposes of
certain other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Activities of producing or distributing goods or performing
services from which a particular amount of gross income is
derived do not lose identity as trade or business merely
because they are carried on within a larger aggregate of
similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeav-
ors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purpos-
es of the organization;
142
and (4) trade or businesses can be related to the purposes for which
exemption is granted as well as unrelated to such purposes. 43
a. The Reference to Section 162.-Although it appears at
first glance that the 1967 regulations merely repeated earlier references to
section 162 without further significance, two circuit court opinions handed
138. Regs. § 1.513-1(a)(4) (as amended by T.D. 6301, 1958-2 C.B. 197).
139. Proposed regulations were announced in Technical Information Release 899
(April 14, 1967). Final regulations were set out on December 11, 1967. effective for taxable
years beginning after December 12, 1967. T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274.
140. Regs. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.; Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
"Trade or business is 'related' to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the
conduct of the business activities has causal relationship to the achievement of exempt
purposes...." Id.
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down subsequent to the 1958 regulations infused new meaning into the 1967
pronouncement that the phrase "trade or business" has for purpose of section
513 the same meaning it has for purposes of the deduction for business
expenses. In Hirsch v. Commissioner,"4 the Ninth Circuit held that an
activity cannot be a business for purposes of the deduction unless the basic
and dominant intent behind the activity is ultimately to make a profit, "i.e.,
taxable income."1 45 The Court refused to allow business expenses claimed
by an officer and director of corporation because there was no understanding
that the officer/director would be compensated for his activities. 146 Similar-
ly, in Lamont v. Commissioner,4 7 the Second Circuit found that the
taxpayer's activities as a writer, publisher, and lecturer did not constitute a
trade or business because the most important criterion, genuine profit motive,
was lacking. Although earlier cases suggested that profit motive was an
essential element for the allowance of the business expense deduction, the
Ninth and Second Circuit opinions brought this requirement into sharp focus
just several years preceding the issuance of the 1967 regulations.1 41
One can only conject whether the 1967 regulations meant to imply
by the reference to section 162 that an activity conducted by a 501(c)(3)
organization is not trade or business, related or unrelated, unless the dominant
or "genuine" intent behind the activity is to make a profit. The regulations do
not use the words "dominant intent" and "profit" in defining the term.
Describing a related trade or business as one that contributes importantly to
the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purposes, 49 could the
1967 regulations have possibly meant that the intent behind related business
activity is primarily a desire for profit?
b. "[T]he term 'trade or business'. . . generally includes any
activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or
performance of services. "PL--Critical to the meaning of this provision is
whether the word "income" means gross income or profit. In other words, is
the phrase "activity carried on for the production of income" meant to
paraphrase the profit motive test of Hirsch and Lamont?
Read in their entirety, the 1967 regulations offered a number of
indications that the word "income" meant gross income and not profit. In
144. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963).
145. Id. at 736.
146. Id.
147. Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964).
148. Cf. White v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1955), (disallowing
expense deductions because transaction not entered into for profit), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939
(1956).
149. Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
150. Id. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
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illustrating the meaning of the phrase "trade or business," the regulations
repeatedly refer to activities of producing or distributing goods or performing
services from which "gross income" is derived.'' Moreover, the words
"gross income" and "income" are used interchangeably.5 2 Additionally,
having used the word "profit" a scant two times in the text of the regulations,
the drafters in no instance explained the phrase "trade or business" as any
activity carried on to derive profit from the sale of goods or the performance
of services.5
3
The regulations made it clear that trade or business substantially
related to the exempt purposes of the organization can receive "gross
income," not just businesses substantially unrelated." Assuming the phrase
"activity carried on for the production of income" implies a motive to
produce gross income, can it be said that an organization conducting a related
trade or business has such a motive? Presumably, a 501(c)(3) organization
such as a university that charges tuition in order for students to attend classes,
thereby deriving gross income, intended to generate gross income from the
performance of services. But this intention does not imply a further intention
151. E.g., id. ("Activities of producing or distributing goods or performing services
from which a particular amount of gross income is derived .. "). Regs. § 1.513-1(d(l)
provides: "Gross income derives from 'unrelated trade or business,' within the meaning of
[IRC] section 513(a), if the conduct of the trade or business which produces the income is not
substantially related ... to the purposes for which exemption is granted." Id.
Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(2) refers to "the conduct of trade or business from which a partic-
ular amount of gross income is derived" and states further. "Whether activities productive of
gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organ-
ization is granted exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved."
152. E.g., id. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274) ("Gross
income derives from 'unrelated trade or business,' within the meaning of [IRCI section 513(a),
if the conduct of the trade or business which produces the income is not substantially related
. .. to the purposes for which exemption is granted."); see also id. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (as
amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274) (Example six of the regulation states: "Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that the production of income from advertising utilizes the circulation
developed and maintained in performance of exempt functions, such income is gross income
from unrelated trade or business.").
153. E.g., id. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274). This
regulation uses the word "profit" as follows: "However, where an activity carried on for the
production of income constitutes an unrelated trade or business, no part of such trade or
business shall be excluded from such classification merely because it does not result in profit."
Id. Does the sentence indicate that the drafters are using "income" to mean gross income and
"profit" to mean an excess of gross income over expenses, or are the two words being used
interchangeably? Compare to the last sentence of IRC § 513(c) added by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969. See IRC § 513(c).
154. E.g., Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(i) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274)
("Gross income derived from charges for the performance of exempt functions does not
constitute gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business.").
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to derive profit from the classroom, as the gross income may be needed to
match expenses. Inasmuch as the regulation did not require a dominant intent
to produce gross income as the driving force of the activity, a motive to
produce gross income can be consistent with a dominant intent to further the
exempt purposes of the organization. Moreover, the regulations did not
illustrate the phrase "activity carried on for the production of income" in
terms of motive. Rather, the phrase is recast-"the production or distribution
of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income
is derived"' 55 -emphasizing the nature of the activity that generates the
gross income rather than the motive behind the activity.
c. A Trade or Business ". . . is not limited to integrated
aggregates of assets, activities and good will which comprise businesses for
the purposes of certain other provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. " 6-One of the Treasury Department's reasons for issuing the 1967
regulations, if not the primary reason, was to lay the foundation for the taxa-
tion of advertising revenue received by an exempt organization even though
the advertising is published in a journal that editorially furthers the exempt
purposes of the organization.5 7 To this end, the regulations fragmentized
what would otherwise be considered an integrated business, e.g., the publica-
tion of the journal, into its component parts, e.g., the advertising, circulation
and editorial components, in order to be able to treat the advertising
component as a separate business. Hence, the regulations determined the
related versus unrelated issue with respect to each activity conducted by an
exempt organization rather than with respect to each integrated business.15'
155. Id. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
156. Id. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274).
157. See William J. Lehrfeld, The Unfairness Doctrine: Commercial Advertising
Profits As Unrelated Business Income, 23 Tax Lawyer 349 (1970).
158. Regs. § 1.513-1(b) provides:
Thus, for example, the regular sale of pharmaceutical supplies to the gen-
eral public by a hospital pharmacy does not lose identity as trade or busi-
ness merely because the pharmacy also furnishes supplies to the hospital
and patients of the hospital in accordance with its exempt purposes....
Similarly, activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commercial
advertising do not lose identity as [sic] trade or business even though the
advertising is published in an exempt organization periodical which con-
tains editorial matter related to the exempt purposes of the organization.
Id.; see id. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (as amended by T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274) (ex. 6, 7).
The publisher of the New England Journal of Medicine challenged the validity of
the 1967 fragmentation regulation as contravening Congressional intent. See Massachusetts
Medical Soc'y v. United States, 514 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1975). The First Circuit agreed with
the taxpayer. Id. The case was decided after the 1969 Congress codified the fragmentation
regulations by enacting IRC § 513(c), The decision, therefore, applied only to taxable years
beginning before the 1969 amendment. Id. Regs. § 1.512-1(d)(2), the First Circuit observed,
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3. The Tax Refonn Act of 1969.-Noting the controversy swirling
around the issue as to whether the 1950 Congress had intended a scalpel to
be applied to an integrated business so that it might be dissected into its
component parts, and with the avowed purpose of codifying the scalpel
invented by the 1967 regulations,5 9 the 1969 Congress added the regula-
tions' fragmentation language to the Code as subsection 513(c):
For purposes of this section, the term "trade or business" includes
any activity which is carried on for the production of income from
the sale of goods or the performance of services. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, an activity does not lose identity as a trade or
allows the excess of expenses attributable to the editorial content of the magazine over income
derived therefrom, i.e., a loss produced solely by the exempt related business component of
the magazine, to offset advertising taxable income, i.e., the unrelated business component.
Observed the Court: "It is doubtful that Congress would have approved such an anomalous
result." Massachusetts Medical Soc'y, 514 F.2d. Id. at 156.
In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989). the AMA
challenged the validity of Regs. § 1.512-1(a)-(f) governing the allocation of revenue and
expenses between a journal's exempt editorial activities and its taxable advertising activities.
For a discussion and generally critical view of the fragmentation regulations, see Thomas R.
Moore, Current Problems of Exempt Organizations, 24 Tax L. Rev. 469, 472, 474-76 (1969);
Liles & Blum, supra note 2, at 50-54; John M. Donahue, Unrelated Business Income of Tax
Exempt Organizations, 37 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 27.0611] (1979); The Macaroni
Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1291. The author of The Macaroni Monopoly acknowledges that
if a university radio station whose programs further educational purposes is taxed on its
advertising income, the "exemption for the radio station itself is meaningless" because
advertising income is usually a radio station's only income. Id. Additionally, although exempt
publications "compete for advertising, their income from this source is necessarily limited by
the size and quality of their readership. When a publication like the National Geographic
Magazine expands, the expansion would presumably serve the purpose for which the Geo-
graphic Society was granted its tax exemption." Id. at 1291-92. Nevertheless. the author finds
the fragmentation provisions of the 1967 regulations acceptable because the tax will only apply
to publications whose total subscription and advertising income exceed expenses. Id. at 1292.
159. In 1968 the Senate approved a measure to exempt advertising revenue in
exempt journals, but the Conference Committee eliminated it. The Senate also voted down a
measure to delay application of the new regulations for a period of one year. S. Rep. No.
1497, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968). In referring to the 1967 regulations. The House
Committee on Ways and Means considering the 1969 Tax Reform Act commented:
In general, [your committee] is in agreement with the purpose of the
regulations. Your committee believes that a business competing with
taxpaying organizations should not be granted an unfair competitive
advantage by operating tax free unless the business contributes importantly
to the exempt function. It has concluded that by this standard, advertising
in a journal published by an exempt organization is not related to the
organization's exempt functions, and therefore it believes that this income
should be taxed.
H.R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 102, at 50, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1695.
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business merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of
similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which
may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organiza-
tion. Where an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated
trade or business, no part of such trade or business shall be excluded
from such classification merely because it does not result in prof-
it.
160
Although the Supreme Court in United States v. American Bar
Endowment 6' refers to the first sentence of subsection 513(c) as defining
a trade or business, 16 the language is presumably not intended as an all-
encompassing definition for purposes of a tax on unrelated trade or business.
The word "includes" in the first sentence, as originally appearing in the 1967
regulations, most likely is directed at including a component part of an
integrated business, i.e., an activity, within the grasp of the tax as well as a
whole business.
Keen on wheeling integrated businesses into the operating room for
obligatory surgery, the 1969 Congress unfortunately codified the ambiguity
of the word "income" in the first sentence as well. Does the use of the word
"profit" in the third sentence indicate that Congress knew the difference
between "income" and "profit" and deliberately chose not to use "profit" in
the first sentence? Is the word "profit" associated only with an unrelated trade
or business, whereas "income" is associated with any trade or business,
related or unrelated? Or, is subsection 513(c) simply using the two words
"income" and "profit" interchangeably?'63
160. IRC § 513(c). Section 513(c) was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 502(c), 83 Stat. 487, 576. The Supreme Court,
in United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986), did not challenge
the validity of the fragmentation rationale embodied in § 513(c).
161. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
162. Id. at 110.
163. The Senate Committee on Finance drafted § 513(c) in narrower terms, to be
limited to advertising in otherwise exempt journals, a sale by a hospital pharmacy of drugs to
persons other than hospital patients, and the operation of a race track by an exempt
organization. S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 100, at 76, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2104.
The Senate Committee interpreted "an activity carried on for the production of income" to
mean "net income." The Senate Committee further stated:
Under both the House and committee versions of the bill, an organization
which publishes more than one magazine, periodical, etc., may treat any
of these on a consolidated basis in determining its unrelated trade or
business income so long as each such periodical, etc., is 'carried on for the
production of income.' The organization, however, would not be permitted
to consolidate the losses of a publication not carried on for the production
of income with the profits of other publications which are carried on for
profit.
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4. Decisions in the 1980s.-Stepping into the middle of this fugue
of statutory interpretation written contrapuntally by Congressional tax
committees and the Treasury during the previous three decades, courts in the
1980s were confronted with the meaning of the phrase "trade or business" for
purposes of the tax on unrelated businesses with little more than ambiguity
to guide them. Faced with the issue in Louisiana Credit Union League v.
United States"6 of whether a business league exempt under section
501(c)(6) was engaged in a trade or business through the activities of
endorsement and promotion of insurance, data processing, and debt collection
service, the Fifth Circuit held that the proper test is whether the organization
"is engaged in extensive activity over a substantial period of time with the
intent to earn a profit."'65 Noting that section 513(c)---"any activity which
is carried on for the production of income" "-first raises the issue of
motive, the court allowed itself to be guided by the regulations to the
"familiar jurisprudence of section 162" and in turn to the conclusion that the
statutory standard must be a motive for profit.' 67 Implicit in the standard
formulated by the Fifth Circuit is the requirement that the profit be earned
from the sale of goods or the performance of services. Under this standard,
the court found that the League was engaged in a trade or business.16s
Finding the "carried on for the production of income" language of
subsection 513(c) "quite clear," the Fourth Circuit in Carolinas Farm &
Id. The Conference Committee followed the House bill, but in the third sentence of § 513(c)
substituted the word "profit" for "income," i.e., "Where an activity carried on for profit" rather
than 'Vhere an activity carried on for income." See Conf. Rep. No. 782. 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2392, 2406. Presumably, the purpose of the third
sentence of § 513(c) is to allow the consolidation of the losses of one periodical published by
an exempt organization with the profits of another periodical published by the same organiza-
tion when the advertising in both is profit-motivated. See Cooper, supra note 71. at 2010; see
also Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1438 (applying § 513(c) to support author's position that a uni-
versity's intercollegiate athletic program can be a trade or business separate from its physical
education program). As to whether broadcast revenues can be treated as a trade or business
separate from the intercollegiate athletic program, see Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1436 n.35.
164. Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982).
Although organizations exempt from income taxation under categories other than § 501 (c)(3)
are not the focus of this article, the principles developed in cases dealing with the tax on
unrelated business applicable to such organizations can be, and have been, applied to the
activities of § 501(c)(3) organizations. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477
U.S. 105, at 110 n. 1 (1986) (citing several appellate court decisions dealing with organizations
exempt under § 501(c)(6) with respect to the definition of a trade or business in applying the
term to the activities of a § 501(c)(3) organization).
165. Id. at 532.
166. Id. at 531.
167. Id. at 532.
168. Id. at 534.
19961
Florida Tax Review
Power Equipment Dealers Ass'n v. United States'69 also equated that
language with the profit motive test to hold a trade association taxable on
insurance premium rebates received from a commercial carrier. The Court
said: "[D]efining an activity as a trade or business on the basis of the
taxpayer's motive for conducting it arguably effectuates Congress's intent
since an activity conducted with a profit motive and not substantially related
to a charitable end 'presents sufficient likelihood of unfair competition to be
within the policy of the tax.' 26 C.F.R. 1.513-1(b)."'"7 Once again, the
inference can be drawn that an exempt organization's primary motive, or at
least one motive, for conducting a trade or business substantially related to
its charitable purpose is by definition a desire for profit.
In a 1984 decision, Professional Insurance Agents of Michigan v.
Commissioner,17 1 the Sixth Circuit explicitly followed the logic of Louisi-
ana Credit Union League in holding another business league taxable on its
income received from splitting insurance premiums with a commercial carrier
in exchange for the organization's promotion of the insurance product among
its membership. 72 Similarly, the Tax Court has either explicitly or implicit-
ly assumed that the word "income" in the first sentence of section 513(c)
means "profit" or has extracted that conclusion from the reference to section
162 and the Hirsch rationale. 7 3 Accordingly, the Tax Court has consistently
determined that the proper test to determine the presence of a trade or
business is whether the organization is conducting the activity with a
predominant motive, or at least a motive, for profit.
74
It was in this judicial setting that the Supreme Court decided United
States v. American Bar Endowment'm in 1986. American Bar Endowment
169. 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983).
170. Id. at 170 (quoting Regs. § 1.513-1(b)).
171. 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984).
172. Id. at 1103-04.
173. See Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mich. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7, 20 (1987)
("If an activity is carried on for the production of income from the sale goods or the
performance of services, then it is a 'trade or business' within the meaning of § 513(c)....
In determining whether petitioner carried on the Christmas card program for the production
of income, our inquiry is directed at petitioner's intent in carrying on the activity. We must
determine whether petitioner carried on the Christmas card program with the intent of
producing income, or stated another way, whether petitioner had a profit motive."). See also
National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75, 84 (1989).
174. See National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75, 84-85 (1989);
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mich. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7, 20 (1987); St. Joseph Farms v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 9, 20 (1985); Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 246,
259 (1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1438
(equating the word "income" in § 513(c) with "profit," and concluding that an activity is a
trade or business if at least one of the motives for operating it is the desire for profit).
175. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
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(ABE) is a 501(c)(3) organization devoted to advancing legal research and to
promoting the administration of justice. ABE has automatically as its
membership all members of the American Bar Association. During the
taxable years in question ABE provided group life, health, accident and
disability insurance to its members. In return for choosing the insurer,
negotiating premium rates, soliciting its members, collecting the premiums,
and screening claims for benefits, ABE received all dividends (refund of
excess premiums) declared by the insurance carriers. As a condition to
participation in an insurance program, members were required to agree to
allow ABE to keep the dividends rather than distribute them to the member-
ship.
176
After reciting section 513(c)'s definition of a trade or business as
"any activity which is carried on for the production of income from the sale
of goods or the performance of services" and noting in footnote 1 that "It]he
standard test for the existence of a trade or business for purposes of § 162 is
whether the activity 'was entered into with the dominant hope and intent of
realizing a profit,' ,.n the Supreme Court determined that ABE's insurance
program "falls within the literal language of these definitions."'7 In order
to assure itself that ABE's activities constituted both the sale of goods and
the performance of services, and possessed the general characteristics of a
trade or business, the Court compared the organization's insurance programs
to activities that potentially could be, or in fact are, carried out by taxable
entities: "Certainly the assembling of a group of better-than-average insurance
risks, negotiating on their behalf with insurance companies, and administering
a group policy are activities that can be-and are-provided by private
commercial entities in order to make a profit."'79 Because the Claims
Court' 80 and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 8 ' had determined
that ABE lacked a motive for profit in operating its insurance program, much
of Justice Marshall's opinion is devoted to dispelling the notion that the
dividends received by ABE are voluntary contributions from the membership
and therefore can not constitute profits."-
176. Id. at 107-08.
177. Id. at 110 & n.1 (quoting Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695. 704 ( 1th
Cir. 1984)).
178. Id. at 110.
179. Id. at 111.
180. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 CI. Ct. 404 (1984). afrd in part
and rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
181. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
182. Id. at 111-16.
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5. Is Profit Motive the Correct Standard?.-If profit in a nontax
sense is the excess of revenues generated by an activity over allocable
expenses, three of the types of activities conceivably conducted by 501(c)(3)
organizations-fund raising, investing, and unrelated trade or
business-typically are driven by a desire for profit to enable the organization
to carry on its exempt purposes. Inasmuch as each of these activities can be
conducted with regularity as well, defining the phrase "trade or business" as
"extensive activity over a substantial period of time with the intent to earn a
profit"'83 or as an activity "entered into with the dominant hope and intent
of realizing a profit '"' does not serve as a useful guidepost to distinguish
business activity from the other two types of endeavors.
Conversely, as the Fifth Circuit observed in Louisiana Credit Union
League, the fourth type of activity potentially conducted by 501(c)(3)
organizations, substantially related trade or business, cannot by the definition
within section 513(a) have as its primary function the potential to raise
revenue to support the organization's exempt function.'85 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit appears to have concluded that the touchstone of trade or business is
profit motive and that a related trade or business by definition can not have
a motive primarily to earn profit.
Similarly, in United States v. American College of Physicians,186
another 1986 Supreme Court decision involving the tax on the unrelated
business income of a section 501(c)(3) organization, the Court appears to
confirm the position that a trade or business is not substantially related to the
exempt purposes of the organization if the exempt function it furthers is
incidental to its purpose to raise revenue.'87 In this respect the two Supreme
Court cases decided in 1986 interpreting the section 511 tax, American
College of Physicians and American Bar Endowment, appear to be inconsis-
tent. To exclude from the category "substantially related trade or business"
any activity primarily driven by a desire for profit (American College of
Physicians) and to adopt the view that a trade or business is an activity
involving the sale of goods or performance of service with the dominant
intent of realizing profit (American Bar Endowment) is to fail to define the
phrase "trade or business" as an activity that can be either related or unrelated
to the accomplishment of the exempt purposes of the organization.
183. Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 532 (5th Cir.
1982).
184. Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11 th Cir. 1984).
185. Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 530.
186. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
187. Id. at 848-49. The Court, in affirming the Claims Court and reversing the Court
of Appeals, quotes with favor the Claims Court: "[A]ny educational function [the advertising]
may have served was incidental to its purpose of raising revenue." Id. at 848.
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What both related and unrelated trade or business activities have in
common with trade or businesses conducted by taxable organizations, and is
not characteristic of either investing or fund raising, is the receipt of gross
income from the sale of goods or the performance of services at market
value. To add an additional ingredient to the definition in the context of the
tax imposed by section 51 1--that the activity be driven by a motive, or
primary motive for profit-is to restrict the scope of the definition to include
unrelated, but not related, trade or business. From this perspective the
reference to section 162, both in legislative history and the regulations, has
misled the courts into infusing the Hirsch and Lamont profit motive gloss into
the meaning of the phrase "trade or business" for purposes of the tax on
unrelated business income.
Requiring profit motive to be the touchstone of trade or business
activity makes sense if the task is to differentiate an individual taxpayer's
business expenses deductible under section 162 from his hobby or other
expenditures nondeductible under section 262.'" The "for profit" criterion
may be the proper one as well to determine whether the expenses of a trade
or business are deductible under subsection 512(a)(1) to determine unrelated
business taxable income. The "for profit" test is misapplied when the task is
to differentiate trade or business activity from other types of endeavors
conducted by 501(c)(3) organizations."s
188. See IRC § 262(a) (disallowing deductions for personal, living, or family
expenses).
189. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit both cite the Supreme Court's
decision in American Bar Endowment as establishing profit motive as the proper test to
determine the presence of trade or business. See American Postal Workers Union v. United
States, 925 F.2d 480, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents v.
Commissioner, 801 F.2d 987, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1986). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit also applied the profit motive test in National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors
v. United States, 944 F.2d 859, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In concluding that a full-time gambler was engaged in a trade or business within the
meaning of § 162, the Supreme Court held that "while the offering of goods and services
usually would qualify the activity as a trade of business, this factor, it seems to us, is not an
absolute prerequisite." Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 34 (1987). Further, the
Court stated:
We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer
must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that the
taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income
or profit. A sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not
qualify.
Id. at 35. But the Court refused to supply an all-purpose definition:
But the difficulty rests in the Code's wide utilization in various contexts
of the term 'trade or business,' in the absence of an all-purpose definition
by statute or regulation, and in our concern that an attempt judicially to
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Arguably, the majority of courts erroneously applying the "for profit"
criterion have nonetheless reached the correct conclusion in their attempt to
identify trade or business activity for purposes of the section 511 tax. There
is, however, a compelling reason to encourage courts to apply a more
accurate definitional test beyond the need to be logical. The "for profit" test
is relevant to differentiate unrelated from related trade or business, but not to
distinguish trade or business from other types of endeavors such as fund
raising. As discussed in Subpart B, infra, by injecting the element of profit
motive in the attempt to identify trade or business, many courts in effect have
resolved the related versus unrelated question before even turning to consider
that issue.
6. Reformulation of the Standard.-Regulations section 1.513-1(b)
should be amended in part to provide that for purposes of section 513 the
phrase "trade or business" generally includes any activity (1) involving the
sale of goods or the performance of services at market value from which
gross income is derived; and (2) which otherwise possesses the characteristics
required to constitute trade or business within the meaning of section 162, but
without regard to whether or not the activity is engaged in with a motive, or
primary motive, to derive profit.
Had the proposed standard been applied to the facts in American Bar
Endowment, the Supreme Court could have found ABE to be engaged in a
trade or business from the basic conclusion that the excess premiums received
by ABE from the insurance carriers more likely constituted gross income
from the sale of goods and the performance of services at market value than
they did charitable contributions from the membership resulting from the
members voluntarily paying the higher than necessary premiums ABE negoti-
ated with the carriers. Unfortunately, the Court interjected the element of
motive into the inquiry when it identified ABE's insurance as a trade or
business by comparing the activity to similar endeavors actually or potentially
carried on by taxable organizations for profit. One can assume that desire for
profit is the driving force behind all sales and service activity conducted by
taxable organizations and is a necessary component to find such activity to
be a trade or business in the hands of an individual. One cannot make the
same assumption with respect to all sales and service activity conducted by
501(c)(3) organizations. 9 '
fomulate and impose a test for all situations would be counterproductive,
unhelpful, and even somewhat precarious for the overall integrity of the
Code.
Id. at 36.
190. In American Bar Endowment, the United States Claims Court applied its own
test to identify trade or business, viz., whether the activity was conducted in a competitive,
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B. Trade or Business: Substantially Related or Unrelated?
The statutory definition of the term "unrelated trade or business" has
remained unchanged since the Revenue Act of 1950. Section 513(a) defines
the term as "any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially
related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the
use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such
organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function
constituting the basis for its exemption... ,,' The Senate Report accom-
panying the 1950 Revenue Bill attempted to illuminate this "substantially
related" standard by way of example and not by way of explication.
Examples offered of substantially related business were a wheat farm
operated by an exempt agricultural college as part of its educational program;
commercial manner. 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 411-12 (1984). This test was developed by the United
States Court of Claims in Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 227 CL Cl. 474 (1981),
wherein a charitable organization sent out books, maps, charts and other premiums in
connection with the solicitation of contributions. The government asserted that the activity was
engaged in for profit and therefore constituted a trade or business. Id. at 486. The Court
responded: "[I]t is clear that not all activity engaged in with the expectation of gain constitutes
a 'trade or business' as that term is utilized with respect to UBTI." Id. The Court pointed out
that both S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and subsequently amended Regs.
§ 1.513-1(b) contain statements to the effect that the sending out of low cost articles incidental
to the solicitation of charitable contributions was not to be considered a trade or business.
Disabled Am. Vets., 227 Ct. Cl. at 486-87. It is clear that the Court of Claims viewed an
activity as being conducted in a competitive, commercial manner when the exempt
organization offered the premium items only in exchange for prior contributions in amounts
that approached the retail value of the item. On the other hand, a "competitive situation would
not be present" when the contribution required for the premium item was greatly in excess of
the retail value of the premium. Id. at 488-89. Utilized in this way, the "competitive,
commercial manner" test employed to identify trade or business is the same criterion proposed
in this article, viz., trade or business is the sale of goods or the performance of services at
market value from which gross income is derived. Fundraising would include the supply of
goods or the performance of services to the extent that the amount voluntarily paid for the
goods or services exceeded their market value. If the article sent out is "low cost:* the entire
amount remitted to the charitable organization can be considered a contribution. See IRC
§ 513(h) (added by Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2766 (Tax Reform Act of 1986)) (providing
that in the case of a charitable organization, the term "unrelated trade or business" does not
include activities relating to the distribution of low cost articles incidental to the solicitation
of charitable contributions). In American Bar Endowment, the Claims Court again applied the
"competitive, commercial manner" test to conclude that the ABE membership was voluntarily
supporting a fundraising effort because "the amount of money ABE is permitted to retain far
exceeds the value of any service it may be providing through the operation of the insurance
programs. It is quite obvious, then, that this money was not earned from the sale of goods or
the performance of services... but for some other reasons." American Bar Endowment. 4 Ct.
Cl. at 411-12.
191. IRC § 513(a) (formerly IRC § 422(b)).
19961
Florida Tax Review
income of an educational organization from charges for admissions to football
games; a nonprofit hospital's income from patients; and income from the sale
of articles made by handicapped persons derived by an exempt organization
engaged in their rehabilitation." 2 Not surprisingly, the manufacture and sale
of automobile tires by a college was offered as an example of a business
ordinarily considered unrelated to the exempt purposes of the school. 3
1. The 1958 Regulations.-Although the statute focuses on the
relatedness of the conduct of business activity to the performance of the
organization's exempt purpose, the test under the 1958 regulations was the
underlying principal purpose driving the activity. Under the 1958 regulations,
a trade or business is ordinarily "substantially related to the activities for
which an organization is granted exemption if the principal purpose of such
trade or business is to further (other than through the production of income)
the purpose for which the organization is granted exemption."'94 Two im-
portant guideposts were offered to determine an activity's principal purpose:
(a) the nature and size of the activity in question compared with the scale of
the organization's exempt activity, and (b) the manner in which the activity
in question was conducted. 5 Expanding upon an example in the Senate
Report accompanying the 1950 Revenue Bill, the 1958 regulations observed
that a wheat farm may not be substantially related to the educational program
of an agricultural college if it is "operated on a scale disproportionately large"
when compared with the exempt activity.' According to the regulations:
Similarly, a university radio station or press is considered a
related trade or business if operated primarily as an integral
part of the educational program of the university, but is
considered an unrelated trade or business if operated in
substantially the same manner as a commercial radio station
or publishing house.'
2. The 1967 Regulations.-As noted above, the 1967 regulations are
remembered for their announcement to the charitable sector that the Treasury
192. S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54, at 107-08, reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.S. at
3165-66.
193. Id. See also The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1291 (suggesting that
the criterion used in the House and Senate reports to distinguish related from unrelated
business was more that between "normal" and "unusual" than a determination of how
substantially the activity furthered the organization's exempt purposes).
194. Regs. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1975).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Department had honed a new surgical skill-an ability to dissect an integrated
business into its component parts, each of which was to be tested as a
separate trade or business to determine that particular component's relatedness
or unrelatedness to the exempt purposes of the organization. Thus, under the
1967 regulations, the activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commer-
cial advertising in an exempt organization periodical was a trade or business
separate from the activity of publishing the editorial matter. Similarly, the
regular sale of pharmaceutical supplies to the general public by a hospital
pharmacy was a business separate from the furnishing of supplies to hospital
patients. t9
Creating less controversy at the time was the 1967 regulations' refor-
mulation of the standard governing whether a trade or business, fragmented
or unfragmented, was related to the exempt purposes of the organization.
Under the 1967 regulations, which are still in effect, a business is substantial-
ly related if the conduct of the business has a substantial causal relationship
to the achievement of the organization's exempt purposes.' 9 As the 1967
regulations rephrase it, "the production or distribution of the goods or the
performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must
contribute importantly to the accomplishment of' the exempt purposes of the
organization. 200 In each case the test is one of facts and circumstances.
To determine the issue of substantial relatedness, both the 1958 and
the 1967 regulations direct one's focus to the size and extent of the activities
in question compared to the nature and extent of the organization's exempt
activity.20' Under the 1958 regulations, however, objective factors such as
the manner in which the activity is conducted are a means to determine the
subjective primary purpose of the activity,22 i.e., did the organization
intend the activity to contribute importantly to the fulfillment of its exempt
purposes? Under the 1967 regulations objective factors are a means to
determine whether or not the activity in fact contributes importantly to the
accomplishment of the exempt goals. -0 3
Did the Treasury Department intend a substantive change by adopting
in the 1967 regulations a reformulated standard governing the substantial
relatedness issue? Perhaps the Treasury Department came to realize that the
198. Id. Regs. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983).
199. Id. Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(2).
200. Id.
201. See id. Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (1967 regulations); Regs. § 1.513-2(a)(41 (1958
Regulations) (as amended in 1969).
202. See Regs. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1969).
203. See Regs. § 1.513-1(d). One possible difference is that an activity too large
relative to the exempt purposes it served was totally taxable under the 1958 regulations and
only partially taxable under the 1967 regulations. See Moore, supra note 158, at 473-74.
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1958 regulations were out of step with the statute by requiring a determina-
tion of an exempt organization's subjective primary motive in operating a
business activity. Section 513 requires only a determination of whether the
conduct of the business is substantially related to the performance of the
exempt function, rather than discovery of the principal motive driving the
activity. Noticeably absent from the 1967 regulations are references to
principal purpose or motive. Did the 1967 regulations mean to imply that an
activity could meet the "contribute importantly" test and fail the "principal
purpose" test?"°
Perhaps the 1967 regulations reflected the Treasury Department's
intention to withdraw the principal purpose test of the 1958 regulations,
focusing rather on more objective criteria, as a necessary consequence of that
regulation's fragmentation of an integrated business into its component parts
each of which itself is regarded as a trade or business. Although a business
as an integrated whole is likely to be driven by a discernible primary motive,
the exempt organization may have failed to formulate a motive, at least on
a conscious level, for each of the business's component parts.
Whatever the reason for the reformulation of the standard, it is
probable that a court faced with the related versus unrelated issue will come
to the same conclusion whether the standard applied is the principal purpose
test of the 1958 regulations or the causal relationship test of the 1967
regulations. Both standards require an examination of the same objective facts
and circumstances to resolve the issue. Moreover, it can be assumed in the
usual case that if the manner in which an activity is conducted contributes
importantly to the exempt purposes of the organization, the activity mirrors
the principal motive to further those purposes. Nonetheless, the case of a
501(c)(3) organization falling to conduct a business activity in a manner that
contributes importantly to its exempt purpose despite its principal purpose to
do so is not beyond imagination. Less likely is the case in which the activity
contributes importantly to the accomplishment of the organization's exempt
purposes notwithstanding a principal purpose to earn profit.05
Is it significant that section 513(c), added by the Tax Reform Act of
1969, codified those portions of the 1967 regulations fragmenting an inte-
grated business into its component parts, but failed to codify those portions
dealing with the issue of whether the activity, fragmented or unfragmented,
was substantially related to the exempt purposes of the organization?
204. Professor Kaplan assumes this to be the case: 'Thus, an activity is 'substantial-
ly related' if it 'contributes importantly' to the university's educational mission, even if the
activity's principal purpose is financial or is otherwise unrelated to education." Kaplan, supra
note 62, at 1451. What luck if a university sets out primarily to make money from an activity
and the activity also contributes importantly to the university's educational mission!
205. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, the last sentence of subsection 513(c) casts a lingering doubt
as to whether the 1969 Congress intended subjective motive to play a role:
"Where an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated trade or
business, no part of such trade or business shall be excluded from such
classification merely because it does not result in profiL" 2 6
Whether or not the 1967 regulations were intended to divert attention
away from subjective motive, very few courts applying the "contribute
importantly" standard to resolve the related versus unrelated issue have been
able to avoid sliding back into the principal purpose test of the 1958
regulations, even after having recited the "contribute importantly" standard
as the appropriate one.
For instance, in American College of Physicians,2 involving facts
almost identical to Example (7) of section 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) of the 1967
regulations, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the
business of selling advertisements containing information about the use of
medical products published in The Annals of Internal Medicine was
substantially related to the educational purpose of the College. Reciting the
regulation's direction to examine the importance of the business activity's
contribution to the organization's exempt purpose, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Claims Court that the manner in which the College selected the
advertisements did not establish the necessary causal relationship between the
activity and the exemption [e.g., those willing to pay for space got it and
there was lacking a comprehensive or systematic presentation of the goods
or services advertised],.08 But the Claims Court itself slipped into the
principal purpose standard of the 1958 regulations when it concluded that any
educational function that may have been served by the advertisements was
incidental to the College's purpose of raising revenue. -09 The Supreme
Court pursued this theme with the following comment: "This is not to say
that the College could not control its publication of advertisements in such
a way as to reflect an intention to contribute importantly to its educational
functions."21 Doubtless Example (7) of the regulation itself with its
reference to both "governing objective" and "method" contributed to the
206. IRC § 513(c).
207. 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
208. Id. at 849.
209. American College of Physicians v. United States, 3 Cl. C. 531. 535 (1983).
rev'd, 743 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
210. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 849 (emphasis added). For an
analysis of the case, see Note, "Substantially Related"--The Magic Words for Nonprofit
Organizations: United States v. American College of Physicians, 21 U.S.F. L Rev. 795 (1987).
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Court's attention to the motive of the College as well as to the manner in
which the advertisements were selected. 2"
In California Thoroughbred Breeders Association v. Commission-
er,212 the Tax Court, citing American College of Physicians, understood the
Supreme Court to hold that "it would examine the conduct and intent of the
organization,, 21 3 that the Supreme Court "found that the taxpayer did not
use or intend to use the advertising for the purpose of contributing to the
educational value of the journal" 214 and that the Supreme Court "found that
any educational function that the advertisements might serve was only
incidental to its purpose of raising revenue. 2 5 It would appear, therefore,
that the principal purpose standard of the 1958 regulations remains in
vigorously good health to this day.
3. Profit and Profit Motive.-The 1958 regulations did not explicitly
provide that if the principal purpose of a trade or business is not to further
the exempt purpose of the organization, a fortiori, the principal purpose must
be to earn profit (ultimately to be used to further the organization's exempt
purpose).2 6 Nor do the 1967 regulations explicitly state that if a business
is found not to contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the organiza-
tion's exempt purpose, the only alternative is to conclude that it is primarily
211. Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) ex. 7. Example 7 provides in pertinent part:
Although continuing education of its members in matters pertaining to
their profession is one of the purposes for which Z is granted exemption,
the publication of advertising designed and selected in the manner of
ordinary commercial advertising is not an educational activity of the kind
contemplated by the exemption statute; it differs fundamentally from such
an activity both in its governing objective and in its method.
Id.
212. 57 T.C. Memo (CCH) 962, T.C. Memo (RIA) 89,342 (1989).
213. Id. at 967; 58 T.C. Memo (RIA) at 89-1722 (emphasis in original).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id. (emphasis added). See Note, Insurance Trade Association Held Subject to
Unrelated Business Income Tax: Independent Insurance Agents of Huntsville, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 47 Tax Law. 815 (1994) (interpreting the Supreme Court in American College
of Physicians to hold that "to contribute importantly (and hence to be substantially related),
an activity need only reflect an intention to contribute importantly and not actually do so." Id.
at 818. The unstated inference is that the principal purpose standard of the 1958 regulations
lies at the heart of the 1967 regulations, notwithstanding the fact that the 1967 regulations
focus on the casual relationship between the conduct of an activity and achievement of the
organization's exempt purposes. The Note observes that a number of appellate court decisions
handed down subsequent to American College of Physicians, notably Huntsville, focused more
on the outcome of the activity in question rather than on the organization's intent as evinced
by how the activity was conducted. Id. at 823.
216. See Regs. § 1.513-2(a) (as amended in 1969).
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a revenue raiser." 7 Nonetheless, the inference in both regulations that a
business activity must serve one master or the other is unmistakable and the
vast majority of courts have assumed this to be the case.
In Iowa State University of Science & Technology v. United
States, 8 one of the few cases decided under standards set out during the
brief nine-year reign of the 1958 regulations, the Court of Claims was faced
with the question of whether the operation of a college television station was
related or unrelated to the educational purposes of the University. Repeating
the example in the regulation that a university radio station is unrelated if
operated in substantially the same manner as a commercial station, the Court
observed that the primary purpose of a typical commercial facility is
profit.2 9 The Court examined the programming policy of the television
station, i.e., the selection of popular entertainment programs to attract the
largest number of viewers, as well as the secondary importance of public
affairs and educational programs, to support the conclusion that the station
was being operated in a manner to maximize revenue.' Finding that the
primary goal of Iowa State's WOI-TV was revenue maximization, the Court
held the University's television business not to be substantially related to the
school's exempt purposes.""
Typically, the issue is framed in the manner in which the Seventh
Circuit put it in Illinois Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Inc. v.
Commissioner.
We must ask: do IAPIA's activities in promoting errors and
omissions insurance coverage among independent insurance
agents evince an intention to use that promotion of E & 0
coverage for the purpose of contributing importantly to the
improvement of conditions in a particular line of business, or
do its activities in promoting coverage indicate that any
exempt function which is served is incidental to its purpose
of raising revenue?'
217. See Regs. § 1.513-1(d).
218. 500 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
219. Id. at 517.
220. Id. at 518-20.
221. Id. at 520.
222. Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 987, 994
(7th Cir. 1986); see also Independent Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 898. 902
(lth Cir. 1993) ("IIAH's conduct does not evince an intention to use its public insurance
activities to contribute importantly to the improvement of conditions in the insurance business
or to further its exempt purposes. Instead, its conduct indicates that raising revenue was its
primary concern.").
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If the parties have stipulated that the activity in question constitutes a trade
or business, courts generally approach the related versus unrelated issue by
first identifying the exempt purposes of the organization and then by deciding
whether the manner in which the activity in question is conducted contributes
importantly (or in terms of the 1958 regulations, evidences an intention to
contribute importantly) to the accomplishment of those purposes. If the court
finds lacking the necessary causal relationship between the conduct of the
business and the accomplishment of the exempt purposes, only then is the
conclusion reached that the activity is being operated in a manner primarily
to raise revenue and therefore the principal underlying motive is profit. The
finding of a primary profit motive is the final step in the analysis.2 23
There is a certain logic to the proposition that an activity's principal purpose must
either be to further directly the organization's exempt purposes, in which case it constitutes
a related business, or the primary motive is profit, in which case the activity is unrelated. One
would have thought that it follows from this proposition that every unrelated trade or business
is primarily motivated by profit. Apparently there is an exception to every proposition. In West
Virginia State Medical Ass'n v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989), a medical
association incurred an excess of direct advertising costs over advertising revenue for 21 con-
secutive years in connection with its monthly medical journal. Id. at 125. It was not disputed
that the advertising activity was not substantially related to the association's exempt purpose.
Id. at 124. Since the Court concluded that the advertising activity losses evidenced a lack of
profit motive, the losses could not offset the income from another unrelated activity. Id. at 125.
Why, then, did the medical association continue to sell advertising space? Perhaps the asso-
ciation thought that the advertising directly furthered its exempt purposes or that the readership
of the journal would diminish without advertising, i.e., that it was related activity. Perhaps
hope springs eternal and the association thought that the advertising might eventually make
a profit. Or perhaps the association never gave the matter much thought one way or the other.
Conversely, one would have thought that it follows from the main proposition that
an activity primarily motivated by profit cannot be a related trade or business. Professor
Kaplan suggests that this may not be the case. See Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1451. He
speculates that Iowa State University of Services and Technology might have been decided in
favor of the taxpayer if the 1967 regulations had been applicable, i.e., the university TV station
contributed importantly to the educational purposes of the university notwithstanding its
primary purpose to make profit. Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1451-52. With the Supreme Court,
in American College of Physicians, continuing to interject motive into the resolution of the
related versus unrelated issue, it appears unlikely that a court would conclude that an activity
was primarily motivated by profit, yet contributed importantly to the organization's exempt
purposes. See The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1289 ("An activity operated
primarily for profit not only is likely to vitiate concern with exempt purposes, but also will
probably be more competitive than an activity which only incidentally produces income."); see
also Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 537 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Because the League's insurance endorsement is basically a fundraising activity, it is by
definition unrelated business activity under section 513(a).").
223. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986);
Texas Apartment Ass'n v. United States, 869 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1989); Hi-Plains Hosp. v.
United States, 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982); Minnesota Holstein-Friesian Breeders Ass'n v.
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Unfortunately, as previously noted, a number of courts faced with
both the issue of whether an activity falls within the definition of a trade or
business and, if it does, whether the activity is related or unrelated to the
organization's exempt purpose, find profit to be the primary motive under-
lying the activity through a resolution of the former issue rather than the
latter. Assuming trade or business for purpose of the section 511 tax to be an
activity motivated primarily by profit, these courts often find such a motive
by applying the axiom that profit itself constitutes strong evidence of a
primary intent to earn it. Thus, by interjecting profit motive into the trade or
business issue, these courts have in effect resolved the related versus
unrelated issue before even turning to it.?4
For instance, prior to examining whether or not a business league's
insurance activities contributed importantly to the exempt purposes of the
organization, the Fourth Circuit in Carolinas Farm & Power Equipment
concluded that the activities were carried on primarily to earn a profit as
evidenced by the consistently profitable result of the operations and the
proportion of insurance income to total income.22 Observed the Court:
"[W]e think that there is no better objective measure of an organization's
motive for conducting an activity than the end it achieves. ' z6 Similarly, in
American Postal Workers, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit discounted testimony on behalf of the union to the effect that the
Commissioner, 64 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1319, T.C. Memo (RIA) 92,663 (1992): California
Thoroughbred Breeders Ass'n v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. Memo (CCH) 962, T.C. Memo (RIA)
89,342 (1989).
224. The following decisions (I) apply the profit motive test to determine whether
an activity constitutes a trade or business for purposes of the tax on unrelated business income;
(2) then infer profit motive wholly or partly from the fact that the activity was profitable; and
(3) then turn to the related versus unrelated issue: Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents
v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1986) (in effect applying the profit motive test twice,
first to determine whether the activity constitutes a trade or business and second to determine
whether the trade or business is related or unrelated to the exempt purposes of the
organization); Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 699 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1983); Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982);
Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. Tex. 1993). rev'd in part, 53
F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 1995); National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75 (1989);
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mich. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7 (1987); and Professional Ins.
Agents v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 246 (1982), aff'd. 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984). In
National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 944 F.2d 859, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit inferred a primary profit motive from profit, but did
not have the related versus unrelated issue before it. In American Postal Workers Union, v.
United States, 925 F.2d 480, 483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit decided that the activity in question was an unrelated trade or business
before deciding that it was a trade or business.
225. Carolinas Farm & Power, 699 F.2d at 170-71.
226. Id. at 170.
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prospect of earning profit had not occurred to anyone even in the face of
evidence of substantial net profit.227 Commented the court: "Apparently, we
are invited to believe that the profit received was, as has been said of the
British Empire, merely picked up in moments of absentmindedness. 228
While it is obvious that recurrent profit, especially large profit, may
indicate a principal motive to earn it, the presence of profit is not conclusive
with respect to the issue of motive. Assume, for example, that ten years ago
a tax exempt school received $20 million gross income from student tuition,
that both tuition and deductible expenses have increased 6% per annum, and
that taxable income has averaged 1% of gross income, i.e., the school has
consistently derived taxable income in the range of $200,000 to $340,000.
Assume further that the performance of the services from which the gross
income is derived contributes importantly to the accomplishment of the
school's educational purpose and that the school has acted in a manner to
indicate that fulfillment of its educational mission is its principal purpose.
Can it be said that substantial and recurrent profit necessarily
contradicts this principal purpose? If the market place has afforded the school
a recurrent 1% profit, the statute does not require, nor should it require, the
school to lower tuition to eliminate the profit by attempting to match more
perfectly deductible expenses, a feat which in itself may be difficult to
accomplish. While not the driving force underlying a related business activity,
profit may legitimately occur and may be needed to tide the school over a
period of anticipated decline in enrollment, to cope with inflation, to expand
services, to improve staff, to add to the endowment fund, or to finance fund
raising efforts or needed capital improvements. In Iowa State University of
Science & Technology, the Court of Claims observed that, "a profitable
227. American Postal Workers, 925 F.2d at 484-85.
228. Id. Similarly, Professor Kaplan looks to the presence of profit as evidence of
profit motive in order to demonstrate that intercollegiate athletics is a trade or business.
Kaplan, supra note 62, at 1439-40. Finding many university intercollegiate athletic programs
to be profitable, Professor Kaplan observes that universities dropping their intercollegiate
football programs because they were losing money shows that such programs were undertaken
to make money in the first place. Id. at 1444-45. Could not one also conclude that the football
program was undertaken to further the university's educational goals, but the university simply
could not afford to keep it going? It is, however, essentially the "problematic" connection
between intercollegiate athletics and education, and the mania for winning, that leads Professor
Kaplan to the plausible conclusion that in many cases intercollegiate athletic programs are not
substantially related to the educational goals of the university. Id. at 1459-60. Winning means
greater revenue from broadcasting, larger gate admissions, and the opportunity to play in bowl
games. The inference is that the focus on winning demonstrates a primary goal to derive profit.
Are there not, rare as they may be, intercollegiate athletic programs with a tradition of winning
that can nevertheless demonstrate a primary purpose to promote educational values by
emphasizing cooperation, perseverance, excellence, living up to potential, pride in accomplish-
ment, and playing by the rules, and not simply winning at all costs?
[Vol. 3:7
Unfair Business Competition
operation may be justified by factors which, on balance, show that the
conduct of the business was substantially related to the exempt purpose of the
institution."229
4. Competitive, Commercial Manner.-The notion that a business
activity operated by an exempt organization is unrelated if conducted in a
manner similar to the operation of a taxable enterprise has its origins in the
1958 regulations, which, as noted supra, provided: "Similarly, a university
radio station or press is considered a related trade or business if operated
primarily as an integral part of the educational program of the university, but
is considered an unrelated trade or business if operated in substantially the
same manner as a commercial radio station or publishing house."' The
inference underlying the 1958 regulations is that the manner in which an
activity is conducted reflects the exempt organization's principal motive to
conduct it, e.g., if the business in question is operated like a taxable business
is operated, the likely motive is profit. The Court of Claims misapplied the
"commercial manner" test in Disabled American Veterans to determine
whether an activity was a trade or business rather than to resolve the issue of
whether the trade or business was related or unrelated to the exempt purposes
of the organization."3 Another court, applying the test to resolve the related
versus unrelated issue, observed that the lack of advertising and solicitation
"substantiate the essentially non-commercial operation" of the activity.'
One taxpayer even argued that its farming operation was so inefficient that
229. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d 508,518
(CL Cl. 1974). One commentator has questioned why a related business activity ever needs
to make a profit See Cooper, supra note 71, at 2020. Setting a fee to earn a profit curtails the
"widest possible distribution of the goods or services being provided by the exempt organiza-
tion." Id. at 2021. According to Cooper
The only excuse for charging profitable prices is to earn money for
support of other activities of the organization. While this is a laudable
goal, it is precisely the justification which was advanced for selling
advertising space in exempt organization publications. The exempt
publishers were merely being alert to the fact that there was profit
potential as a by-product of their related publishing businesses. If Congress
was willing to bar this form of skimming profits out of a related business,
it is not a great step to saying that any business which earns a profit
should be taxed.
Id. at 2021.
230. Regs. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1969).
231. See supra note 190.
232. St. Luke's Hosp. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 85, 91 (W.D. Mo. 1980): see
also Hi-Plains Hosp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[The hospital
pharmacy] has not sought to expand its market or the type of products it sells. It does not
advertise nor does it use display areas to attract customers. In short, it lacks the indicia of a
modem commercial drug store ... ").
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it could not possibly be compared to a for-profit enterprise. 3'
Unfortunately, courts attempting to apply the "manner reflects
motive" inference underlying the 1958 regulations often fail to differentiate
between an activity simply utilizing modem business practices to achieve its
exempt goals and one conducted in a manner to maximize profit. Clearly, the
distinction between unrelated and related business is not that the former is
operated in an efficient, business-like manner and the latter is not. Evidence
that a business activity operated by an exempt organization advertises,
markets, or promotes its goods or services, prices its goods or services in
accordance with what the market will bear, attempts to keep costs down,
operates efficiently, makes capital improvements, or engages in other
behavior similar to the manner in which a taxable organization behaves is not
inconsistent with either a principal purpose to further the organization's
exempt purpose or a finding that the activity contributes importantly to the
achievement of that purpose. Exempt organizations offering goods or services
to the public often find it imperative to engage in such "commercial" activity
with respect to their obviously related businesses in order to survive in a
world in which competition for the dollar is fierce and a dollar earned buys
less. Evidence of such "commercial" activity does not ipso facto answer the
question of whether the manner of operation in its totality indicates a
substantial causal connection to the accomplishment of the organization's
exempt purposes or indicates that the activity is essentially a revenue raiser.
In Califonia Thoroughbred Breeders Association v. Commissioner,34 the
Tax Court was called upon to determine whether an exempt agricultural
organization's auctions of thoroughbred horses was related or unrelated to its
exempt purpose. Although the Association's auctions in many respects
resembled those conducted by commercial auction houses, the taxpayer's
expert witness observed, "In summary the CTBA has not acted like a profit
maximizer, commercial auction company.'235
233. St. Joseph Farms v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 9, 20 (1985), nonacq., 1986-2 C.B.
I ("In support of its contention that the farm is not operated primarily for profit, petitioner
cites various operational practices (such as delayed replacement of equipment; failure to use
maximum automation; the failure to expand the farm or to borrow money; and loans of
equipment, facilities, and the Brothers' time to neighboring farms) and petitioner's accounting
practices (failure to use accelerated depreciation or to claim investment tax credits) as
inconsistent with maximizing profits."). The Tax Court responded that the mere fact that a
trade or business may not be run as efficiently as possible does not negate a primary motive
for profit. Id. at 20-21.
234. 57 T.C. Memo (CCH) 962, T.C. Memo (RIA) 89,342 (1989).
235. Id. at 969; see Sugarman & Pomeroy, supra note 61, at 432-33 n.42 ("If
applied literally, [the regulations] would deny exempt treatment to a university station or press
operated in a business-like manner. Presumably the statement is directed more to the subject
or content of programs or publications than to method of conduct of operations.").
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5. Identifying Unrelated Businesses by the Activities of Taxable
Entities.-Confronted with whether the activities of a business league exempt
under section 501(c)(6) were related to the purposes of the organization, the
Fourth Circuit in Carolinas Farm & Power Equipment Dealers Associa-
tion,236 citing regulations section 1.501(c)(6)-1,' concluded that the
Association's insurance activities operated to benefit individual members and
not the industry as a whole because "the fees charged members for participa-
tion in the insurance program are in direct proportion to the benefits
received."'2 8 Observed the Court: "the service provided by the Association
is one commonly provided by for-profit entities.... Where a service is
available in the marketplace, a trade association need not provide it to
accomplish an exempt purpose."239 More recently, a federal district court
in Texas expanded the generalization, presumably to apply to all tax exempt
entities and not just trade associations or agricultural organizations exempt
under section 501(c)(5), with the comment that "[a]n activity is less likely to
be substantially related if it is one commonly provided by for-profit enti-
ties.,24
The Tax Court repeated this proposition in Florida Trucking Ass'n
v. Commissioner.24' Faced with the issue of whether advertisements
appearing in the Association's journal, Florida Truck News, furthered the tax
exempt purposes of another trade association, the Court observed that the sale
236. Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealer's Assoc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1983).
237. "A business League is an association of persons having some common business
interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a
regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. ... Thus, its activities should be
directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business as
distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual persons." Regs.
§ 1.501(c)(6)-1 (as amended in 1990).
238. Carolinas Farm & Power, 699 F.2d at 171 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 171-72. But see United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S.
105, 111 (1986) (comparing ABE's insurance activities to the type of businesses conducted
by taxable entities in support of the Court's conclusion that the activity was a trade or
business, not to demonstrate that the activity was an unrelated trade or business). The Seventh
Circuit compared IAPIA's insurance activities to the type of business conducted by for-profit
entities both to demonstrate that the activity was a trade or business and to demonstrate that
the activity was an unrelated trade or business. See Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents
v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 987, 992, 994 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Finally, the services performed by
IAPIA, and the insurance sold through its efforts are the kind of services performed, and
insurance sold, by private commercial entities in order to make a profit .... Where services
and goods are available in the marketplace, 'a trade association need not provide it to
accomplish an exempt purpose."' (citing Carolinas Farm & Power, 699 F.2d at 172)).
240. Texas Farm Bureau v. United States. 822 F. Supp. 371, 377 (,V.D. Tex. 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 53 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 1995).
241. 87 T.C. 1039 (1986).
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of advertising ordinarily is conducted by for-profit entities and therefore a
trade association need not provide it to accomplish an exempt purpose.
2 42
The generalization as applied in Florida Trucking Ass'n begins to weaken
even as applied to business leagues tax exempt under section 501(c)(6). What
the Tax Court meant was that "[t]he entities that paid for advertisements in
Florida Truck News presumably could have and did pay for similar or
identical advertisements in other magazines or newspapers that were tax-
paying entities. 243 As the Court itself acknowledged, had Florida Truck
News selected advertisements to appear in its publication on the basis of
coordinating the advertising and editorial content of the issue, or selected
only advertisements to reflect new developments in the industry, the
magazine's business of selling advertising space may well have furthered the
exempt purpose of the organization to enhance the interests of the trucking
industry.2' This thought was suggested by the Supreme Court in American
College of Physicians with respect to the Annals of Internal Medicine.
Presumably, a for-profit entity would not select advertisements for tires,
engines, and trailers with a view to promoting the common business interests
of the trucking industry, but rather with an eye primarily on their revenue
producing potential.
The axiom that a trade or business is more likely to be unrelated if
it is one provided by a taxable entity becomes even less tenable when applied
to the activities of a 501(c)(3) organization. The committee reports accompa-
nying the 1950 Revenue Bill and both the 1958 and 1967 regulations
recognized that a related business activity may be of the type conducted by
both tax-exempt and taxable entities.245 The related versus unrelated issue
is not determined by the qualitative nature of the activity; rather, it is decided
by whether or not the exempt organization conducts the activity in a manner
to further its exempt purposes.
246
As noted, the position of the 1958 regulations is that a university
radio station or press is a related or unrelated trade or business depending
upon the manner in which it is operated.247 Similarly, in St. Luke's Hospital
242. Id. at 1044-45.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1045.
245. E.g., S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 54, reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.S. at 3165
(offering as examples of potentially related businesses a wheat farm and a football game),
Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(4) (as amended in 1983) (adds to the list a trade show, the sale of milk and
cream, and the sale of advertising in a newspaper).
246. Early revenue rulings addressing the related versus unrelated issue often
decided the issue by finding that the activity in question is normally conducted by taxable
entities. For a criticism of this approach, see The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1286.
247. Regs. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1969).
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v. United States,248 a Missouri federal district court found the hospital's
pathology department to be conducting a related business when it performed
diagnostic tests for nonhospital patients of staff physicians because the tests
contributed to the teaching functions of the hospital.?9 Observed the Court,
"There can never be too many tests, because the more there are the richer the
available instructional material is and the better the teaching program is." -o
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Hi-Plains Hospital found the hospital's
pharmacy sales to private patients of the staff doctors contributed importantly
to the hospital's exempt purposes because one of the purposes of the
establishment of a medical center in Hale Center, Texas, a small town of
about 2,250 people, was to induce doctors to practice there. The pharmacy
sales in question, said the court, facilitated the practice of medicine in the
town and thus furthered the goal of making medical services available
there.
251
The fact that taxable entities operate radio stations, newspapers,
medical diagnostic testing laboratories, and pharmacies was irrelevant to the
issue of whether the same activity in the hands of a section 501(c)(3)
organization was related to the organization's exempt purposes. As the Fifth
Circuit noted in Hi Plains Hospital 2 and as the Supreme Court held in
American College of Physicians, Congress in considering the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 rejected a version of section 513(c) that would have made sales by
a hospital pharmacy to nonhospital patients and sales of advertising space by
tax-exempt professional journals per se unrelated. 3 It may be that certain
activities like pharmacy sales to nonhospital patients, the sale of advertising
space in journals, and the farming activities in St. Joseph Farms are
frequently conducted by taxable entities and are not traditionally considered
charitable work, but there is no avoiding "... the explicit case-by-case
requirement articulated in Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(d)(2)...
6. Identifying Unrelated Businesses by the Potential for Competition
with Taxable Entities.-In National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner,255
the Tax Court stated:
248. 494 F. Supp. 85 (WV.D. Mo. 1980).
249. Id. at 93.
250. Id. at 90.
251. Hi-Plains Hosp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 528. 531 (5th Cir. 1989).
252. Id. at 532.
253. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 84547 (1986);
Hi-Plains, 670 F.2d at 532.
254. American College, 475 U.S. at 844.
255. National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75 (1989).
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In its trade or business determination, the Supreme Court
also pointed out that the income from the insurance program
constituted UBTI [unrelated business taxable income-ed.]
because the taxpayer unfairly competed with other insurance
companies. United States v. American Bar Endowment,
supra, 477 U.S. 114.... The Supreme Court held that the
facts in the case represented 'precisely the sort of unfair
competition that Congress intended to prevent' since private
commercial entities could have provided the same services
for the insurance program that were provided by the taxpay-
er. 477 U.S. at 114.
256
The difficulty with the Tax Court observation is that the Supreme Court in
American Bar Endowment (ABE) did not have before it the issue of whether
a trade or business was related or unrelated to the accomplishment of the
exempt purposes of ABE. The parties in the case stipulated that the activity
was unrelated. Rather, the issue before the Court was whether the activity was
a business or a fund-raiser. The insurance program's potential for unfair
competition with taxable entities led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that
the activity was a trade or business and thus, being unrelated by stipulation,
was "precisely the sort of unfair competition that Congress intended to
prevent. '' 257 The Supreme Court did not conclude that the insurance
program was unrelated as opposed to related because of the potential for
competition.
The Supreme Court, in fact, overstated the case with its observation
that "[t]he undisputed purpose of the unrelated business income tax was to
prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses
whose earnings were taxed." 8 While the adoption of the tax and unrelated
businesses of exempt organizations clearly expressed a Congressional concern
about the potential for unfair competition between an unrelated business and
its taxable counterpart, Congress never intended the potential for competition
to serve as a guidepost to differentiate unrelated from related trade or
business. A business activity furthering the exempt purposes of the organiza-
tion is still able to compete, fairly or unfairly, with its taxable counterparts
without itself paying tax. As noted by the Court in Midwest Research
Institute v. United States, "Tax-exempt organizations do enjoy a competitive
advantage when providing the same goods and services as ordinary business-
es .... Nonetheless, the drafters chose to tax only income from businesses
256. Id. at 90, 91.
257. Id. at 91.
258. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 114.
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that were not 'substantially related' to the exempt purpose of the organiza-
tion, not all income from activities that competed with private industry."' 9
C. Is a Finding of Unfair Competition a Prerequisite to Imposition of the
Tax?
Tax-exempt organizations resisting the Government's efforts to collect
the section 511 tax on unrelated businesses on occasion have argued that an
activity cannot be a trade or business unless the court finds that the activity
competes unfairly with a taxpaying entity.'  The taxpayer in Louisiana
Credit Union League v. United States6' framed the issue more accurately.
Assuming that the activity in question is a trade or business and is unrelated
to the fulfillment of the organization's exempt purpose, is a specific finding
of unfair competition with a taxable entity engaged in a similar activity
nevertheless a prerequisite to imposition of the tax? 2- In all cases the
taxpayer's argument against taxation under section 511 has been based on an
expression of Congressional intent that one of the purposes of the tax is to
prevent such unfair competition.
Notable among the decisions in which the taxpayer lost the "no
competition/no tax" argument are Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Veterans
of Foreign Wars v. United States263 and Louisiana Credit Union League.
In Clarence LaBelle Post, the Eighth Circuit held that a 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion could be taxed on revenues received from the operation of bingo games
259. Midwest Research Inst. v. United States. 554 F. Supp. 1379, 1383-84 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (citation omitted), affd, 744 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1984); see also The Macaroni
Monopoly, supra note 60, at 1287; H.R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 102, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1695 ("Your committee believes that a business competing with taxpaying
organizations should not be granted an unfair competitive advantage by operating tax free
unless the business contributes importantly to the exempt function."). In the case of trade
associations, tax exempt under IRC § 501(c)(6) their activities further a common business
interest rather than the members in their individual capacities; the government has argued that
the fact that the activity competes with those of taxable entities demonstrates that the activity
is not unique to the organization's exempt purpose and therefore does not contribute
importantly to it. See Texas Apartment Ass'n v. United States, 869 F.2d 884. 887-89 (5th Cir.
1989) (in which the government lost this argument because the court found the taxpayer's
materials to be "unique").
260. See Fraternal Order of Police, Ill. State Troopers, Lodge No. 41 v.
Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1987); Greene County Medical Soc'y Found. v.
United States, 345 F. Supp. 900, 901 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
261. 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982).
262. Id. at 539.
263. 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978) [hereinafter
Clarence LaBelle Post].
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even though the games did not compete with taxable organizations. 2"
Similarly, in Louisiana Credit Union League the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the presence or absence of actual competition between a taxable business and
an unrelated trade or business is irrelevant to the issue of whether the section
511 tax is to be imposed.26
On the other side of the ledger, the Seventh Circuit in Hope School
v. United States' declined to tax a 501(c)(3) educational organization on
revenues generated by its greeting cards mail-out program to prospective
donors because there was no evidence that the school's solicitation campaign
competed unfairly with taxable greeting card businesses.26 Likewise, Judge
Schatz, dissenting in Clarence Labelle Post, vigorously supported the
taxpayer's argument that its bingo games could not be taxed because of lack
of competition with taxable businesses.268
Both sides of the controversy argued that legislative history supported
its position. In Louisiana Credit Union League, the Fifth Circuit conceded
that the prevention of unfair competition was a goal of the 1950 legislation,
but maintained that Congress was equally concerned with two other problems,
viz., the loss of revenue resulting from the ownership of unrelated businesses
by tax-exempt organizations and the inequity of allowing such ownership at
no tax cost.269 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Clarence LaBelle Post
concluded that the goal of eliminating unfair competition "existed only as part
of a larger goal of raising revenue.
270
As a rejoinder, Judge Schatz, dissenting in Clarence LaBelle Post,
cited Table 1 of the Senate Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1950
to make the point that most of the additional revenue to be raised by the Act
was projected to come from higher corporate and individual income tax
rates.27' In fact, as Judge Schatz points out, the Senate bill compared to the
House bill substantially decreased the projected additional revenue to be
generated by the amendments affecting tax-exempt entities. Thus, in the
opinion of the Judge, while Congress desired to raise revenue as an overall
objective of the 1950 legislation, the specific goal of the new tax on unrelated
businesses was to eliminate unfair competition.272 Judge Schatz's view is
264. Id. at 274.
265. Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 541-42.
266. 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
267. Id. at 304.
268. Clarence LaBelle Post, 580 F.2d at 279-81 (Schatz, J., dissenting).
269. Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 540.
270. Clarence LaBelle Post, 580 F.2d at 272.
271. Id. at 277 (Schatz, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
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shared by the Supreme Court in United States v. American Bar Endow-
ment273 and is supported by Treasury regulations.274
While Judge Schatz, as well as the Seventh Circuit in Hope School,
accurately interpreted the legislative history of the section 511 tax, there is
little either can glean from the statutory language itself to support the position
that a specific finding of unfair competition is a prerequisite to imposition of
the section 511 tax. Section 513 defines the term "unrelated trade or
business" as any trade or business not substantially related to the exempt
purpose of the organization.275 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Louisiana
Credit Union League:
Although the legislative history speaks of competition, those
who actually drafted the statute avoided the word as if it
were the plague. The statute nowhere requires or even
suggests that the presence or absence of competition is a
factor to be considered in connection with the unrelated
business income tax.2'6
Carefully avoiding reference to the statute itself, the Seventh Circuit
in Hope School turned rather to other sources in search of ammunition to
support its "no competition/no tax" position, including a 1975 amendment to
the Treasury regulations.2' The 1975 amendment provides that the tax on
unrelated businesses does not apply when low cost articles are sent out
incidental to the solicitation of a contribution because "the organization is not
in competition with taxable organizations."27 The Seventh Circuit failed to
quote, however, another sentence of the same regulation that appears to
establish a conclusive presumption that an unrelated trade or business
conducted by a tax-exempt entity competes unfairly:
However, in general, any activity of a section 511 organization which
is carried on for the production of income and which otherwise
possesses the characteristics required to constitute "trade or business"
273. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). "The undisputed purpose of the unrelated business
income tax was to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses
whose earnings were taxed." Id. at 114.
274. See Regs. § 1.513-1(b) ("The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated
business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated
business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt
business endeavors with which they compete.").
275. IRC § 513(a).
276. Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 541.
277. Hope ScIool, 612 F.2d at 301.
278. Regs. § 1.513-1(b).
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within the meaning of section 162-and which, in addition, is not
substantially related to the performance of exempt functions-pre-
sents sufficient likelihood of unfair competition to be within the
policy of the tax.279
Aware of this last quoted sentence of the regulation, Judge Schatz,
dissenting in Clarence LaBelle Post, held steadfast in his opinion that the
sentence is subservient to the primary purpose of the section 511 tax to
eliminate unfair competition, a purpose confirmed by the first sentence of the
same regulation.80 Judge Schatz, however, did not, and could not, cite any
provision in either the Code or the regulations that explicitly imposes a
finding of competition as a condition to taxation under section 511.
As a parting sally the taxpayer in Clarence LaBelle Post argued that
by enacting section 513(d) 281 in 1976, Congress provided additional
evidence that it intended to exclude from the section 511 tax unrelated
businesses that do not actually compete with taxpaying entities. The Senate
Report accompanying the 1976 legislation indeed indicated that section
513(d) was adopted as a reaction to Internal Revenue Service
rulings-involving horse racing at an exempt county fair association and
renting display space at a convention trade show-in which the Service held
that the tax applies even though the activity does not compete with commer-
cial endeavors.282 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Hope School found
support for the "no competition/no tax" position with the adoption of section
513(f) in 1978.283 In specifically overruling the holding in Clarence LaBelle
Post, subsection 513(f) excludes from the term "unrelated trade or business"
the conduct of bingo games where such activity is not ordinarily carried out
on a commercial basis in the State in which the exempt organization
operates.2" As the House Report accompanying section 513(f) explained,
279. Id.; see Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 542.
280. Clarence LaBelle Post, 580 F.2d at 278 (referring to the first sentence of Regs.
§ 1.513-1(b): "The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to
eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain
exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the non-exempt business endeavors with
which they compete.").
281. IRC § 513(d) (providing that qualified public entertainment activities or
qualified convention and trade show activities are not unrelated trade or businesses).
282. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 602 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3439 (indicating that (1) the committee thought that the activities in question
were related to the exempt purposes of the organizations that conduct them, and that (2) in any
event, there was little opportunity for the activities to compete with those conducted by
taxpaying entities).
283. Hope School, 612 F.2d at 304.
284. IRC § 513(f).
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the basic rationale of the section 511 tax does not apply where taxable
organizations are not carrying on the same activity. 
-8
Unconvinced by the taxpayer's argument, the Eighth Circuit in
Clarence LaBelle Post reasoned that the adoption of section 513(d) provided
evidence to support precisely the opposite conclusion. Rather than requiring
a finding of competition between the unrelated trade or business and a taxable
entity as an across-the-board general rule, argued the Court, Congress, in
enacting section 513(d), chose to carve out only two specific exceptions for
horse racing at an exempt county fair and renting display space at trade
shows. 6 The Eighth Circuit's reasoning applies to the adoption of section
513(f) as well, the very provision that subsequently overruled its decision in
Clarence LaBelle Post. Section 513(f) confines its focus narrowly to bingo
games, bypassing the opportunity to exclude from the tax all unrelated trade
or business in situations where taxable organizations are not carrying on the
same endeavor. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Louisiana Credit Union League:
"For over thirty years, Congress has had the opportunity to create a
requirement of competition with taxable entities as a prerequisite for taxation
on unrelated business income. It has declined to do so."'
One would have thought that the Supreme Court put the competition
matter to rest with its 1986 decision, United States v. American Bar
Endowment.28 In determining that ABE's insurance program "presents an
example of precisely the sort of unfair competition that Congress intended to
prevent,"289 the Court was untroubled by the fact that "ABE prices its
policies competitively with other insurance policies offered to the public and
to ABE members" 290 nor by the failure of the Claims Court to find any
taxable entities that compete with ABE. Without subjecting earnings from its
insurance program to tax, the Court speculated, ABE was in a position to
earn less profit, presumably by lowering prices and still earn the same return
on investment as taxable organizations offering group insurance policies to
its members. Furthermore, speculated the Court, it was likely that ABE
members were also members of such taxable organizations."' As the
285. H.R. Rep. No. 1608, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1978). reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3716, 3718.
286. Clarence LaBelle Post, 580 F.2d at 273.
287. Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 541 (footnote omitted); see also
Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir.
1983).
288. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
289. Id. at 114.
290. Id. at 108.
291. Id. at 114-15. The Court also stated: "If ABE's members may deduct part of
their premium payments as a charitable contribution, the effective cost of ABE's insurance will
be lower than the cost of competing policies that do not offer tax benefits." Id. at 114. The
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Seventh Circuit subsequently noted in its 1987 decision, Fraternal Order of
Police, Illinois State Troopers, Lodge No. 41 v. Commissioner, 292 "In
concluding that the American Bar Endowment's insurance program did
unfairly compete, the [Supreme] Court relied on hypothetical possibilities,
rather than on an actual finding of unfair competition." 293
Given the present statutory framework, the question remains whether
Congress should now adopt a general rule requiring a specific finding of
unfair competition as a prerequisite to imposing the tax on unrelated business.
Assume that Congress adopts such a rule and places the burden of proof on
the Government. The Internal Revenue Service subsequently attempts to
collect the tax from a very successful ice cream manufacturer operated by a
university tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3). The Government is able to
establish both the parameters of the market place in which the feeder
currently operates and the identity of a taxable competitor attempting to sell
ice cream of comparable quality within the same territory.
Having demonstrated actual competition, the Government should not
have the additional burden to prove the competition to be unfair. The
competition is potentially unfair even if the feeder does not currently take
advantage of its newly enacted exemption. Whatever amount the taxable
manufacturer is required to pay as income tax, the feeder has available an
equivalent amount to add to any budget line it chooses, whether it be sales,
marketing, management, production, inventory, capital improvement,
investment, training or research, or it can simply lower its prices. Further, if
the feeder distributes 100% of its profit to its 501(c)(3) owner, there is
nothing in the present statute to prevent the exempt organization from re-
contributing an equal amount back to the feeder at a later time. Once the fact
of competition has been established, the unfairness of the competition should
be presumed.
Should the Government even have the burden to prove the existence
of an actual competitor doing business in the same marketplace as the feeder?
United States v. American Bar Endowment illustrates the difficulties that can
Court then proceeded to eliminate this potential for unfair competition by holding that no
portion of the premium payments constituted charitable contributions. Id. at 119. For an
analysis of the case, see Charitable Donations or Unrelated Business Income?: United States
v. American Bar Endowment, 21 U.S.F. L. Rev. 817 (1987).
292. 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987).
293. Id. at 722 (citations omitted). See Donald C. Haley, The Taxation of the
Unrelated Business Activities of Exempt Organizations: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We
Seem To Be Headed?, 7 Akron Tax J. 61 (1990) ("[T]he controversy over the relevance of the
presence or absence of competition with taxable entities continues." Id. at 78. Some of the
cases cited by Haley to support this statement focused upon the potential for competition with
taxable entities, or the lack of it, to determine whether the activity in question was "unrelated"
or "related." Id. at 79.).
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be encountered in the attempt. By assuming that the ABE membership as a
group constituted the marketplace, the Claims Court unsurprisingly was
unable to identify any taxable entity competing with ABE for the business of
the group as a whole. By contrast, the Supreme Court, realizing that the
potential market consisted of ABE's members as individuals rather than as
a group, speculated that it was likely that such individuals were eligible to
participate in other group insurance programs offered by various taxable
entities of which they were also a member. Furthermore, although it cannot
be denied that group insurance programs traditionally offers lower rates than
individual policies, the argument can be made that every licensed insurance
broker residing in the same community as an ABE member potentially
competed with ABE's insurance program for premium dollars. Given that the
ABE membership is dispersed throughout the country, should not a court be
empowered to take judicial notice of the fact that insurance brokerage exists
as a trade or business throughout the United States? Or, is it necessary that
the Government specifically identify at least one group insurance program
sponsored by a taxable organization available to each ABE member, or
alternatively at least one insurance agency doing business in his or her
community?
Assume that the feeder is able to establish affirmatively that there are
no taxable businesses competing in the same territory with its goods or
services, e.g., the feeder's brand of ice cream is the only one sold in its
comer of the marketplace. Given that ice cream is sold elsewhere, there is the
possibility that the taxable ice cream manufacturers have been unable to crack
the feeder's market due to the advantages afforded the latter by its exemption
from tax. Failure to find an actual taxable competitor, therefore, may be just
as indicative of unfair competition as a finding of actual competition in the
same marketplace. Nor would it matter significantly if the feeder conducted
a business not found anywhere else. It has to be assumed that if a section
501(c)(3) organization finds an unrelated trade or business potentially
profitable enough to conduct, it is probable that a taxable entity would regard
operating a competing business with equal interest. Inasmuch as any unrelated
trade or business invites its own potential taxable competition, one must in
all cases reckon with the potential anti-competitive effect of the exemption
from tax, whether actual competition is found or not. In rejecting the "no
finding of competition/no tax" rule, one is led full circle back to the
presumption of unfair competition found in Regulations section 1.513-1(b):
any unrelated trade or business "presents sufficient likelihood of unfair
competition to be within the policy of the tax."'
294. Regs. § 1.513-1(b).
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V. METASTASIS OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION RATIONALE AND
A REGIMEN FOR CONTAINMENT
A. The Challenge from the Small Business Community
1. Competition Between Related Businesses and Taxable Enterpris-
es.-In June of 1987, the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on
Ways and Means held hearings in furtherance of its mandate to reexamine
"the policy considerations underlying the appropriate tax treatment of income-
producing activities of tax-exempt organizations,"'295 in particular to
determine how the tax on unrelated business income impacted both tax-
exempt organizations and for-profit businesses. Although the witnesses before
the Subcommittee representing the nonprofit sector and the small business
community, respectively, could agree on very little, both camps were
confronted with the irrefutable fact that the number of nonprofit organizations
had increased dramatically over the years. Between 1967 and 1987, the IRS
295. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 3. 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, was the first witness and, de facto, set the
agenda for the hearings. Mr. Chapoton commented on the following items: the "substantially
related" standard, which the Treasury Department believes has "conceptual merit as the basis
for granting exemption from tax," id. at 24, although there was concern that its "inherent
generality is a source of administrative difficulty," id. at 39; the need for an expanded Form
990, i.e., more detailed reporting to improve enforcement and compliance; the need to
reexamine the "volunteer" exception to the definition of unrelated business provided by
§ 513(a)(1); the need to reexamine the "convenience" exception to the definition of unrelated
business provided by § 513(a)(2) for an activity carried on primarily for the convenience of
the organization's members, students, patients, officers, or employees; the justification for the
"donated property" exception provided by § 513(a)(3); the need for legislation to override
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1984), which
allocated fixed costs of the Institute's field house between related and unrelated uses on the
basis of its total hours of use rather than on the basis of comparing the hours used for the
unrelated business to the total hours available for use (as contended by the IRS); the
suggestion to increase the $1,000 specific deduction provided by § 512(b)(12) to $5,000; the
necessity of maintaining the "fragmentation rule" provided by § 513(c); the need to broaden
the "controlled subsidiary" test provided by § 512(b)(13) to include subsidiaries more than
50% owned, by voting power or value, by the parent exempt organization, using attribution
rules; the desirability of including the unrelated business activities of subsidiaries to determine
whether the primary purpose of the parent organization is the carrying on of an unrelated
business; the desirability of maintaining the exclusion for "passive" income (dividends,
interest, annuities, royalties, and rents provided by § 512(b)(l)-(3)); the need to reexamine the
definition of "royalty" to make amounts measured by net profits taxable; the need to develop
appropriate standards to differentiate exempt from taxable research activities; the need for
additional restrictions to prevent improper allocation of partnership deductions between
partners who are tax-exempt and taxable; and the need to reexamine the issue of whether a
501 (c)(3) organization acting as a general partner in a limited partnership is "incompatible with
the prohibition against distribution of earnings to private interests and whether they create a
conflict of interest for the exempt organization." UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 23-54.
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Master File for active tax-exempt organizations had increased from approxi-
mately 400,000 to in excess of 850,000.296 Further, although there was
insufficient data to draw quantifiable conclusions, it appeared that 501(c)(3)
organizations were becoming increasingly reliant on income-producing
activities, in particular, revenues from the sale of goods and services, as a
source of funding and less reliant on government grants and private
donations.297
IRS Master File data show that, in 1946, organizations
exempt under section 501(c)(3) obtained 59% of their
support from business receipts, interest, dividends, rents,
royalties, sales of assets and miscellaneous sources other than
government grants, private contributions, dues and assess-
ments; 71 percent from such sources in 1975; and 78% in
1983.298
Views clashed sharply, however, as to the nature of the income-
producing activities upon which 501(c)(3) organizations were presumably
becoming more reliant and the significance of the meager data that was
available. Some members of the small business community were of the
opinion that unfair competition between tax-exempt organizations and taxable
businesses had intensified primarily due to the former's expansion into areas
beyond the traditional role of the non-profit sector-in part due to increased
demand for services and excess capacity. 299 At least one witness on behalf
296. See UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 12 (containing statements of 0.
Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), U.S. Department of the
Treasury). In 1987, there were "nearly 390,000 religious (other than churches), educational,
charitable and scientific organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) . I.." d. at 26. In 1985,
operating expenditures of nonprofits totaled S239 billion, or 6% of GNP, according to an
estimate of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Id. "In 1984, 47 percent of current operating
expenditures of nonprofits were accounted for by health service organizations, and 22 percent
by educational and research organizations." Id. at 27.
297. See id. at 97 (testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration); Id. at 129-39 (containing statements of Jennie S. Stathis,
Associate Director, General Governmental Division, U.S. General Accounting Office); Id. at
134, 139 (statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Associate Director, General Governmental Division,
U.S. General Accounting Office); Id. at 158, 183 (statement of Marion R. Fremont-Smith,
Board Member, Independent Sector); see also id. at 160 (statement of Marion R. Fremont-
Smith, Board Member, Independent Sector) (discussing how private payments, primarily fees
for service, for social services increased in 1984 while governmental payments decreased).
298. Id. at 27 (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Tax Policy), U.S. Department of the Treasury).
299. See id. at 134 (statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Associate Director, General
Governmental Division, U.S. General Accounting Office) ("[s]ome business people told us that
this apparent increase in income-producing activities [by tax-exempt organizations] is a source
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of the business community was prepared to admit, however, that increased
competition between the two sectors had resulted as much from taxable
businesses seeking a foothold in a certain traditionally nonprofit markets such
as health care as it had from nonprofits expanding into the domain of taxable
business.3" Witnesses on behalf of 501(c)(3) organizations emphasized that
third-party and government funding for social services had made it profitable
for taxable businesses to enter fields traditionally reserved for nonprofits such
as "hospitals, day-care centers, alcoholism treatment centers, homes for the
aged, health research, continuing education and even cemeteries." '' Other
members of the tax-exempt community viewed the data indicating increased
reliance on income-producing activities as simply reflective of the fact that
501(c)(3) organizations as a group were more reliant on charging fees for
related goods and services in furtherance of their exempt purposes than on
contributions from the public or government funding.302
of unfair competition."); id. at 218 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition
for Fair Competition) (discussing increased demand and excess capacity). Of particular concern
to the small business community was the entry of nonprofits into the following businesses:
paging, answering, cleaning, and laundry services; retail pharmaceuticals; hearing aids; medical
equipment; and prosthetics. Id. at 100 (statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel For
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration). Other businesses included: "interior
decorating, computerized billing for doctors, catering, health and fitness clubs, travel agencies,
marketing of frozen foods for the elderly, data processing, day-care centers, and medical hotels
for patients who no longer need hospital care but are not ready to return home." Id. (quoting
James J. McGovern, Restructured Nonprofit Hospitals, 35 Tax Notes 405, 406 (Apr. 27,
1987)). Mr. O'Neil also listed the following businesses which compete with nonprofits:
Areas in which businesses go head to head with nonprofits include food
service, testing laboratories, retail sales of books and computers, travel,
recreation, nurseries, day care, hearing aids, veterinarians, blood banks,
consulting engineers, medical equipment suppliers, pencil makers, specialty
advertisers, hotels, bus operators, printing, construction, laundries,
janitorial services, waste hauling, electrical, plumbing, and heating
contracting to name a few.
Id. at 218. There was, however, no attempt to identify which of these endeavors were: (1)
claimed by the nonprofit to be a "related" activity; (2) claimed by the nonprofit to be
nontaxable under the "convenience" exception; (3) reported as an "unrelated" activity; or (4)
not reported as an "unrelated" activity.
300. See id. at 218 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition for
Fair Competition).
301. Cf. id. at 155 (statement of Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Board Member,
Independent Sector).
302. See id. at 134 (statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Associate Director, General
Governmental Division, U.S. General Accounting Office); id. at 241 (testimony of the National
Assembly of National Voluntary Health & Social Welfare Organizations) ("Some [nonprofit)
organizations do rely heavily on fee income."). See generally Walter B. Slocombe, Exempt
Organizations: Business and Other Activities in an Uncertain World, 70 Taxes 974 (1992)
(discussing a number of issues confronting 501(c)(3) organizations).
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Conceding that some percentage of the perceived increased competi-
tion confronting for-profits may have found its source in activities directly
related to furthering the charitable purposes of the conducting organization,
the small business community took the position before the Subcommittee On
Oversight that such related activity should nonetheless be taxed."0 3 The
logic of the argument proceeded as follows: if exemption from tax afforded
501(c)(3) organizations is based on the rationale that such organizations
provide the citizenry with governmental type goods and services otherwise
unavailable in the marketplace, then there is no justification for the exemption
with respect to those goods and services sold by both for-profits and tax-
exempts in the same market.3 4 Further, nonprofits are not necessarily more
On the other hand, the proscription against nonprofit organizations raising equity
capital and their inability to borrow at favorable rates had impelled 501(c)(3) organizations to
seek capital for their related activities through collaborative joint ventures with for-profit
entities. Typically, the charity would act as the general partner in a limited partnership and the
for-profit investors would participate as limited partners. Such collaborative enterprises raise
a number of issues of their own. Should the 501(c)(3) organization's tax-exempt status be
threatened because it operates such a joint venture with a substantial non-exempt purpose, i.e.,
to further the private interests of the profit-motivated investors? Does the fiduciary duty of the
charity acting as general partner to the limited partners create a conflict of interest? Does a
distribution to the limited partners violate the prohibition against a charity's earnings inuring
to private individuals? Is there unwarranted shifting of tax benefits to taxable partners? Is the
charity engaging in unfair competition for invested capital? See id. at 51-54 (statement of 0.
Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), U.S. Department of the
Treasury); id. at 416-17, 420-21 (statement of Jeff Carr, Vice Chancellor for University
Relations and General Counsel, Vanderbilt University); Michael H. Schill. The Participation
of Charities in Limited Partnerships, 93 Yale L.J. 1355 (1984).
We realized that Vanderbilt had the land and the professional faculty talent
to support an additional facility, but not the capital.... A collaborative
effort with Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) was developed under
which an 88-bed Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Hospital would be built
on Vanderbilt land, professionally staffed with Vanderbilt faculty, financed
by HCA capital, and managed by HCA.... Of particular importance is
the point that this Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Hospital would not
and could not have been built and operated without the unique contribu-
tions of both Vanderbilt and HCA.
UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 420-21 (statement of Jeff Carr. Vice Chancellor for
University Relations and General Counsel, Vanderbilt University).
303. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 90 (containing statements of Frank S. Swain,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration) (suggesting the tightening
of the current relatedness test); id. at 103-04 (statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
304. See id. at 103-04 (statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy,
U.S. Small Business Administration); id. at 219 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman,
Business Coalition for Fair Competition).
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efficient, more regulated, or more moral than for-profits.3 5 Moreover, the
relationship between volunteerism and nonprofit status, desirable as it is, is
not dependent on tax exemption, but on the volunteer's knowledge that his
efforts will promote the public good and not private gain." Thus, the
expansion of for-profits and tax-exempts into each other's markets has
"blurred [their] separate identities" 3°7 and reduced the primary distinction
between them to one of taxation for the former and an exemption for the
latter. This distinction offers tax-exempts an unfair competitive advantage
which should be eliminated.0 s
305. See id. at 220 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition for
Fair Competition).
306. See id. at 219-20.
307. Id. at 97 (statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration).
308. See id. at 90 (containing statements of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration); id. at 98 (testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
The small business community complained that nonprofits enjoyed competitive
advantages in addition to federal tax exemption, including Federally subsidized mail rates;
numerous state and local tax exemptions; special treatment under various federal laws,
including those relating to social security, unemployment insurance, and minimum wage; and
a goodwill advantage in marketing their goods and services-referred to as the "halo effect."
Id. at 98-99.
Additionally, there were complaints that feeders were purchasing supplies at the tax-
exempt parent's lower rates; using the parent's personnel and property; and availing themselves
of the parent's ability to accumulate tax-free capital. See id. at 835 (views of Paul Simmons,
President, Health Industry Distributors Association) (discussing recommendations of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury). "Even when an activity is considered unrelated and, therefore,
taxable, the exempt organization gains a significant advantage because it is able to use untaxed
income from other sources, such as dues, contributions of related activity, to fund unrelated
commercial activity." Id. at 104 (statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy,
U.S. Small Business Administration). In addition to their ability to accumulate tax-free internal
capital to fund feeders and unrelated businesses, 501(c)(3) organizations, unlike for-profit
investors, can also raise investment capital through gifts, grants, and donations. These
advantages, however, may be offset by the inability of 501(c)(3) organizations to raise equity
capital or to borrow money as easily as can for-profit investors. See Steinberg, supra note 25,
at 355. Further, under the present statute:
[W]hen a [nonprofit] invests in active production, it forgoes the opportuni-
ty to earn the pre-corporate-tax rate of return from alternative passive
investments. In contrast, when a [for-profit] invests in active commercial
production, it forgoes the post-corporate-tax rate of return. Thus,
[nonprofits] face a higher opportunity cost of active production, and would
prefer passive investment unless the active commercial output strongly and
directly helps them accomplish the exempt purpose.
Id.
Steinberg also raises a number of nontax issues when a for-profit entity alleges that
a nonprofit organization is unfairly competing with it, viz., the degree of the for-profit entity's
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The difficulty with this argument begins with its premise, viz,
activities directly furthering the charitable purposes of nonprofit organizations
should be exempt from tax only when the public goods and services they
offer are otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. Comparing the nonprofit
and for-profit models, it is the intrinsic defect in the for-profit model, i.e., its
focus on the bottom line rather than on continuity and quality, that justifies
the exemption subsidy afforded nonprofits in cases where similar essential
public goods and services are offered by both nonprofits and for-profits in the
same market. Comparing the nonprofit model with the federal government,
it is the principles of pluralism and democratic decentralization that add
further weight to the legitimacy of the exemption subsidy in cases where
similar essential public goods and services are offered by both. The
importance of the nonprofit charitable sector to society does not arise only
when there is a void left to fill by the twin failures of for-profit enterprise
and the federal government. A nonprofit entity organized and operated
primarily to further one or more of the activities enumerated in section
501(c)(3), and in compliance with the section's additional requirements,
merits exemption as representing generically an essential provider of the type
of public goods and services it offers, and not simply as a third-string player.
The problem with the position taken by the small business community
is illustrated by one of the case studies of "unfair" competition submitted to
the Subcommittee On Oversight by the National Federation of Independent
Businesses. In "Non-Profit Case-No. 7" the president of a business consulting
firm complained that the "[1]ocal university, the North Carolina Department
of Industrial Engineering[,] publishes a listing of course offerings and
seminars in direct competition with local consultants and other private
businesses with expertise in the same areas.""
Clearly, the for-profit business consulting firm does not through its
own course offerings or consultations bring to the marketplace the same
efficiency; whether the nonprofit entity is benefiting from a cost advantage; whether the for-
profit entity suffers "from competition only in circumstances where... [its) profits would
otherwise be exorbitant"; and whether there is a random element to "[nonprofit] successes and
corresponding [for-profit] failures .... To the extent that success and failure occur for random
reasons, [for-profits] are just as likely to succeed and [nonprofits] to fail as vice versa.
However, only the former would be reported anecdotally. leaving a biased picture." Id. at 352.
Additionally, "[i]f [nonprofits] enjoy greater success at the expense of [for-profitsl. which of
the many tax and regulatory differences in treatment of the two sectors are responsible?
Elimination of some differences might not help [for-profits] very much, and the different taxes
have varying impacts on the broader economy." Id. Steinberg concludes that "[w]e do not yet
know the impact of tax and regulatory differentials on the behavior and performance of
competing [for-profit] and [nonprofit] firms." Id. at 361.
309. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 291 (statement of John J. Motley, Ii and
Abraham Schneier, National Federation of Independent Business).
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character and quality of services brought by the university. The continuing
or adult education programs of the university must be viewed as an integral
component of the larger institution. The sole purpose of the university is to
promote the general welfare, viz, to meet society's "intellectual, cultural,
social, economic and technological needs" ' through teaching, research,
and public service to the local community in which it exists. The primary
purpose of the private consulting firm is to make a profit. As a nonprofit
organization, the university is forbidden from distributing profits, if it should
earn any, to or for the benefit of private persons. The purpose of the private
consulting firm is to make such a distribution to its owners. The university
is required to make its services available to a broad segment of the communi-
ty. The private consulting firm has no such mandate. The university as
an American institution has existed in excess of 300 years as a preserve of
"the legacies of our past through a succession of cultural fads, political
changes, and ideological movements";312 it has the capacity to conduct its
activities without consideration of short-term market demands, and it can
continue to serve the community around it through continuing education and
assistance programs in depressed economic times on a break-even basis.3"3
The private consulting firm, guided primarily by market forces, will disappear
if the profit opportunity evaporates.
As the United States economy in the past decades has gradually
shifted from one based on manufacturing to one based on technology, the
central and vital role of the American university in the conduct of basic and
applied research, in the transfer of the resultant technological innovation to
the business community, and in the transmission of technological information
to the public, has grown in importance.314 It is not surprising, therefore, that
Congress has made a decision to encourage the "related" activities of the
university, including continuing education programs, through exemption from
income tax and not similarly to subsidize the activities of the private
consulting firm that happens to operate in the same community.
Thus, there may be competition between the "related" activities of the
501(c)(3) organization directly furthering the purposes of its mandate and
similar activities conducted by a taxable enterprise, but the tax exemption
310. Id. at 363 (statement of the American Council on Education).
311. See id. at 367 ("Pursuant to ... legislative mandates ... colleges and
universities provide public services that range from continuing education and adult education
programs to technical assistance to low-income health clinics.").
312. Id. at 364.
313. See id. at 373 (noting that the farming community needs to know that critical
services provided by colleges and universities will be around in both good and bad economic
times, whether or not the services are profitable to perform).
314. See id. at 365, 372.
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afforded the former does not render the competition unfair. Rather, the
exemption from tax and any competitive advantage that may be the result is
an expression of a national policy to encourage and preserve the 501(c)(3)
organizations' historic social mission.
2. The Statutory Standard Revisited.-From this perspective, the
statutory exemption from tax afforded business activities substantially related
("contributing importantly") to the fulfillment of the organization's charitable
purpose is an appropriate standard in furtherance of this national policy.
Proposals offered by the small business community to tax an activity
conducted by a 501(c)(3) organization based on the activity's "commercial"
nature rather than its purpose 1 5 contravenes this policy. These proposals
include taxing any commercial activity conducted by a nonprofit;3" 6 taxing
a nonprofit if its commercial activity exceeds a specified minimum; 31
7
taxing any activity that competes with the for-profit sector,3t or imposing
a rebuttable presumption of taxability if an activity both earns a profit and
competes with a for-profit entity in the same market.
31 1
As a fallback position, some advocates on behalf of the small
business community urged tightening of the "substantially related" test in part
to reverse the statutory expansion of the definition that had occurred since
enactment of the original statute in 1950. The Chief Counsel for Advocacy
for the U.S. Small Business Administration observed that "[the definition] has
been held to encompass the sale of broadcasting rights, the operation of
grocery stores, and horse racing tracks, the exchange of mailing lists, and the
sale of milled lumber and greeting cards, to name just a few activities."'
It is true that a number of legislative amendments to the original statute have
removed certain activities from the reach of the tax. For example, the Tax
315. See id. at 223 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition for
Fair Competition).
316. See id. at 822 (statement of the American Clinical Laboratory Association).
317. See id.; see also id. at 90 (containing statements of Frank S. Swain, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Association) (suggesting applying an overall cap
on the amount of commercial activity a nonprofit organization can conduct).
318. See id. at 104 (testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy. U.S.
Small Business Administration).
319. See id. at 223-24 (statement of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition
for Fair Competition). The Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy). Department of the
Treasury, took the position that the "substantially related" test had "conceptual merit." See id.
at 24 (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy). U.S.
Department of the Treasury). Also, Internal Revenue Commissioner Gibbs said that the IRS
couldn't determine whether competition was unfair. See id. at 69 (testimony of Lawrence B.
Gibbs, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
320. Id. at 105 (statement of Frank S. Swain. Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration).
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Reform Act of 1976 exempted specified entertainment activities traditionally
conducted at agricultural affairs or educational expositions, as well as
activities traditionally conducted at trade shows;32 1978 legislation exempt-
ed bingo games when such games were not ordinarily conducted on a
commercial basis;322 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 exempted activities
relating to distribution of low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of
charitable contributions, as well as the exchange or rental of mailing lists
among charitable organizations. 3
On the other hand, the most important amendment to the original
statute, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, extended the tax on unrelated business
income to include all exempt organizations other than United States
instrumentalities, 324 adopted the fragmentation rule allowing each compo-
nent of an integrated business to be tested against the relatedness stan-
dard, 32 expanded the scope of the tax with respect to acquisitions financed
with debt,326 extended the tax to cover income received from a controlled
corporation 327 and narrowed the exclusion of rents received from the lease
of personal property in combination with real property.328 The record of
statutory amendments taken in its entirety does not support the generalization
that Congress has been chipping away at the reach of the tax on unrelated
business.
Frank Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business
Administration, additionally complained that the existing "substantially
related" test left "the boundaries between related and unrelated activities...
so unclearly drawn that the test has proven difficult for the Service to
administer and enforce," it has promoted inconsistency in its application, and
has allowed "somewhat related" activities to go untaxed.329 Mr. Swain,
appearing before the Subcommittee On Oversight, pointed to Hi-Plains
Hospital v. United States, 30 the 1985 Fifth Circuit decision, as an example
of "[h]air-splitting court cases illustrative of the fact that 'substantially
321. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1305(a), 90 Stat. 1716
(adding IRC § 513(d)).
322. See Pub. L. No. 95-502, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 1702 (adding IRC § 513(f)).
323. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1601(a), 100 Stat. 2766
(adding IRC § 513(h)).
324. See supra note 106.
325. See IRC § 513(c).
326. See supra note 107; see also IRC § 514.
327. See IRC § 512(b)(13).
328. See IRC § 512(b)(3).
329. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 104 (testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
330. 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982).
[Vol 3:7
Unfair Business Competition
related' requires subjective decisionmaking,"33' and, since Hi-Plains
Hospital was one of several decisions holding for the taxpayer on the issue,
presumably illustrative of the fact that some courts are willing to apply the
standard loosely in favor of the charitable organization.3 2
In his testimony before the Subcommittee, the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service, Laurence Gibbs, offered further illustration of the
difficulty in enforcing the "substantially related" standard due to its facts-and-
circumstance nature by comparing one IRS ruling holding the sale of a Teddy
bear to be a substantially related activity "where it was identified as a model
of the stuffed toy named after Theodore Roosevelt, and because it introduced
children to American history and President Roosevelt," '333 with another
ruling in which
the sale of blazer buttons adapted from a medal commemo-
rating George Washington's First Inauguration was held to
be an unrelated activity because of the utilitarian purpose of
the buttons ... [but] if the blazer buttons were sold with
descriptive literature explaining their connection with the
original medal, the sales might then be considered related
activity. 3
The two rulings can better serve to illustrate just how minuscule the focus of
the IRS had become in its efforts to enforce a statute adopted in reaction to
fear that major ventures owned by tax-exempt organizations were threatening
to drive all their taxable competition out of business. 35
Unfortunately, subjective decisionmaking appears to be endemic to
the application of a legal standard, such as "substantially related", to facts and
circumstances. The Treasury Department for its part has attempted to offer
guidance as to the meaning of "substantially related" by including numerous
examples in the 1967 regulations illustrating when and when not, in its view,
an activity contributes importantly to the accomplishment of the organiza-
331. UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 104 (testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration) (footnote omitted).
332. See id. (noting the decision in Hi-Plains HospitaO; see also UBIT Hearings,
supra note 78, at 38 (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax
Policy), U.S. Department of the Treasury) ("IThere are indications [that the standard] has been
applied in an overly generous manner.").
333. Id. at 67-68 (testimony of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
334. Id. at 68.
335. See also Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264 (holding that sales in a museum
shop of souvenirs related to the city in which the museum is located constitute an unrelated
activity).
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tion's exempt purpose.336 Any inference that the courts have interpreted the
"substantially related" test liberally in favor of exempt organizations is
controverted by the government's victories with respect to this issue in the
Supreme Court,337 in the Fourth,33 Fifth,339 Seventh (twice)," ° Elev-
enth,34' Federal3 2 and District of Columbia Circuits, ' 3 several times in
the Claims Court,' and numerous times in the Tax CourtY5
B. Compliance and Beyond
Apart from their differences with respect to the appropriateness of the
"substantially related" standard as an expression of tax policy or as a guide
to enforcement of that policy, all witnesses before the Subcommittee agreed
that what was needed was more detailed reporting requirements by tax-
exempt organizations in order to improve data collection, compliance, and
336. See supra text accompanying notes 198-215.
337. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
338. See Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 699 F.2d
167 (4th Cir. 1983).
339. See Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir.
1982).
340. See Illinois Ass'n of Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 987
(7th Cir, 1986); Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980).
341. See Independent Ins. Agents of Huntsville, Inc. v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 898
( lIth Cir. 1993).
342. See National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 944 F.2d 859 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
343. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States, 925 F.2d 480 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
344. See National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310
(1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 859 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650
F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology v. United States, 500
F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
345. See National Water Well Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75 (1989); Veterans
of Foreign Wars, Dept. of Mich. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7 (1987); Shiloh Youth Revival
Ctrs. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 565 (1987); Florida Trucking Ass'n v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1039 (1986); St. Joseph Farms v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 9 (1985), nonacq., 1986-2 C.B. 1;
Professional Ins. Agents v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 246 (1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.
1984). Subsequent to the conclusion of the UBIT Hearings, on June 23, 1988, the Chairman
of the Subcommittee On Oversight, J.J. Pickle, released a draft report to the other members
of the Subcommittee containing proposals for legislative reforms, including taxing mail order,
gift shop and book store sales, fitness and exercise activities, travel services, veterinary
services, and advertising sales under a per se rule; repealing the "convenience exception"
provided by § 513(a)(2); and reducing the 80% "controlled subsidiary" test to a "more than
50%" test. See Haley, note 293, supra, at 82-3.
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enforcement.' Commissioner Gibbs testified that of the approximately
900,000 exempt organizations on the Master File, about 500,000 were not
required to file Form 990, the Annual Information Return, either because they
were churches or received $25,000 or less in gross receipts, and of the
remaining 400,000, only 27,000 on average filed Form 990-T, which requires
reporting of unrelated business gross receipts in excess of $1,000.11 7
Unquestionably, present resources of federal administrative agencies
are inadequate to supervise the efficient delivery of social benefits by
501(c)(3) organizations, and the inadequacy will markedly increase if the
elective credit described in Appendix A to the article is enacted into law. At
the same time, commentators have observed that the Internal Revenue
Service, an agency devoted primarily to raising revenue and not "to make
certain that revenue dollars foregone are wisely spent,"'  is ill-suited to
supervise the spectrum of nonprofit organizations concerned with such diverse
issues as higher education, health care, research and public policy, wildlife
and the environment, housing and employment, youth and the family, disaster
relief, and arts, culture, and humanities.
In 1967 Professor Lawrence Stone offered the suggestion that a
separate division be created within the Treasury Department to supervise
exempt organizations, perhaps emulating in legal structure and function the
Securities and Exchange Commission, chaired by a new Commissioner of
Charities, a presidential appointee.3 9 In addition to being required to file
an annual report, each exempt organization would be required to register with
the Commission and to re-register every three to five years to assure periodic
review.3'0 The Commission would have "equity powers, including the
power, with court approval, to remove derelict trustees, add trustees, force the
merger of charities whose original purposes have ceased to exist into active
charities, and require the restoration to charity of property improperly taken
346. See UBIT Hearings, supra note 78, at 24, 27-28, 39 (statement of 0.
Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), U.S. Department of the
Treasury); id. at 69 (testimony of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). The
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, admitted that there was
insufficient data to prove anything. See id. at 127 (containing statements of Frank S. Swain,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
347. See id. at 70 (containing statements of Lawrence B. Gibbs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue). See also DeGaudenzi, supra note 121, at 214-31 (discussing more recent
proposals to improve disclosure and to impose sanctions as a means to increase compliance
among public charities).
348. Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 347.
349. Stone, supra note 24, at 63-67.
350. Id. at 64.
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from it."'35' Professor Stone's suggestion made sense in 1967. It makes even
more sense today.
Professor Stone went on to suggest that the Commissioner of
Charities have the power to "delegate regulatory authority to states or to
private self-regulatory associations," '352 the latter "operating with quasi-
governmental powers and subject to some supervision by government. '
In the wake of the challenge from the small business community to tax
exemption afforded to related activities of 501 (c)(3) organizations, and public
perception of operational weaknesses within the charitable sector, private self-
regulatory associations of the various subgroups of charitable nonprofits are
virtually an imperative.
Such self-regulatory associations could formulate codes of behavior
for their members; devise planning strategies, such as to avoid overcapacity
or undercapacity within a subsector; issue policy directives, such as to
determine what percent of gifts and contributions should be allocated to the
current budget rather than to the endowment fund; and construct general
operational guidelines. They could periodically review a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion member to assess its success in fulfilling its social mission; its compli-
ance with the prohibition against private inurement and compensation
unreasonable in amount; its degree of inefficiency, waste, and excessive
budgeting for fund-raising and marketing for consumers; its maintenance of
an arms-length relationship with its feeders and unrelated businesses; its
avoidance of abusing the "convenience" exception to the tax on unrelated
activities; and its thoroughness in reporting unrelated activities. They could
investigate allegations of misconduct or lack of compliance. In the event the
elective credit outlined in Appendix A is enacted into law, such self-
regulatory associations could enforce compliance with its various conditions,
such as the competitiveness of the rates charged by a 501 (c)(3) organization's
feeders and unrelated businesses, the computation of the related activity net
operating loss limitation, and the computation of the percentage limitations
with respect to total gross receipts and the investment portfolio.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1950 Congress enacted legislation to tax the income generated by
feeders and unrelated businesses destined for charity primarily to protect
private enterprise from the threat of unfair competition. Assuming arguendo
the validity of the rationale supporting the 1950 legislation, the statutory
351. Id. at 65.
352. Id. at 66
353. Id. at 67.
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solution to retain tax exemption for related businesses and to tax only feeders
and unrelated businesses was a commendable attempt to balance the interests
of private enterprise and of the nonprofit sector. Retention of tax exemption
for activities substantially related to the furtherance of the 501(c)(3)
organization's stated purposes was also an appropriate expression of a policy
to preserve the unique social mission of such organizations in the pursuit of
their charitable endeavors. Notwithstanding administrative and judicial
difficulties in accurately defining the statutory phrase "trade or business" and
in applying appropriate criteria to differentiate related and unrelated activities,
the "substantially related" test, properly applied, is an administrable standard.
With the accuracy of vision that hindsight affords it is clear that the
1950 Congress, while attempting to balance the interests of private enterprise
and of the nonprofit sector, failed to appreciate the inadequacy of mere tax
exemption as a means to meet the pressing and legitimate need of charitable
organizations for revenue. This Congressional failure in perception may not
have been simply a case of nearsightedness. The federal government
apparently does not view the fiscal soundness of the private, nonprofit
charitable sector to be within the ambit of its legitimate concerns. Yet, federal
government action has directly and indirectly played a key role in shaping the
financial destiny of the charitable sector in the ensuing years. Decreases in
federal research grants and health care reimbursements have profoundly
impacted the fiscal well-being of universities and nonprofit hospitals.
Charitable contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations as a percent of total
support have diminished, perhaps in part due to changes in the tax laws
affecting the economic result of contributions to donors. As revenue sources
have decreased, compliance with a burgeoning quantity of federal legislation
and regulations has caused expenses to mount.
Navigating in a society that espouses laissez faire, but in fact
profoundly affected by the actions of the federal government, the charitable
sector has attempted to make ends meet by playing in the "free market"
competition game without a compass or a map. In some instances the
competition to squeeze revenue out of a shrinking pool of available consumer
dollars and contribution funds has led 501(c)(3) organizations to overburden
their operating budgets with undue allocations to marketing and fundraising.
In other cases the pressure for revenue has led charitable nonprofits to push
the "convenience exception" to unrelated business activity beyond its intended
limits. At the same time, for-profit enterprises have added to the competitive
pressure by finding certain traditionally nonprofit activities to be profitable,
at least for the moment.
As a result, forty-six years after the effective date of the 1950
legislation, it is the private, nonprofit charitable sector that now threatens to
move to the top of the list of endangered species. It is the position of this
article that the species is worth saving as representing an essential ingredient
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in the mix of American pluralistic society. Clearly, a plan to secure an
adequate and reliable source of revenue to fund the charitable activities of
501(c)(3) organizations will require a collaborative effort on the part of the
organizations and the federal government; one that, hopefully, respects the
charitable sector's needs for financial and political independence. This article
suggests that the charitable sector's need to replace diminished revenue from
traditional sources may, to some measure, be achieved through enactment of
the elective credit outlined in Appendix A. The elective credit offers the
advantage of a revenue source that is at least within the control of the
501(c)(3) organization's wholly-owned business benefactors without
compromising the ability of for-profit enterprises to compete fairly with those
benefactors.
Finally, the article maintains that the creation of private self-
regulatory associations of the various subgroups of charitable nonprofits is
virtually an imperative. Such self-regulatory associations, working in tandem
with a new Commission of Charities, could go a long way toward promoting
the efficient delivery of social benefits by 501(c)(3) organizations, enforcing
their accountability to the public, increasing understanding of the unique role
played by charitable nonprofits in American society, and thereby restoring
public confidence in the tax system as it applies to the charitable sector.
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APPENDIX A
1. Subject to the limitations described below, a feeder or unrelated
business wholly owned by a 501(c)(3) organization (other than a
private foundation as defined in section 509) shall be allowed an
elective credit against its income tax for the taxable year an amount
equal to distributions made or deemed made during such taxable year
to its 501(c)(3) owner on the basis of $1 credit for (for purposes of
illustration) $1.35 of distributions.
Example 1: Assume that taxable income equals pre-tax cash
profit and that the income tax rate is a flat 35%. Feeder, Inc.,
wholly-owned by University, earns $1 Ox taxable income for
the taxable year on which there is a $35x tax before applica-
tion of the elective credit. Feeder, Inc. distributes $47.25x to
University during the taxable year ($35x tax times 1.35) and
elects to claim a $35x credit against its $35x tax liability.
Thus, Feeder, Inc. may elect to reduce its income tax liability
to zero on condition that it distributes the sum of a tax
equivalent amount ($35x) plus an additional amount, in this
case $12.25x (12.25% of taxable income), to University.
Rationale: The assumption is that Feeder, Inc.'s for-profit competitor
earning $100x taxable income and paying $35x tax will be expected
to distribute 12.25% of taxable income to its shareholders as an
adequate return on investment. The goal is to leave the feeder with
the same "after tax/distributions to owners" dollars as its for-profit
competition ($100x taxable income minus [$35x plus $12.25x] equals
$52.75x remaining for each).
2. As a condition to electing the credit, the feeder or unrelated business
shall be required to establish the competitiveness of the prices it
charges for the sale of its goods or services. Compliance with "safe
harbor" guidelines shall be deemed compliance with this condition,
e.g., the five-year average of the taxpayer's gross profit margin (or
return on equity capital) within an acceptable deviation does not
exceed, or is not less than, the industry standard for gross profit
margin (or return on equity capital).
Rationale: Absent this condition, Feeder, Inc. in Example 1 could
lower its prices by, e.g. 20%, in which case Feeder, Inc.'s taxable
income would be $80x on which there would be a $28x tax before
the elective credit. Feeder, Inc. could elect to reduce the tax to zero
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by distributing $37.8x to University. Although Feeder, Inc.'s "after
tax/distritutions to owners" dollars would be $42.2x ($80x taxable
income minus $37.8x distributions) compared to its for-profit
competitors $52.75x ($100x taxable income minus the sum of $35x
tax and $12.25x distributions to its shareholders), University's return
on investment ($37.8x) would still be 3.086 times more than that
received by the shareholders of the for-profit competitor pre-tax
($12.25x).
3. The elective credit allowable on a combined basis to a 501(c)(3)
owner's feeders and unrelated businesses shall not exceed an amount
equal to the net operating loss incurred by the 501(c)(3) owner for
the same taxable year in the conduct of all of its related activities
divided by 1.35 (corresponding to a $1 credit for a $1.35 of distribu-
tions). The amount of the elective credit allowable under this
limitation allocable to a particular feeder or unrelated business is
hereinafter referred to as Limitation A. For this purpose, net
operating loss is determined by:
a. Adding the sum of the following items received by the
501(c)(3) owner during the taxable year: (a) net investment
income other than from feeders and unrelated businesses; (b)
gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees, excluding
any of such items restricted by the donor to a special
purpose, to the endowment fund, or to a capital campaign;
(c) gross income from the conduct of all related activities;
and
b. Subtracting from the total of the items in 1, above, the total
of the following items paid out by the 501(c)(3) owner
during the taxable year: (a) expenses allocable to all related
activities, and (b) capital expenditures for the acquisition of
assets substantially used to further related activities for which
there are no other specially allocated purchase funds.
Example 2: Same as Example 1. Feeder, Inc. is the only
feeder or unrelated business owned by University. University
incurs a $47.25x net operating loss for the taxable year. The
amount of Limitation A is $35x ($47.25x divided by 1.35).
Feeder, Inc. may elect to take a credit against $35x tax by
having distributed $47.25x to University.
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Example 3: Same as Example 2, except that University incurs
a $40.5x net operating loss for the taxable year. The amount
of Limitation A is $30x ($40.5x divided by 1.35). The
maximum credit allowable to Feeder, Inc. is $30x.
Rationale: The purpose of Limitation A is to assure that the equaliz-
ing distributions of amounts equal to tax and return on investment are
used by the 501(c)(3) owner to fund its related activities rather than
(i) reinvested back into the feeder or unrelated business as a capital
contribution, loan, or collateral for a loan; (ii) used to augment the
501(c)(3) owner's investment portfolio; or (iii) used to amortize debt
incurred to acquire or improve assets used in activities unrelated to
its charitable purposes.
4. The elective credit otherwise allowable to each of the 501(c)(3)
owner's feeders and unrelated businesses before application of any
limitation hereunder shall be reduced by four percentage points for
each percentage point (or fraction thereof) the Limitation B percent
exceeds 25%. For this purpose the Limitation B percent is
Basis to 501(c)(3) owner, or fair market
value at time of gift, of investments in
feeders and assets used in unrelated
businesses X 100
basis to 501(c)(3) owner, or fair market
value at time of gift, of all assets
(other than assets substantially used
in connection with related activities)
The values of the numerator and the denominator of the fraction shall
be determined at the beginning of the taxable year.
Example 4: Same as Example 3. University's bases for all of
its assets at the beginning of the taxable year (not including
assets substantially used in connection with related business-
es) is $900x of which $225x is allocable to feeders and
unrelated businesses. The Limitation B percent equals $225x
divided by $900x, or 25%. Since no more than 25% of
University's total investment assets consist of investments in
feeders and unrelated businesses, the elective credit is not
limited by Limitation B. The maximum credit allowable to
Feeder, Inc. is $30x under Limitation A.
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Example 5: Same as Example 3. University's bases for all of
its assets (not including assets substantially used in connec-
tion with related businesses) is $900x of which $270x is
allocable to feeders and unrelated businesses. The Limitation
B percent equals $270x divided by $900x, or 30%. Since the
Limitation B percent exceeds 25% by 5 percentage points,
the elective credit otherwise allowable to Feeder, Inc. is
reduced by 20 percentage points to 80%. 80% times $35x
credit otherwise allowable before application of any limita-
tion equals $28x. The maximum credit allowable to feeder,
Inc. under Limitation B is $28x.
Example 6: Same as Example 5, except that one half of
University's investment assets are allocable to feeders and
unrelated busineses. The Limitation B percent is 50%. Since
the Limitation B percent exceeds 25% by 25 percentage
points, the elective credit otherwise allowable to Feeder, Inc.,
is reduced by 100 percentage points to zero. The maximum
credit allowable to Feeder, Inc. under Limitation B is zero.
Rationale: The purpose of Limitation B is (a) to discourage the
501(c)(3) owner from subjecting more than 25% of its total invest-
ment portfolio to the risks inherent in wholly-owned business
ventures, and (b) to cap the potential loss of tax revenue to the
federal government.
5. The elective credit otherwise allowable to each of the 501(c)(3)
owner's feeders and unrelated businesses before application of any
limitation hereunder shall be reduced by 4 percentage points for each
percentage point (or fraction thereof) the Limitation C percent
exceeds 25%. For this purpose the Limitation C percent is
Gross receipts received by the 501(c)(3)
owner during the taxable year from
feeders and unrelated businesses X 100
Gross receipts received by the 501(c)(3)
owner during the taxable year from all
sources
For this purpose, gross receipts received from unrelated businesses
means distributions received from unrelated businesses to be used by
the 501(c)(3) owner in the conduct of its charitable activities.
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Example 7: Same as Example 5. University's gross receipts
received during the taxable year from all sources is S 89x of
which $47.25x is received from Feeder. Inc. The Limitation
C percent is $47.25x divided by $189x, or 25%. Since no
more than 25% of University's gross receipts received during
the taxable year is derived from feeders and unrelated
businesses, the elective credit is not limited by Limitation C.
The maximum credit allowable to Feeder, Inc. under Limita-
tion B is $28x.
Example 8: Same as Example 5. University's gross receipts
received during the taxable year from all sources is $135x of
which $47.25x is received from Feeder, Inc. The Limitation
C percent is $47.25x divided by $135x, or 35%. Since the
Limitation C percent exceeds 25% by 10 percentage points,
the elective credit otherwise allowable to Feeder, Inc. is
reduced by 40 percentage points to 60%. 60% times $35x
credit otherwise allowable before application of any limita-
tion equals $21x. The maximum credit allowable to Feeder,
Inc. under Limitation C is $21x.
Rationale: The purpose of Limitation C is to restrict the ability of the
501(c)(3) owner to use equalizing distributions of amounts equal to
tax and return on investment distributed from feeders or unrelated
businesses to fund related activities where the organization does not
receive at least 75% of its financial support during the taxable year
from (i) gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees; (ii)
investments, other than feeders and unrelated businesses; and (iii)
related businesses. Otherwise, the danger exists that any given
501(c)(3) organization could use tax equivalent dollars and equalizing
distributions of return on investment to fund activities unresponsive
to social needs as reflected by the excessive ratio of gross receipts
received from feeders and unrelated businesses to financial support
received from the public.
6. As a condition to electing the credit, officers, directors, and employ-
ees of the 501(c)(3) owner shall be prohibited from receiving
compensation from a feeder or unrelated business.
Rationale: The purpose is to discourage the 501(c)(3) owner from
diverting energy and attention away from its charitable purposes.
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